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THE IMMOVABLE OBJECT V ERSUS THE
IRRESISTIBLE FORCE: RETIDNKING
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SECURED CREDIT AND
BANKRUPTCY POLICY
Lawrence Ponoroff*
and F. Stephen Knippenberg**
And then, with the coming of the night the north wind was again
loosed, while the rain still beat against the windows and pattered down
from the low Dutch eaves.
When it was light enough Johnsy, the merciless, commanded that
the shade be raised.
The ivy leaf was still there.

- 0. Henry1
INT RODUCTION

The last leaf in 0. Henry's classic short story was hanging by a
delicate thread, but it never fell. It never fell, of course, because it
wasn't real; Old Behrman had painted it (and caught pneumonia
for his trouble) in order to give Johnsy the will to live. The
Supreme Court's decision in Dewsnup v. Timm2 is also hanging by a
thread, following a barrage of scholarly criticism and more than
four years of limiting case law and legislative incursions on the
case's core conceptual rationale. But the holding in Dewsnup,
unlike the last leaf, is very real. It has had, and continues to have, a
deleterious effect on the ability of many individual debtors to
obtain meaningful relief and a truly "fresh start" in bankruptcy.
* Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School. J.D. 1978, Standford. - Ed.
** Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma Law Center. J.D. 1980, University of

Tulsa; LL.M 1987, Temple. - Ed. We would like to thank Professor Margaret Howard for
her thoughtful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. Professor How
ard has been the most vocal and certainly the most articulate critic of the Supreme Court's
decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). Therefore, while we do not by any means
intend to imply her concurrence with either the approach taken or all of the ideas expressed
by us in this article, her input was particularly welcome and appropriate.
1. 0. HENRY,
(1994).
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This article urges Congress, as it considers the recommendations
of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission,3 to sever the last
thread and consign the Supreme Court's 1992 decision to its rightful
role as a historical anomaly. In taking this action, Congress could
clarify once and for all the nature and status of security and secured
claims in bankruptcy.4 The advantages to be attained from doing so
are considerable, not the least of which includes establishing the
contours of the fresh start for individual debtors in chapter 7 in a
manner that raises fresh-start policy to a level of dignity commensu
rate with the policy of efficient debt collection.5
The treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy, and, in particu
lar, partially secured claims, has been a controversial subject6 since
3. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103·394, tit. VI,
§§ 601-610, 108 Stat. 4147 (1994), established the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
to "investigate and study issues and problems relating to title 11 [of the] United States
Code." National Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, tit. VI,§ 603(1),
108 Stat. 4147, 4147-48 (1994). The Commission is also directed to prepare and submit a
report not later than two years after the date of its first meeting containing a detailed state
ment of its findings and conclusions, and to make recommendations to Congress, the Chief
Justice, and the President for appropriate legislative or administrative action. See National
Bankruptcy Review Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 103-394, tit. VI, §§ 603(3), 608, 108 Stat.
4147, 4147, 4149 (1994). The Commission, whose final report is due in October, 1997, has
recommended that debtors in chapter 13 cases be permitted to strip down undersecured sec
ond mortgage residential loans, but has taken no action to repeal Dewsnup. See Bankruptcy
Review Commn., Summary of Consumer Bankruptcy Framework Proposals #11-12 (June 10,
1997 draft) (forthcoming October, 1997, on file with authors). The National Bankruptcy
Review Commission Act is part of the larger Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11U.S.C., 12U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C., which we will refer to in the remainder of this article as the "1994
Amendments." The current law of bankruptcy is found in title 11 of theUnited States Code.
See 11U.S.C.§§ 101-1330 (1994). Its foundation is the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (effective Oct. l, 1979) (codified as amended at 11U.S.C.§§ 1011330 (1994)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, as amended, is commonly referred to as
the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code," a convention that is followed in this work, such that
references to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code" are to title 11 of theUnited States Code
as amended through October 22, 1994, the effective date of the 1994 Amendments. See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 702, 108 Stat. 4106, 4150 (establish
ing the effective date of the 1994 Amendments).
4. Defining the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy has proved to be an ongoing
challenge for bankruptcy theorists. See generally Margaret Howard, Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy: An Essay on Missing the Point, 23 CAP.U. L. REV. 313, 313 (1994) (noting that
despite the passage of 16 years, we are still "groping for answers to a basic question that
should have been laid to rest long ago - what, exactly, are the rights of secured creditors in
bankruptcy?"); Mary Josephine Newborn, Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup,
Nobelman, and the Decline of Priority, 25 Aruz. ST. L.J. 547, 573-81 (1993) (comparing the
treatment of secured claims under the former Bankruptcy Act and the Code).
5. Parting company with early Anglo-American law, which regarded bankruptcy solely as
a creditors' collection remedy, the Code identified collective distribution as only one of its
two major functions, the other being to ensure a generous fresh start for the bankrupt debtor.
See Charles G. Hallinan, The 'Fresh Start' Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical
Inventory and an Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 85-86 (1986) (describing the
Code's assurance of a fresh start).
6. See generally David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of
Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 63 (1991) [hereinafter Carlson, Eely Character];
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the enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1979.7 For exam
ple, a fundamental tension has always existed between the state-law
rules - which facilitate a single creditor's ability to fence off all of
the debtor's existing and after-acquired property - and bank
ruptcy's fresh-start and rehabilitative policies.s Nevertheless, the
combination of contemporary scholarship examining the purposes
of secured credit9 and nearly ten years of case law devoted to work
ing through the Code's approach to secured and unsecured claims10
demonstrate that Dewsnup was more than just another manifesta
tion of that traditional tension. As we argue in this article, Dew
snup was not only a historical anomaly in terms of the Supreme
Court's established methodology in its approach to bankruptcy

Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 506(a) and
llll(b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuations of Collateral, 6 BANKR. DEVS. J. 253 (1989);
[hereinafter Carlson, Undersecured Claims]; Theodore Eisenberg, The Undersecured Creditor
in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security, 38 V AND. L. REv. 931 {1985). The question
David Gray Carlson,

that lies at the bottom of the controversy about treatment of partially secured claims in bank
ruptcy may be stated as follows: What rights, if any, beyond those of a general unsecured
creditor, does a partially secured creditor enjoy with respect to the judicially established
unsecured portion of its claim {that portion in excess of the judicially determined value of the
collateral securing the claim)? Resolution of that issue implicates certain unresolved ten
sions between the state-law rules and policies governing asset-based financing, on the one
hand, and the fresh start and rehabilitative policies that animate, respectively, the consumer
and business provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code, on the other.
7. As discussed supra note 3, the foundation of the current law of bankruptcy is the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 {effective Oct. 1, 1979)
{codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 {1994)).

8. See infra text accompanying notes 107-23. See generally Steve H. Nickles, Consider
Process Before Substance, Commercial Law Consequences ofthe Bankruptcy System: Urging
the Merger of the Article 9 Drafting Committee and the Bankruptcy Commission, 69 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 589 (1995) {discussing the inherent tension between bankruptcy policy and state
commercial law).
9. While there is a long history to academic attempts at normative justification of secured
financing, going back in the legal literature to Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman,
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, SS YALE L.J. 1143 (1979), the most recent
collection of work on the subject is the Virginia Law Review's Symposium, Revision ofArticle
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783 {1994). See infra Part III.
10. The first major crucible in this respect was the Supreme Court's decision holding that
undersecured creditors are not, as part of the adequate protection of their interests, entitled
to postpetition interest. See United Sav. Assn. v. Tnnbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re
Tnnbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 484 U.S. 365 {1988); David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of
Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 10 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 7-9 {1996); infra note 136.
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cases,11 but also an untenable exception in the ever-more-clearly
emerging course of bankruptcy jurisprudence under the Code.12
11. With the exception of its decision in Dewsnup, and to a lesser extent its recent deci
sion in Field v. Mans, 116 S. Ct. 437 (1995) (concerning the reliance element of 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(2)(A) (1994)), the Rehnquist Court has followed a strict statutory-construction
approach in deciding bankruptcy issues. Several good articles exist exploring the Supreme
Court's contemporary bankruptcy jurisprudence. See, e.g., Carlos J. Cuevas, The Rehnquist
Court, Strict Statutory Construction and the Bankruptcy Code, 42 Cr.Ev. ST. L. REv. 435
(1994); Walter A. Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving "Plain
Meaning" Approach to Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. REv. 1636 (1993);
Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code, 10
BANKR. DEV. J. 289 (1994); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens:
A Study ofthe Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 {1996); Robert K.
Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 {1993); Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless,

Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 823 (1991); see also Adam J. Wiensch, Note, The Supreme
Court, Textualism, and the Treatment ofPre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 19 GEO. L.J. 1831 {1991)

(arguing that the Court's consistent textualist approach to bankruptcy law under the Code is
best explained as a product of the comprehensiveness of the Code as compared with earlier
bankruptcy law, the importance of commercial certainty, and the Court's general hostility
toward the equitable powers of bankruptcy courts).
12. The, Supreme Court in Dewsnup narrowly limited the precedential value of its holding
to the facts of the case, including, specifically, the fact that the matter involved a liquidation
proceeding under chapter 7. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416-17. After a period of some
uncertainty, there is now a growing consensus accepting the logic of the position that Dew
snup has no applicability in reorganization proceedings under chapter 11 or 13. See Wade v.
Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126 {10th Cir. 1994) (asserting that Dewsnup could not be imported into
chapter 11 without eviscerating other key provisions and the principles of the reorganization
chapter). Compare Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 144 B.R. 105, 113-15 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1992) (prohibiting avoidance of undersecured tax lien in a chapter 11 case), revd. on other
grounds, Nos. CV 92-6665 MRP, CV 93-1800 MRP, 1993 WL 558844 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 1993),
modified, 68 F.3d 306 (9th Cir. 1995), affd. on rehg., 96 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996), petition for
cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1996) (No. 96-881) with Dever v. IRS (In re
Dever), 164 B.R. 132, 137-39 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (arguing that Dewsnup makes no sense
in the reorganization context). While residential lenders are given special protection against
bifurcation of their claims by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994), lien stripping is also
permissible in chapter 13 cases. See, e.g., Bank One, Chicago, N.A. v. Flowers, 183 B.R. 509
{N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that Dewsnup does not extend to chapter 13 cases). In Nobe/man v.
American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993), the Supreme Court prohibited strip down of a
mortgage on the debtor's principal residence, but its holding was based solely on
§ 1322(b)(2), implicitly suggesting that strip down is otherwise permitted in chapter 13. Sev
eral decisions since Nobe/man have made the implication explicit. See, e.g., Howard v.
National Westminster Bank (In re Howard), 184 B.R. 644 {Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (allowing
strip down of a wholly unsecured judicial lien against the debtor's residence in a chapter 7
case, and concluding that Dewsnup did not apply because the lien was nonconsensual and
therefore the parties had never bargained to secure the debt with a lien on the property). In
In re Barrett, 188 B.R. 285 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995), the court, in permitting bifurcation of the
creditor's claim into secured and unsecured portions, acknowledged that Nobe/man's prohi
bition against strip down rested solely on the special rule in§ 1322(b)(2) for creditors secured
only by property that was the debtor's personal residence. Moreover, § 1322(c)(2), which
was enacted as part of the 1994 Amendments, overrules Nobe/man to the extent the mort
gage falls due during the life of the plan. See In re Young, 199 B.R. 643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1996); see also Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574 {8th Cir. 1996) {holding that neither
Dewsnup nor Nobe/man operate to limit interpretation of the term "allowed secured claim"
in§ 1225(a)(5) to the lesser of the amount of the debt or the value of the collateral). Fmally,
some courts have taken the view that Nobe/man does not prohibit "strip off' of a claim
served by a mortgage that is entirely, as opposed to only partially, unsecured. Compare In re
Geyer, 203 B.R. 726, 728-29 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) {holding that wholly unsecured lien may
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We begin in Part I by examining the Dewsnup holding in the
context of contemporaneous legislative and judicial developments
relating to the treatment of undersecured claims in bankruptcy. In
Part II, we evaluate, and find unconvincing, the most recent apolo
gia for the outcome in Dewsnup. We conclude from this that
Dewsnup must to a considerable degree be understood as the prod
uct of certain imaginative conceptions about the nature of secured
credit. This leads us in Part III to review the most recent positions
advanced in the now nearly twenty-year-old debate over the effi
ciency of secured financing. Our examination reveals that scholars,
whether writing from an economics-driven perspective on the law
or not, are increasingly reaching the conclusion that secured credit
as an institution, and its derivative rule of full priority for secured
claims upon insolvency, does not in fact promote systemic effi
ciency. Nevertheless, the law in this area continues to be guided by
the precepts of freedom of contract and free alienability of property
rights.13 It is that normative justification for secured credit - pre
mised on the same principles of party autonomy that form the phil
osophical underpinnings of both contract and property law - that
presents the most serious challenge for the position we advance in
this paper.
In Part IV, therefore, we examine this "conveyance model" of
the security interest in the bankruptcy setting and find that it fails to
account adequately for certain unique but fundamental bankruptcy
policies, including, in consumer cases, the fresh-start policy. This
leads us to the conclusion that, notwithstanding the utility of a
property-based understanding of security interests in a variety of
other contexts, what is called for in the bankruptcy context is an
alternative to the conceptualization of the secured claim as "prop
erty." Part V examines recent work in the cognitive sciences on
which such an alternative conceptualization might be built. That
work has revealed that abstract concepts, such as legal concepts, are
understood metaphorically. The principal insight of that learning,
that concepts are not direct reflections of some external reality
independent of the reasoner, has important ramifications for legal
analysis and legal reform. The significance of that insight is
nowhere better demonstrated than in the context of the topic at
be "stripped off'') with Barnes v. American Gen. Fin. (In re Barnes), 207 B.R. 588, 592-93
(Banlcr. N.D. Ill. 1997) (ruling that "strip off'' is precluded under § 1322(b)(2) and

Nobe/man).
13. See generally Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory
ofSecurity Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, BOVA. L. REV. 2021, 2047-53 (1994).
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hand, the way in which we have come to conceptualize secured
credit.
Finally, having unpacked the metaphors by which our thinking
about security has been both advanced and constrained, in Part VI
we critique the metaphor that implicitly dictated the result in
Dewsnup. We then offer, and consider the practical applications of,
an alternative characterization of security interests in bankruptcy
that conceptualizes the security interest as a claim to property,
rather than as an indefeasible right in the property itself.
!.

AVOIDANCE

OF UNDERSECURED CLAIMS

IN BANKRUPTCY

Consider as a starting point for discussion a chapter 7 debtor
with a homestead exemption of $15,000 and a residence valued at
$120,000. Assume this property is subject to, in order of priority, a
$100,000 nonavoidable first mortgage, a $15,000 judicial lien, and a
$20,000 nonavoidable second mortgage. Section 522(f)(l)(A) of
the Bankruptcy Code authorizes the debtor to avoid the fixing of
the lien on the debtor's property to the extent that such lien impairs
an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise have been enti
tled.14 Section 522(f)(2)(A), added to the Code by the 1994
Amendments, now defines impairment15 to make it clear that the
entire judicial lien impairs the exemption and, therefore, may be set
aside in toto.16 By focusing on the dollar amount of liens against
14. See, e.g., Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305
(1991).
15. Section 303 of the 1994 Amendments adopts a simple mathematical calculation for
determining the extent to which a lien impairs an exemption. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 303, 108 Stat. 4106, 4132 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(f)(2) (1994)). Specifically, a lien is deemed to impair to the extent that the sum of (i)
the lien, (ii) all other liens against the property, and (iii) the amount of the exemption that
the debtor could claim if there were no liens against the property, exceeds the value that the
debtor's interest in the property would have in the absence of any liens - i.e., the fair market
value of the debtor's interest. Under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(B) (1994), in the case of property
subject to more than one lien, a lien previously avoided is to be excluded from the calculation
under subparagraph (A). The effect of this formulation is to permit avoidance of the
"unsecured" portion of a judicial lien, regardless of whether the debtor has any equity in the
property over and above the sum of the nonavoidable consensual liens.
16. On the facts of the hypothetical, the calculation would go as follows: (i) $15,000 plus
= $150,000 minus $120,000 = $30,000. Since the lien is less than
the amount of the impairment, it would be avoidable in its entirety. See Jones v. Mellon
Bank, N.A. (In re Jones), 183 B.R. 93 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995) (avoiding entire judicial lien in
the amount of $10,954.29, even though debtor's equity in her personal residence was equal to
exactly the amount of the applicable homestead exemption, $7,500.00); In re Thomsen, 181
B.R. 1013 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1995) (avoiding $60,000 judgment lien where it was stipulated
that property had a value of either less than the first mortgage, or less than the sum of the
first mortgage and the debtor's $10,800 statutory homestead claim). But see In re Seltzer, 185
B.R. 116 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that because, under New York law, a debtor is not
entitled to a homestead exemption unless there is equity in the property, where consensual
liens exceed the value of the property any subsequent judicial liens do not impair an exemp-

(ii) $120,000 plus (iii) 15,000
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the property and the value of the exemption, the new statutory
formula for measuring impairment effectively overrules those cases
that refused to permit avoidance unless there was an execution
pending on the lien at the time the bankruptcy was :filed.17 It also
negates the continuing viability of those decisions holding that
there can be no impairment where state law requires a minimum
bid equal to the amount of the homestead exemption in order for a
forced sale to be valid.ls
Because of the existence of the unavoidable second mortgage,
however, the above scenario presents another interpretational issue
that is not resolved by the text of the 1994 Amendments to the
Code.19 Unless the benefit of the avoidance is preserved for the
debtor, it inures entirely to the junior mortgagee.20 This raises the
tion and, thus, are not voidable under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)). The legislative history to the 1994
Amendments indicates that in adopting the new definition of impairment, Congress essen
tially intended to adopt the formula set forth in In re Brantz, 106 B.R. 62, 68 (Banl<r. E.D. Pa.
1989), in which the court concluded that a debtor could avoid all judicial liens in excess of the
amount produced by subtracting from the fair market value of the property the sum of all
nonavoidable liens and the debtor's allowable exemption. See H.R. REP. No. 103·835, at 52·
54 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3361-63. Codification of the Brantz interpre
tation of§ 522(f) represents a rejection of the pre-1994 Amendment approach, which several
courts of appeals had taken, of avoiding a judicial lien only to the extent that the lien
"impaired" the exemption, as measured by the debtor's equity in the property or the amount
of the exemption, whichever was less. See authorities cited infra note 22. For further elabo
ration of this view and its application, see 2 DAvm G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY§ 8-28,
at 560-67 (1992).
17. See In re Lynch, 187 B.R. 536 (Banl<r. E.D. Ky.) (exposing the fallacy, in light of the
1994 Amendments, in the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Moreland (In
re Moreland), 21 F.3d 102 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that no homestead exemption exists unless
execution sale is pending), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 956 (1995)). For additional discussion of the
operation of the new definition of "impairment," see David Gray Carlson, Security Interests
on Exempt Property After the 1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 4 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 57, 64-69 (1996); Margaret Howard, Avoiding Powers and the 1994 Amend
ments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM BANKR. LJ. 259, 268-77 (1995); Scott Everett, Com
ment, Debtors' Delight? Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994: How Revisions to 11 U.S.C.
.

§ 522(f) Affect Debtors' Ability to Avoid Liens Which Impair Texas Personal Property Exemp·
lions, 26 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1331 (1995).
18. See In re Allard, 196 B.R. 402, 410-11 (Banl<r. N.D. Ill.) (rejecting as irrelevant after
the 1994 Amendments the reasoning of the court in In re Harrison, 164 B.R. 611 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1994), to the effect that because the homestead exemption amount must be paid off
as part of valid forced sale, judicial lien could not impair the exemption), affd. sub nom.
Great S. Co. v. Allard, 202 B.R. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
19. But see infra note 20 (referring to the legislative history that does address this issue
but that, unfortunately, did not find its way into the text of the statute itself).

20. Some courts and commentators resolve the issue by taking the position that the fresh
start objectives of§ 522 are thwarted by an approach that permits junior lienors, rather than
the debtor, to benefit when an exemption-impairing lien is avoided. See Losieniecki v. Thrift
Consumer Discount Co. (In re Losieniecki), 17 B.R. 136, 139-40 (Banl<r. W.D. Pa. 1981); 2
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, § 8-28, at 566 (relying as well on the trustee's power under
§ 549(a) to set aside postpetition transfers); John T. Cross, The Application of Section 522(f)
of the Bankruptcy Code in Cases Involving Multiple Liens, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 309, 333-35
(1989); Margaret Howard, Multiple Judicial Liens in Bankruptcy: Section 522(f)(l)
Simplified, 61 AM BANKR. LJ. 151, 180-84 (1993).
.
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question of whether the junior unavoidable lien simply fills the
vacuum created by the avoidance of the judicial lien or whether the
concept of preservation of avoided liens for the benefit of the estate
under 11 U.S.C. § 551 can be imported into 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) in
order to allow the debtor to rely on section 522(i)(2) to claim an
exemption out of the avoided lien. Permitting the junior lien to
claim the priority formerly occupied by the avoided judicial lien
might be defended as corresponding more or less with the result
under state law.21 Furthermore, there is an arguable theoretical
benefit to the debtor attendant to the avoidance of the judicial lien,
even if the nonavoidable junior lien is not subordinated to the
exemption.22 In the final analysis, however, it is a result that serves
For examples of decisions concluding that the junior consensual liens are not altered by
the elimination of the judicial lien, with the result that they simply move up in priority as a
result of the avoidance, see Simonson v. First Bank (In re Simonson), 758 F.2d 103 (3d Cir.
1985) (refusing to construe§ 522(g) to allow the debtor to improve its position at the expense
of the holder of a nonavoidable lien); Kenpack Converters, Inc. v. Patterson (In re Patterson),
139 B.R. 229, 231 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992). The 1994 amendments, by dictating the manner in
which impairment is measured, overrule cases like Simonson to the extent they stand for the
proposition that unavoidable liens can be cumulated to wipe out any equity, and thereby any
impairment in the first place. Amended§ 522 does not, however, expressly address the pres
ervation and priority issues when an avoidable judicial lien is sandwiched between unavoida
ble liens. Nevertheless, the legislative history of the amendments indicates that they adopt
the dissent's position in Simonson. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 52-54, reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3361-63. Importantly, one of the points made in that dissent was that the
lien in question should not only be avoided, but also preserved, for the debtor's benefit under
§ 522(i)(2).
21. See Patterson, 139 B.R. at 231 Gustifying awarding the value of the avoided lien to the
junior consensual lien on the basis that state-law priority rules ought to be preserved except
where expressly inconsistent with the terms of the Code); In re Shafner, 165 B.R. 660, 662
(Banlcr. D. Colo. 1994) (suggesting that avoidance of a "sandwiched" judicial lien would
impermissibly disturb the "established order of priority of the encumbrances"), affd., 82F.3d
426 (10th Cir. 1996). Actually, under state law this situation presents a sort of circular prior
ity problem - the homestead exemption is "senior" to the judicial lien, and the judicial lien
is senior to the second mortgage, but, because of the operation of law or an explicit subordi
nation or waiver provision in the mortgage, the second mortgage is senior to the exemption.
Therefore, it is not at all clear that allowing the junior unavoidable lien to move up in priority
in fact corresponds, as the court maintained in Patterson, with state law. See infra text accom
panying notes 172-82. Given this uncertainty, as well as the idiosyncrasies of state law, it
seems that a uniform solution, derived from a normative view of the scope of the fresh start,
might make more sense than attempting to decide the issue by abiding the principle of leav
ing state-law priorities undisturbed.
22. By eliminating the judicial lien, the debtor may effectively redeem the property for its
current value, thereby attaining full value of future appreciation and eliminating any hold-up
value the judicial lienor might have extracted as a condition to releasing its lien, should the
debtor wish to alienate the property in a voluntary transaction. Prior to the 1994
Amendments, even this limited benefit would not have been available in jurisdictions that
"carved" the exception out of the lien but otherwise left the balance of the lien intact. See,
e.g., Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir.
1994) (per curiam) (holding that under former § 522(f), the maximum extent to which a
debtor could avoid a judicial lien was defined by the dollar amount of the exemption). In
Holloway v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. (In re Holloway), 81F.3d 1062, 1069-70
(11th Cir. 1996), a case in which the debtors had no equity in their homestead, the court
acknowledged that Wrenn had been overruled by the 1994 Amendments. Nevertheless,
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rather poorly the humanitarian impulses that accounted for the
adoption of the debtor avoiding power in the first instance.23 The
other, and candidly, more logical, alternative would be to permit
the debtor to use 11 U.S.C. section 506(d) in tandem with section
522(f)(l)(A) to set aside the second consensual mortgage in the
bankruptcy proceeding to the extent of that creditor's unsecured
deficiency.24 The problem, of course, is that Dewsnup foils this neat
solution, forcing debtors to resort to far more costly and convoluted
schemes for accomplishing the same result.25
because the case was filed before the effective date of the 1994 Amendments, the court felt
constrained to apply Wrenn and leave the lien intact. This pre-1994 practice of carving the
exemption out of the unsecured portion of the lien but otherwise leaving the lien intact as a
continuing encumbrance against the property, resulted in what Professor Howard aptly
termed an "empty exemption" for the debtor. See Howard, supra note 20, at 166, 174-80
(using as an example of this phenomenon the decision in Kroger v. Beneficial Commercial
Corp. (In re Kroger), 11 B.R. 785 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987)).
23. Section 522(f)'s avoidance power is an important component in the Code's overall
objective in consumer bankruptcy cases of affording a financial fresh start to the debtor. See
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 362 (1977), reprinted in 1918 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6318 {"Subsection
(f) [of§ 522] protects the debtor's exemptions, his discharge, and thus his fresh start by per
mitting him to avoid certain liens on exempt property."). The discharge and the exemption
provisions of the Code are perhaps the two most critical elements of the Code's fresh-start
policy. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their
Assets on the Eve of Bankroptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
235, 239-41 (1995); see also Cross, supra note 20, at 338-39 (explaining that Congress singled
out nonpurchase money security interests and judicial liens because neither type of interest
represents a true "reliance" claim, and because of their tendency to interfere with the fresh
start by undermining the debtor's exemptions).
24. Section 506(a) requires a partially secured creditor to bifurcate its claim into a
secured and unsecured portion based on the value of the collateral. On its face, § 506(d)
then seems to allow for avoidance of the lien to the extent it is unsupported by value. This
makes a great deal of sense, given that the claim represented by that portion of the lien is
being allowed and adjusted as an unsecured claim in the ensuing bankruptcy proceeding.
Application of this approach to the facts of our hypothetical would require avoiding the
$15,000 unsecured portion of the mortgage under§ 506(d) and then avoiding the judicial lien
pursuant to§ 522(f) so that the property is left with $105,000 in encumbrances and the debtor
enjoys the full $15,000 homestead exemption. Avoidance of the judicial lien under § 522(f),
even if the lien is preserved for the benefit of the debtor, still leaves the property subject to
$120,000 in encumbrances if nothing is done about the second mortgage. Thus, this approach
allows the debtor to enjoy the benefit of the homestead exemption not only in the event of
foreclosure but also on immediate transfer. It also preserves for the debtor the benefit of
future appreciation. In a chapter 11 case, the creditor has the ability to defeat that kind of
lien stripping by electing to have its claim treated as fully secured under 11 U.S.C. § llll(b)
{1994), although the debtor-in-possession can dilute the benefits of such an election with a
minimum of effort. See Carlson, Unsecured Claims, supra note 6, at 291-92 (explaining the
orthodox interpretation of the § llll(b) election, but demonstrating how, by extending the
payment period, the economic value of this election nearly always can be defeated by the
debtor-in-possession). In a chapter 7 case, there is no such statutory restraint. See Margaret
Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506{d) and the Theory of Bankruptcy, 65 AM.
BANKR. LJ. 373 (1991) (urging, pre-Dewsnup, that lien stripping under § 506(d) should be
permitted as a fair accommodation of the tension between the bankruptcy fresh-start policy
and the secured creditor's entitlement to the value of its claim in bankruptcy).
25. One of these more "costly and convoluted schemes" is to resort to the device known
as a "chapter 20," a technique involving the rapid-fire filing of a chapter 13 case as soon as
the debtor receives a discharge under chapter 7. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S.
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How did we arrive at this curious state of affairs? As always,
through the most circuitous of routes. Our story begins not at the
beginning but at what we gather (and hope) is nearly the end. Prior
to the 1994 Amendments, several courts, including at least four cir
cuit court of appeals panels,26 had ruled that in order to be subject
to the debtor's avoiding power in 11 U.S.C. section 522(f)(l),27 the
debtor had to have equity in the property over at least the amount
of senior nonavoidable liens.28 Accordingly, if the judicial lien were
completely unsecured (in the bankruptcy sense of the word), it was
nonavoidable because it did not, to use the language of the statute,
impair an exemption to which the debtor would otherwise be enti
tled.29 Thus, on the facts of the hypothetical posed earlier, the
78 {1991) (declining to adopt an absolute bar to the chapter 20 technique); infra text accom
panying notes 246-51; see also Newborn, supra note 4, at 579-81 (explaining that the issue in
Johnson was not lien avoidance, but the effect of discharge on the underlying claim, and that,
therefore, Johnson is not authority for the proposition for which it was cited in Dewsnup,
namely, that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected).
26. See Wrenn v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162 {11th Cir.
1994) (per curiam); Menell v. First Natl. Bank (In re Menell), 37 F.3d 113 {3d Cir. 1994); City
Natl. Bank v. Chabot (In re Chabot), 992 F.2d 891 {9th Cir. 1993); Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co. v. Oppennan (In re Oppennan), 943 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1991). One of the first Code cases
to adopt this approach was Day v. Boteler (In re Boteler), 5 B.R. 408 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1980).
27. As originally enacted,§522(f)(l) of the Code referred solely to the debtor's power to
avoid a judicial lien to the extent that the lien impaired an exemption. See Bankruptcy
Refonn Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 101,§522(f)(l), 92 Stat. 2549, 2589 {codified at
11 U.S.C. §522{f)(l) (1994)). Section 522(f)(2) then conferred a similar power on debtors
with respect to nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interests in certain types of con
sumer collateral, professional tools, and health aids. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 101,§522{f)(2), 92 Stat. 2549, 2589 (codified at 11U.S.C.§522{f)(2)
{1994)). The 1994 Act collapsed both provisions into § 522(f){l), as subparagraphs {A) &
(B), respectively, and carved out, in subparagraph (A), an exception to the power to avoid a
judicial lien where the lien was given to secure a debt to a spouse, former spouse, or child, for
alimony, maintenance, or support. See 11 U.S.C. §522(f)(l) (1994). Section 522(f)(2) now
contains the statutory fonnula for determining the extent to which a lien will be considered
to impair an exemption. See 11 U.S.C. §522{f)(2) (1994); supra note 15.
28. In addition, some courts included junior nonavoidable liens in the determination of
whether the debtor had any equity in the property that might be impaired by the judicial lien.
See Simonson v. First Bank (In re Simonson), 758 F2d 103 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussed supra
note 20). The corollary of the view that a debtor could not avoid a lien if it did not attach to
equity having monetary value, was that even when equity existed, avoidance would be lim
ited to the lesser of the monetary value of the equity or the amount of the exemption. See,
e.g., Menel� 37 F.3d at 115 {holding that only the part of the lien that interferes with the
exemption may be avoided); Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895. The effect of this approach was that
when the amount of the lien exceeded the exemption value, the unavoided (and unsecured)
portion of the lien would remain as a charge against the property. The most generous view
was that the statutory exemption amount set the outer limit of impairment. See, e.g., West v.
West (In re West), 68 B.R. 647, 648-49 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986). In light of postbankruptcy
realities in most cases, this rendered the debtor's exercise of the §522{f) avoiding power an
essentially meaningless act. See supra note 15.
29. Many bankruptcy courts reached the opposite result, permitting total avoidance when
the debtor's equity was insufficient to satisfy both the exemption amount and the judicial
lien. See, e.g., In re Cross, 164 B.R. 496, 497-98 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); Osborne v. Dominion
Bank, N.A. (In re Osborne), 156 B.R. 188, 191 {Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993), revd., 165 B.R. 183
(W.D. Va. 1994); LaPointe v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc. (In re LaPointe), 150 B.R. 92, 94-95
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entire judicial lien might have survived because the debtor had no
equity in the property over and above the sum of the nonavoidable
liens.30 This line of authorities, which in part was seen as offering a
preferred construction of the statute because of its consistency with
the Supreme Court's holding in Dewsnup, 31 has now also been
overruled by the statutory formula for determining "impairment"
that was added to the Code by the 1994 Amendments.32 The avoid
ance power in section 522(f)(l)(A), however, is limited to judicial
liens.33 Thus, while it surely calls into question the holding in
(Banlcr. D. Conn. 1993); In re Magosin, 75 B.R. 545, 547 (Banlcr. E.D. Pa. 1987). But see In
re Corio, 190 B.R. 498 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (affirming the banlcruptcy court's order that a judicial
lien could not be avoided as impairing the debtor's homestead exemption because the debtor
had no equity in the property, and, therefore, no exemption to be impaired).
30. A possible exception existed, in the view of some courts, where one or more of the
unavoidable liens was junior to the judicial lien under attack. See Silver v. Savings Bank (In
re Fiore), 27 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (holding that junior, unavoidable liens are
not considered in determining impairment). In effect, this approach would produce, in some
cases, an equity figure where none would otherwise exist. In other cases, it would produce an
equity figure sufficient to cover both the judicial lien and the exemption, thereby depriving
the debtor of her right to avoid any portion of the judicial lien under § 522(f). See In re
Shafner, 165 B.R. 660, 662 (Banlcr. D. Colo. 1994), affd., 82 F.3d 426 (10th Cir. 1996); 2
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 16, § 8-28, at 564-65.
31. See Chabot, 992 F.2d at 895 ("Our holding [precluding avoidance of the lien in excess
of the amount of the exemption] is consistent with . . . Dewsnup v. Tunm. "). But see Wrenn
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co. (In re Wrenn), 40 F.3d 1162, 1165-66 (11th Cir. 1994) {per
curiam) (observing that avoidance of the entire lien would not be inconsistent with Dewsnup
if one were to accept the debtor's argument that the discharge of the underlying claim effec
tively disallowed the creditor's claim). In addition, there was the view that the prohibition
against lien stripping in Dewsnup did not extend to the avoidance of an "underwater" judicial
lien that impaired exempt property. See Howard, supra note 20, at 165.
32. See 11 U.S.C.§ 522(f)(2)(A) (1994) (discussed supra note 15). Recent cases constru
ing the operation and effect of this new formula for determining impairment include Zeigler
Engg. Sales, Inc. v. Cozad (In re Cozad), 208 B.R. 495 (Banlcr. 10th Cir. 1997); Pepper v. Pub.
Serv. Employees Credit Union, No. 97-10574 CEM, 1997 Banlcr. LEXIS 902 (Bankr. D.
Colo. June 27, 1997); Corson v. Fidelity and Guar. Ins. Co. (In re Corson), 206 B.R. 17
(Banlcr. D. Conn. 1997); Marshall v. Suntrust Banlc, Savannah N.A. (In re Marshall), 204
B.R. 838 (Banlcr. S.D. Ga. 1997); In re Jakubowski, 198 B.R. 262 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); In
re Allard, 196 B.R. 402 (Banlcr. N.D. Ill.), affd. sub nom Great S. Co. v. Allard, 202 B.R. 938
(N.D. Ill. 1996); In re Todd, 194 B.R. 893 (Banlcr. D. Mont. 1996). See also Butler v. South
ern 0 Corp. (In re Butler), 196 B.R. 329, 330-31 (Banlcr. W.D. Va. 1996) (reviewing in detail
the legislative history to§ 522(f)(2), concluding that Dewsnup is no barrier to avoidance of a
judgment lien where the lien impairs an exemption, and noting that the Amendments over
ruled cases such as Chabot); In re Cavenaugh, No. CIV.A.95-4408, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14962 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 1995). See generally Carlson, supra note 17, at 67-69; supra note 18.
In dictum, the Ninth Circuit itself has conceded that, for cases filed on or after the effective
date of the 1994 Amendments, Chabot has been overruled. See Jones v. Heskett (In re
Jones), 106 F.3d 923, 924 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997); Wynns v. Wilson (In re Wtlson), 90 F.3d 347, 350
(9th Cir. 1996); see also Higgins v. Household Fin. Corp. (In re Higgins), 201 B.R. 965, 967
(Banlcr. 9th Cir. 1996) ("Congress has made it clear in amending Section 522 that a lien will
be deemed to impair an exemption, even when there is no equity in the property
").
• • • •

33. "Judicial liens" are defined in§ 101(36) of the Code as "lien[s] obtained by judgment,
levy, sequestration or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C. § 101(36)
(1994). They are distinguished from both consensual liens and statutory liens. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(51), (53) (1994). Curiously, the 1994 Amendments also added a new subsection (f)(3)
to § 522 of the Code, which purports to give the states a limited opportunity to opt out of
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Dewsnup, it does not compromise the continuing viability of that
holding - at least not directly.34
If and when permitted, the power to avoid "underwater" liens35
has value to the debtor in at least three circumstances. First, before
creditors can foreclose, the debtor may be able to scrounge up
enough cash from other sources to redeem the property by paying
off all nonavoided liens. In the example used previously, the prop
erty could be redeemed for, at most, exactly its judicially
determined value: $120,000, and, with full lien stripping, that value
less the amount of the exemption, or $105,000. Alternatively, if the
debtor is otherwise able to stave off foreclosure, market factors may
create equity in the property in the future that will inure to the
debtor's benefit and not to the benefit of an undersecured lienor.
While lenders might understandably regard the reallocation of
future appreciation as unfair, the nature of bankruptcy is such that
any postpetition gain properly belongs to the debtor.36 Finally, and
most problematic, the court may have undervalued the property,
resulting in the debtor's immediate enjoyment of existing wealth at
the expense of secured creditors as soon as the property is aban
doned or the bankruptcy case is closed.37 In all three cases, the
subsection (f)(l){A) when the collateral is worth more than $5,000. See Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,§ 310(2), 108 Stat. 4106, 4137-38 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C.§ 522{f)(3) {1994)). This new provision is awkwardly worded, and its full effect is not
yet fully understood. See Carlson, supra note 17, at 76-84. There are only a few cases so far
attempting to give meaning to the convoluted linguistic meanderings of§ 522(£)(3). See In re
Ehlen, 202 B.R. 742 {Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1996), affd., 207 B.R. 179 (W.D. Wis. 1997); In re
Parrish, 186 B.R. 246 (Bankr. W.D. WIS. 1995); In re Zimmel, 185 B.R. 786 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1995).
34. Of course, it is our position that the 1994 Amendments indirectly call into question
the wisdom of that decision because, along with other developments, they reflect how aber
rant Dewsnup really was, insofar as contemporary bankruptcy jurisprudence is concerned.
See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text.
35. A lien is considered to be "underwater" to the extent it is unsupported by value. See
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 424 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Howard, supra note 20, at
165.
36.

See infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.

37. Distrust of judicial valuation, coupled with the belief that markets do a better job of
establishing values, has been a central theme in the writings of a loosely associated group of
bankruptcy scholars who have approached the subject area using the tools of economic anal
ysis and corporate finance. For a survey of that literature, see John D. Ayer, The Role of
Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 .AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 53 (1995). Much
of this writing has been aimed at reform, or outright elimination, of the present system in
chapter 11 for court-supervised reorganizations of financially distressed business entities. See
generally Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 439 (1992);
Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 523
{1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127 {1986); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations,
101 HAR.v. L. REv. 775 {1988); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case
for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The
Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 85 (1995);
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judicial lienor in our hypothetical, never a true reliance creditor to
begin with,38 is now wholly eliminated. Ideally, the junior lienor
would also be relegated to what, under these circumstances, the
Code in section 506(a) determined a party in that position to be all
along anyway; namely, an unsecured creditor to the tune of $15,000.
How does this result square with Dewsnup, and with the charac
terization of secured claims in bankruptcy implied by Justice
Blackmun in his majority opinion in that case? Not very well. In
Dewsnup, the debtors, husband and wife, argued that pursuant to
Code sections 506(a) and 506(d), they were entitled to reduce the
balance of a $120,000 judgment lien against their nonexempt farm
property to the judicially determined value of that property, or
$39,000.39 The debtors lost at the bankruptcy court, district court,
and court of appeals levels,4o despite favorable authority from other
jurisdictions authorizing debtor lien avoidance (so-called lien strip
ping) in these circumstances pursuant to section 506( d).41 By this
Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Modelfor Corporate Reorganization, 83 CoLUM.
L. REv. 527 {1983). However, the same suspicion of misvaluation of an individual debtor's
real property also fuels the case in favor of prohibiting strip down in chapter 7 and preserving
the holding in Dewsnup. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
38. The fact that judicial lienors are nonreliance creditors is an important part of the
justification for the debtor-avoiding-power provision, in § 522{f){l){A), in circumstances
where the lien has actual economic value. It is not essential, however, to the related issue of
whether strip dovm should be permitted under § 506(d), as, in those instances, the lien has no
current economic value. However, to the extent that the defense of Dewsnup is cast in terms
of the bargain metaphor, see infra note 43 and accompanying text, it is a factor that appears
to weigh more heavily in actuality than we think it should.
39. The judgment lien arose from a default by the debtors for amounts due under the
terms of two mortgages that the debtors had granted to a private lending group in 1978 in
order to finance acquisition of additional farmland. The sad plight of the Dewsnups is
recounted in detail in Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR. L.
& PRAc. 513, 513-14 {1992).
40. The bankruptcy court concluded that because the property had been abandoned, the
estate no longer had an interest in the property and § 506{d), by its terms, was inapplicable.
See Dewsnup v. Trmm (In re Dewsnup), 87 B.R. 676, 683 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988), affd. per
cuiram, 908 F.2d 588 {10th Cir. 1990), affd., 502 U.S. 410 {1992). The court also expressed the
view that, as a matter of policy, to permit strip down in these circumstances would constitute
an unwarranted intrusion on the rights of secured creditors. See Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 683.
The district court affirmed without a separate opinion, while the Tenth Circuit added to the
bankruptcy court's rationale that to allow strip down would be to permit a de facto redemp·
tion of real property in apparent contravention of 11 U.S.C. § 722 {1994), which limits
redemptions to personal property intended primarily for personal, family, and household use.
See Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 592 {10th Cir. 1990), affd., 502 U.S. 410 {1992). The court also
opined that lien avoidance under § 506(d) would create an anomalous situation in which
debtors would receive more in liquidation than they would in reorganization under chapter
11 or 13 because of the prohibitions against modification in, respectively, 11 U.S.C.
§§ llll{b) and 1322{b)(2) (1994). See Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 592.
41. See, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 889 F.2d 1304 {3d Cir. 1989). The pre
Dewsnup authorities pro and con are collected in Howard, supra note 24, at 374 n.2 (indicat
ing that a majority of the decisions hold that a chapter 7 debtor may use § 506{a) and {d) to
avoid liens unsupported by value).
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time, LaMar Dewsnup had died and his widow Aletha Dewsnup's
last stop was the United States Supreme Court. When she arrived
there, the reception was no warmer than it had been in the lower
courts.
In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun offered a variety of
rationales to justify the denial of Ms. Dewsnup's claim,42 reflecting
perhaps a concern that any one alone was not a sufficiently sound
analytic structure upon which to rest the majority's decision.
Among these rationales, and of principal interest for purposes of
this article, was the assertion that permitting lien stripping under
section 506(d) would deprive undersecured creditors of access to
postvaluation appreciation in the encumbered property in violation
of the prepetition bargain that had been struck between mortgagor
and mortgagee.43 Relying primarily upon case law decided under
the former Act, and taking that case law wholly out of context,44
Justice Blackm.un and the Justices who joined him in the majority
opinion adopted bargain as the appropriate metaphor for conceptu
alizing the nature of security and secured claims in bankruptcy.
In a dyspeptic dissenting opinion,45 Justice Scalia chided the
majority for engaging in what he regarded as a wholly untenable
construction of the clear language of the statute.46 He did not, how42. Tue majority offered several justifications. First, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
Pub. L. No. 55-541,§ 67d, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978), unavoided liens passed through bank
ruptcy unaffected. See Dewsnup v. TIIlllll, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992). Second, Congress was
presumed to have enacted§ 506(d) with a full understanding of the fact that under pre-Code
law, involuntary debtor lien avoidance was not permitted. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418-19.
Third, there was no indication in the legislative history of the Code to suggest that§ 506(d)
should be interpreted to permit lien avoidance. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419-20.
43. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417-18. The Court assumed that this would be the result if
the mortgagor elected to remain aloof from the proceeding, and thus could "see no reason
why his acquiescence in that proceeding should cause him to experience a forfeiture of the
kind the debtor proposes." 502 U.S. at 418. Of course, since even the debtor can file a proof
of claim on a creditor's behalf, see 11 U.S.C.§ 501(b) (1994), the point really adds very little.
See In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A secured creditor may be dragged into
the bankruptcy involuntarily, because the trustee or debtor . . . may file a claim on the credi
tor's behalf."). The bottom line remains that the majority in Dewsnup considered it a "wind
fall" for the debtor to enjoy the benefit of any subsequent increase in the value of the
property. It is difficult, however, to understand how the "windfall" attributable to postfiling
appreciation differs fundamentally, for example, from the "windfall" the debtor enjoys by
being able to retain postpetition earnings free from prepetition contractual obligations. And
yet, while not always a feature of American bankruptcy law, today no one seriously questions
that the law should contain some system for discharging debts. See, e.g., Charles Jordan
Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325 (1991).
44. See infra note 51.
45. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Souter joined in the
dissent, while Justice Thomas did not participate, making it a 6-2 vote for the appellees.
46. "The Court makes no attempt to establish a textual or structural basis for overriding
the plain meaning of § 506(d), but rests its decision upon policy intuitions of a legislative
character
" Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
. • • •
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ever, respond directly to the policy-based aspects of the majority's
opinion,47 comfortable presumably in his conviction that the
unarguable meaning of the statutory text rendered such discussions
superfluous, however interesting they might be in another con
text.48 With all deference to Justice Scalia, we believe the major
ity's articulated concern over upsetting the secured creditor's
bargain merits a response since the implications of that conception
of security extend beyond simply the issue of lien stripping in chap
ter 7.
Other commentators have already called into question Justice
Blackmun's reliance on Long v. Bullard49 and Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radfords0 as authority for the proposition that a
secured creditor is entitled not just to the value of its collateral in
bankruptcy, but also to have its rights in the collateral protected in
perpetuity.51 The proposition itself remains the subject of consider
able disagreement. Scholars associated with the law and economics
mode of analysis have argued most vigorously, and not unpersua
sively, that bankruptcy law should not modify state-law property
interests except in extraordinary circumstances.52 As a general
47. Justice Scalia did, however, at least intimate that these policy intuitions might have
been served without "evisceration" of the language in §506(d). See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at
422 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

48. The dissent pointed to the Court's holdings in Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151
(1991), and United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235 (1989), as examples of how the
majority's opinion was totally at odds with the Court's established "plain meaning" method
of interpretation in previous Bankruptcy Code cases. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 433.35
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 11.
49. 117 U.S. 617 (1886).
50. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
51. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418-19. Professor Howard explains that the Court's reli
ance on Radford as apparent authority for the view that strip down would raise constitutional
concerns was misplaced. See Howard, supra note 39, at 524-25. First, she notes that while
Radford involved a successful challenge to the Frazier-Lemke Act amendments, Pub. L. No.
73-486, 48 Stat 1289 (1934) (expired 1949) to the Bankruptcy Act, the problem with those
provisions was that they were given retroactive effect and permitted farmer-debtors to
purchase property for less than its judicially established fair market value. After Frazier
Lemke was amended in 1935 to assure creditors of the full value of their collateral, attempts
to challenge its constitutionality as an impermissible taking failed. See Wright v. Vinton
Branch, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); Howard, supra note 39, at 525 & n.60; see also Howard, supra
note 4, at 314-15; Newborn, supra note 4, at 580-81 (pointing out that Long v. Bullard "stands
only for the proposition that bankruptcy discharge extinguishes only the debtor's personal
liability for the debt" and that there was pre-Code precedent for the practice of lien avoid
ance). While the Supreme Court's decisions in Radford and Long do not, therefore, stand in
the way of lien avoidance generally, Radford in particular does carry some implications for
liquidations under the Code that would need to be addressed were Dewsnup repealed. See
infra note 273 and accompanying text.
52. This proposition is one of the central tenets of the well-known creditors' bargain
model developed in the 1980s by Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson. According to
Baird and Jackson, bankruptcy exists in order to solve the "common pool" problem created
by the debtor's insolvency. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE Lome AND LIMITS OF
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avowal, the point is virtually unarguable. As always, however, the
real action is at the margins,53 and the view that the protection of a
secured creditor's rights includes preserving creditor control over
all decisions concerning when and how his or her interest will be
foreclosed faces far tougher sledding in the face of numerous bank
ruptcy provisions that effectively freeze a secured creditor's claims
BANKRUPTCY LAW 7-19 (1986); Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 815, 822-24 (1987). Faced with the
prospect of a multiplicity of wasteful and expensive individual creditor collection actions,
Baird and Jackson maintain that bankruptcy represents the ex ante bargain that, had they the
opportunity, creditors would have reached had they negotiated in advance over the conse
quences of financial reversals that would place them in competition with one another for
limited assets. Such an agreement necessarily would preclude any reordering of the legal
priority of existing claims because the prospect for different patterns of distribution would
presumably induce self-interested behavior antithetical to the interest of the common pool.
See Baird, supra, at 823 (asserting that the priorities that exist under bankruptcy law and
nonbankruptcy law should remain parallel; if one changes, so too should the other). This is
the problem of "forum-shopping" which plays such a pivotal role in Baird and Jackson's view
of bankruptcy. See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and

the Treatment ofDiverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. RE.v. 97, 101 (1984); Baird, supra, at 824-28 (arguing

that having multiple avenues of enforcement for every substantive right creates special costs
and, thus, can only be justified in relation to the reasons for having separate avenues, and not
in terms of the substantive rights, under one scheme or the other, of the party affected). To
instantiate this justification for a separate bankruptcy system, Baird and Jackson adopt as
their fundamental principle the rule that bankruptcy must leave undisturbed the relative enti
tlements of all creditors under state law. See JACKSON, supra, at 20-24, 71-83 (maintaining
that changes in substantive rules, unless intended to preserve assets for the common good,
run counter to the proper goals of bankruptcy); see also Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy,
Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 868-71 (1982).
Note that Jackson does not maintain that a bankruptcy system must honor state-law entitle
ments in every respect; a secured creditor could hardly be permitted to foreclose as it could
under state law in the face of the stay rules in 11 U.S.C.§362(a) (1994). What matters, then,
is preserving "relative values" of state-law entitlements. See JACKSON, supra, at 29. More
over, even that principle may be ignored if it can be shown that recognition of a particular
right would compromise the collectivizing goal of the bankruptcy process. Id. at 29 n.15.
Although commentators writing from an economics-based perspective of the law have sug
gested that the market may be better suited to solve the collective action problems that for
Baird and Jackson justify a separate bankruptcy system, all of these theorists, without much
question, accept creditor wealth maximization as the sole normative object of any bankruptcy
regime. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate
Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. RE.v. 311, 319-23 (1993); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests,
Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. RE.v. 645, 647 (1992).
53. Not even the most strident adherents of the view that bankruptcy is designed to maxi
mize creditor returns have called into question the centrality of fresh-start policy in consumer
bankruptcy cases. See JACKSON, supra note 52, at 225-79 (attempting to offer a normative
justification for discharge that, if not exactly consistent, is at least not at odds with the first
principles posited under the creditors' bargain model). For further discussion of Jackson's
view of discharge in consumer cases, see Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 249-52.
Nevertheless, while acceptance of the economic account of bankruptcy, with its limited view
of bankruptcy purposes, may predispose one to be sympathetic with the rationale in
Dewsnup, it does not require acceptance of that rationale. Instead, the issue still comes down
to the extent to which one's conceptualization of secured credit outside of bankruptcy is
altered by the federal policy of fresh start that is implicated once an individual bankruptcy
case is initiated.
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and entitlements as of the time of filing or plan confirmation.54
Moreover, whatever justification one accepts for secured credit
generally,55 one cannot assume necessarily that all of the entail
ments that derive from that justification carry over unaffected into
bankruptcy.56

54. Initially, there was considerable concern about the implications of Dewsnup in reor
ganization proceedings. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 4, at 319-36 (addressing the hannful
effects of Dewsnup in various reorganization proceedings); Newborn, supra note 4, at 582-96
(discussing the "damaging legacies of Dewsnup"). By and large, that concern has been laid
to rest. Subject to the separate limitation in § 1322(b)(2) in chapter 13 cases, and the
§ llll(b) election in chapter 11 cases, there is no longer any serious argument that Dewsnup
alters the widely accepted premise that secured creditors in these proceedings are entitled
only to the present value of their secured claim, in the traditional § 506(a) sense of the tenn,
as of the relevant valuation date, although the timing of that valuation remains an unsettled
and controversial question. See infra notes 112, 223. See generally Jane Kaufman Winn, Lien
Stripping After Nobelman, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 541, 597-616 (1994) (reviewing the treat
ment of secured claims under chapters 11, 12, and 13). There are several general Code provi
sions that reinforce this view of security, in addition to the basic definitional provision in
§ 506(a) and the exemption impairing lien-avoidance power in § 522(f)(l}(A) already dis
cussed. For example, § 552(a) prevents a security interest containing an after-acquired prop
erty clause from attaching to postpetition property. Section 363(f) permits the estate to sell
encumbered property free and clear of liens provided inter alia that there is equity in the
property over and above the value of all liens. Fmally, the Supreme Court's earlier decision
in United Savings Assn. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates (In re Timbers of Inwood
Forest Associates), 484U S 365 (1988), construed the adequate protection requirement that
conditions the estate's ability to retain and use property subject to a prepetition security
interest as protecting only the value of the collateral as of the filing date and not the loss of
the creditor's immediate right to possession or foreclosure under state law. Professor Carl
son argues, however, that contrary to the implications of T1111bers, the most logical interpreta
tion of Dewsnup is that valuations in bankruptcy are not final unless and until the property is
sold at a liquidation sale or a plan of reorganization is confirmed. See Cnrlson, supra note 10,
at 22.
.

.

55. See infra Part III for further discussion of the different positions that have been
espoused by commentators attempting to justify a system of secured credit.
56. This is one of the central positions we advance in this work; namely, bankruptcy rep
resents not only a collective debt-collection device but also, in pursuit of the goals of the
fresh start, a complete reordering of contractual rights and priorities under state law. See
infra text accompanying notes 147-51, 216-18. It is a view that is obviously in conflict with the
economic account of bankruptcy. See supra note 52. In chapter 11, the same debate is
framed in terms of whether reorganization is merely intended to maximize the economic
value of the estate for creditors with legally cognizable interests under state law, or whether
the process is intended to take into account the broader range of interests affected by finn
failure. See generally Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits
of the Judicial Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 75 (1995) (describing the nature of the debate but
concluding that the bankruptcy judicial process is ill suited to redistributing the costs of busi
ness failure); Lawrence Ponoroff, Enlarging the Bargaining Table: Some Implications of the
Corporate Stakeholder Model for Federal Bankruptcy Proceedings, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 441,
472-86 (1994) (suggesting that public company bankruptcies affect a broader range of constit
uencies than simply traditional creditor groups and, therefore, that those interests should be
taken into account in allocating the losses occasioned by the enterprise's financial collapse);
Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement:
Sentinel ofan Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw.U. L. REv. 919, 948-66 (1991) {describing
and comparing the competing views of bankruptcy policy and concluding that bankruptcy
purposes are not only several and varied, but also are in a state of continuous evolution).
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In the context of lien stripping other than pursuant to section
522(f)(l)(A), the most recent, and perhaps the most cogent,
defense of Dewsnup along policy lines comes from Professor Barry
Adler.57 While Adler submits that the majority's decision yielded a
good result, even he concedes that it did so based on a flawed inter
pretation of the language in section 506.58 In Adler's estimation,
strip down, and for that matter cram down,59 unfairly exposes the
creditor to the risk of error in court valuation of the collateral, a
risk that he views as a very serious one.6° The better solution,
according to Adler, would be openly to require surrender to the
secured creditor of any collateral that the court values as worth less
than the sum of the liens that encumber it, rather than abandon
ment followed by either strip down or cram down.61 In the
meantime, however, Adler seems inclined to accept Dewsnup,
interpretational shortcomings notwithstanding, as a means of forc
ing a debtor either to repay her debt in full or to allow the secured
57. See Barry E. Adler, Creditor Rights After Johnson and Dewsnup, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 1
(1993-1994).
58. Id. at 12 ("The Court decided Dewsnup incorrectly, yet the decision yielded a good
result."). In direct contrast, we are far less troubled with the majority's liberal approach to
statutory construction, and far more troubled with the outcome insofar as consistency with
core bankruptcy policy is concerned.
59. Adler contrasts strip down in chapter 7 with "cram down" in chapter 13, which essen
tially pennits a debtor to retain property so long as the plan proposes to pay an undersecured
creditor in present dollars the judicially determined value of the property, even where the
debtor has previously discharged the unsecured portion of the creditor's claim in chapter 7.
Id. at 5-6 (discussing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991)). The apparent incon
gruity between Dewsnup and Johnson, which Adler avoids dwelling upon by arguing instead
against a debtor's entitlement to both abandonment and judicial determination of collateral
value, is discussed further infra text accompanying notes 246-56.
60. Adler acknowledges that if courts could determine value accurately and quickly, cred
itors should be indifferent between cram down or strip down on the one hand and foreclo
sure sale on the other. See Adler, supra note 57, at 5. Of course, implicit in Adler's
assumption that courts consistently misvalue assets is the further assumption that the mis
valuation consistently inures to the debtor's benefit, that is, that courts' valuations are always
too low. The response to this is threefold. First, there is no empirical evidence to support
this assumption. Second, even if courts do undervalue assets, this makes the case only for
improving the judicial valuation process, not for prohibiting strip down. See Howard, supra
note 24, at 418-19 (making this point as well as observing that secured creditors do, after all,
have the opportunity to fully litigate the issue). Finally, it is hardly clear that the alternative
to strip down - release from the stay and foreclosure - produces more accurate valuation.
In fact, commentators writing from both sides of the issue reject as naive the suggestion that
permitting debtors to strip-down liens under chapter 7 merely replicates the foreclosure pro
cess. See Adler, supra note 57, at 5 (referring to the assessment as "incredible"); Howard,
supra note 24, at 406 (calling the proposition an "oversimplification"). The disagreement
centers on whether foreclosure is the most likely alternative to strip down and who, as
between debtor and creditor, has the superior claim to postbankruptcy appreciation in the
absence of foreclosure. See generally id. at 408-18.
61. See Adler, supra note 57, at 15.
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lender to retain all of the proceeds from foreclosure up to the out
standing balance of the loan.
Implicit in Adler's argument may be a concession. Specifically,
Adler seems willing to concede that "true" postbankruptcy appreci
ation belongs to the debtor.62 However, given the apparent diffi
culty in sep arating true appreciation from the phantom
appreciation attributable to judicial misvaluation, Adler concludes
that the only fair solution is to effectively give the property to the
creditor to dispose of as it wishes. While this notion may not be too
far from Justice Blackmun's admonition that lien stripping deprives
the creditor of its bargain, the two approaches are not in fact identi
cal. The majority in Dewsnup indulges, without much scrutiny or
analysis, in two questionable assumptions: first, that such a bargain
exists in fact, and, second, that this bargain (even if one concedes its
existence) is inviolate in bankruptcy. As will be discussed further,63
we think both assumptions are suspect, and Adler does not neces
sarily endorse either one.64
Indeed, Adler's defense of Dewsnup is curious. It is curious in
the sense that while he is extremely concerned (perhaps not without
good reason) for the accuracy of judicial valuations, he seems to
accept without blanching the notion that state-law foreclosure sales
produce better estimates of value.65 In fact, neither approach con62. See supra note 60. "True" appreciation would be appreciation attributable to actual
changes in market conditions, rather than the appreciation "created" by undervaluation.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 144-58.
64. Adler's concern is, at bottom, much more prosaic. It is a concern over the risk of
court error in valuation. Although not essential to the elimination of that risk, not to be lost
in the wash is the fact that Adler's solution to the valuation error problem - prohibiting
abandonment of encumbered property unless each creditor holding an interest in such prop
erty consents - serendipitously reallocates the benefit of true postbankruptcy appreciation
to the secured creditor. Perhaps a more neatly tailored solution would be to reform the
valuation process to eliminate from the system the risk of persistent bias against secured
creditors in that process. See infra note 65.
65. See Adler, supra note 57, at 5 (suggesting that strip down would be acceptable if, in
fact, it provided to creditors the same economic result as foreclosure). The evidence, how
ever, is overwhelmingly at odds with the notion that foreclosure sales establish fair market
value. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1993) ("[M)arket value, as it is
commonly understood, has no applicability in the forced-sale context; indeed, it is the very
antithesis of forced-sale value."); OB/Gyn Solutions v. Six (In re Six), 80 F.3d 452 (11th Cir.
1996) (noting that foreclosure sale price does not conclusively establish the value of the prop
erty at-issue even if no objection is made); Howard, supra note 24, at 407. Therefore, to the
extent that the secured portion of the creditor's claim for § 506(a) purposes is determined
with reference to market as opposed to forced-sale value, the creditor should end up with a
greater return from the property as a result of strip down and retention than could be
expected from the logical alternative of abandonment and foreclosure. In fact, the trend in
the courts has been away from a foreclosure approach to valuation in favor of a replacement
or fair market value theory, focusing on retail rather than wholesale value. Most recently,
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled the "replacement value," rather than the lower "foreclo
sure value," should be used in valuing the allowed secured-credit claim of a creditor when a
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sistently produces the same price that would be established at a true
auction conducted under optimal conditions with open and compet
itive bidding.66 Quite simply, the issue boils down to who should
bear the risk of valuation error, and as to that question Adler offers
no more than an opinion that it should be the debtor rather than
the secured creditor, even though in reorganization proceedings the
governing rules of law produce the opposite result.67 In fact, one
chapter 13 debtor proposes to retain the collateral over the secured party's objection. See
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 65 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. June 16, 1997).
Initially, the retreat from a foreclosure sale approach began when several courts con
cluded that the deduction of hypothetical repossession, foreclosure, and sale costs was inap
propriate in circumstances in which the debtor intended to retain the secured asset. See
Huntington Natl. Bank v. Pees (In re McClurkin), 31 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1994); Lomas
Mortgage USA v. Wiese, 980 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated, 508 U.S. 958, modified, 998
F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1993); Brown & Co. Sec. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir.
1991); United States v. Case (In re Case), 115 B.R. 666 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990). From these
decisions, it was a rational leap to the view that fair market value, rather than forced-sale
value, is the proper valuation of secured assets that the debtor intends to retain. See, e.g.,
Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving property retained
by chapter 11 debtors), petiticm for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3433 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1996) (No. 96881); Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995); Wmthrop Old Farm
Nurseries v. New Bedford Inst. for Sav. (In re Wmthrop Old Farm Nurseries), 50 F.3d 72 (1st
Cir. 1995). The Court's decision in Rash not only overruled the foreclosure value standard
that had been adopted below, 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996), but also replaced the hybrid
approach adopted in the Seventh Circuit, which used a midpoint between foreclosure and
replacement value as the proper method for valuing a secured creditor's interest in property
retained by a chapter 13 debtor. See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996). Although
use of any greater-than-wholesale-value approach arguably overcompensates creditors, see
Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 320 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment); the point is that, since
replacement cost is now the prevailing standard, the contention that creditors are somehow
prejudiced by permitting a debtor to strip an undersecured lien down to the amount of the
secured claim as determined under § 506(a) seems particularly unfounded, if not incredulous.
66. Producing those conditions, however, is no sure thing. For example, some markets
are just too "thin" to ensure that a well publicized auction will always bring the best price.
See generally Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 64752 (1993) (suggesting that auctions may not be the most effective way of achieving maximum
value in all cases); David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of
Bankruptcy Theory, 1993 WIS. L. REv. 465, 477-79 (pointing out some of the limitations of an
auction approach as applied to whole firms). The Code recognizes that the standard of valu
ation will vary with the circumstances, because value is to be determined in light of the pur
pose for the valuation. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.A.A.N. 5963, 6311-12; see also In re Vitreous Steel Prods. Co., 911 F.2d 1223, 1332 (7th
Cir. 1990). Moreover, contrary to Adler's assumption, there is no such thing as an objective,
determinable value out there waiting to be revealed under the right circumstances. Just as
value depends on context, so too is it the case that "value" is inherently subjective. That
judicial valuation is simply an estimate or prediction does not automatically make it less
reliable than a value established by actual sale. Only under perfect market conditions does
an arms-length sale emulate "real value," but such conditions exist only in hypothesis, not
reality. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MicH. L.
REv. 336, 380 (1993) (pointing out that in testing economic principles, researchers ignore
transaction costs, informational asymmetries, and ambiguous property rights that are always
present in real markets).
67. See supra note 54. It also strikes us as odd that debtors whose financial condition or
financial prospects are sufficiently strong to permit reorganization should be given a fresher
start than debtors whose only alternative is liquidation. The protection of human capital,
which lies at the heart of the fresh-start policy in consumer cases, would seem to militate
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suspects that Adler's concerns in this area have been assuaged to at
least some degree now that, at least for purposes of cram down, the
courts have moved away from a foreclosure-sale standard of valua
tion to standards more closely approximating a true "fair market
value" measurement.68 Ultimately, then, lack of faith in the ability
of the bankruptcy process specifically and the judicial process gen
erally to render rational and accurate valuation judgments cannot
form the basis for a principled defense of Dewsnup.
m.

THE :euzZLE OF SECURED CREDIT

A.

A Brief History

In order to decide what to do about lien stripping in chapter 7,
we thus must return to the fundamental question of how we should
understand security in bankruptcy. As bankruptcy law seems to
have adopted to a substantial degree state-law conceptualizations of
the security interest, inquiry must begin with a review of the posi
tions that have been staked out in relation to the same question
outside of bankruptcy. In the late 1970s, legal scholars associated
with the law and economics movement began to question the con
ventional explanation that secured financing expands debtors'
access to credit markets and, in the process, increases the overall
availability of credit.69 Using the analytical tools of modem finance
theory, these writers attempted to show that, viewed from a macro
perspective, the benefits flowing from secured credit in the form of
lower borrowing costs are more than offset by the combination of
against any approach that gives prepetition creditors a stake in the debtor's postpetition life.

See generally infra notes 223-34. The tenn human capita� used to refer to value derived by
the debtor after filing, comes from Professor Jackson. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh
Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HAR.v. L. REv. 1393, 1440 n.147 (1985). While Jackson
tends to limit use of the tenn to a debtor's earned income, there seems no logical reason for
drawing a line between wealth derived from postpetition labor and wealth attributable to
postpetition appreciation in exempt or abandoned assets.
68. See supra note 65.
69. The first salvo was fired by Thomas Jackson and Anthony K ronman in 1979. See
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 9 (offering a justification for security interests in the fonn of
reduced monitoring costs). The fonnal challenge to solve the "puzzle" of secured credit was
issued a couple of years later by Professor Alan Schwartz, who observed that, in a perfect
market, the benefits derived from secured financing would be offset exactly by higher rates of
interest charged for unsecured credit because of the increased risk undertaken. See Alan
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981). Subsequently, several legal academics employing the tools of eco
nomic analysis have labored unsuccessfully to provide a general account of secured credit
that demonstrates its efficiency. See infra note 72.
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the increased cost of unsecured credit and the transaction costs
entailed in establishing enforceable security arrangements.70
Having thus exposed and debunked the conventional "myth"
that there is a net gain in the aggregate amount of credit available
because of the high-risk loans that would not be made but for the
existence of secured credit,71 these theorists turned to the task of
constructing an explanation for secured financing that would
demonstrate why the social gains from secured lending exceed the
social costs.72 That is to say, they launched a quest to justify the
existence of secured financing on grounds of systemic efficiency, the
same normative imperative that had served as the benchmark for
declaring the failure of the traditional analysis.73 The conventional
70. Applying the basic insight of the Modigliani-Miller Irrelevance Theorem, which holds
that in a perfectly functioning capital market the value of a firm is independent from the
particular mix of debt and equity securities that comprise its capital structure, Professor
Schwartz has hypothesized that secured credit is a zero-sum game. See Schwartz, supra note
69, at 10. That is to say, the benefits to one creditor garnered by taking security are offset
exactly by the increased cost imposed on unsecured creditors who will extract a higher charge
to compensate for the diminishment in the amount of assets available to satisfy their claims.
For a further discussion and analysis of the Irrelevance Theorem as applied in this context,
see Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle ofSecured Debt, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1053-65
{1984).
71. See, e.g., JAMES C. VAN HoRNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND PouCY 464 {10th ed.
1995) (arguing that without security, high-risk debtors would be denied access to credit
altogether).
72. Several good articles survey this literature at various points in its evolution. See
sources listed infra notes 73, 75. For example, Professor Scott suggested that the premium
earned by secured creditors could be seen as a return for the valuable counseling functions
they provided to the debtor. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing,
86 CoLUM. L. REv. 901, 930-33 (1986). In 1989, Professor Shupack argued that the general
efficiency of security interests could be demonstrated by casting away the erroneous assump
tion that the cost of secured credit always exceeds that of unsecured credit, although he also
pointed out that explaining security interests in economic terms left unanswered several
important policy questions. See Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transac
tions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067, 1121-24 (1989). In 1992, Professor Triantis attempted to
explain how two different and seemingly inconsistent explanations for secured debt - signal
ing and agency cost theories - could be reconciled by differentiating between the different
types of market informational asymmetries to which they are a response. He concluded that
secured debt is the most cost-effective way for addressing a variety of informational imper
fections in the market. See George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions ofImperfect
Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 255-58 {1992). More recently, Professors Kanda and
Levmore have attempted to explain the existence of security, as well as bankruptcy priorities,
as representing a compromise between the benefits and dangers of late-in-time borrowing by
financially troubled debtors. See Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priori
ties, 80 VA. L. REv. 2103, 2121-27 (1994).
73. Most of the law and economics literature assumes that security is efficient and then
labors to explain or prove that it is so. One more recent work from the genre, however, not
only rejects the presumption of efficiency, but also concludes that, in fact, full recognition of
the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy is inefficient. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse
M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE LJ.
857, 904-26 {1995) (arguing tJiat adoption of one of two alternative partial-priority rules
would eliminate the efficiency costs associated with the current norm, full priority) ..
Professor Ronald Mann has gone even a step beyond Bebchuk and Fried in his assertion that
wealth-maximization considerations demand nothing less than the complete abandonment of
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wisdom that secured lending expands access to capital markets on a
transactional basis was apparently no longer worthy of note or com
ment once it was shown that the gains to those firms and secured
creditors were achieved at the expense of correspondingly greater
losses to other creditors and, presumably, firms at large.
The several alternative explanations advanced by economic the
orists since 1979 have already been neatly catalogued and described
in the periodic literature.74 By and large, they have failed alto
gether or offer astonishingly anemic justifications for secured
credit.75 While steeped in the impressive language of finance eco
nomics and mathematics, these frequently elaborate models end up
doing little more than identifying a few dollars saved here or there
in the form of monitoring, credit investigation, or other costs associ
ated with the extension of credit. Proceeding from the premise that
any rationale for secured financing ultimately must be judged on
the basis of its efficiency in reducing costs or risks to the secured
party relative to the increase in costs and risks to unsecured credi
tors, the benefits of secured credit as identified by the legal econo
mists are disappointingly small and fundamentally uninteresting.76
temporal (first-in-time) priority rules in favor of a system of contextualized rules designed to
create party incentives that minimize the prospect for business failure. See Ronald J. Mann,

The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien
Priority, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 11 (1996).
74. See generally Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2025-27; Scott, supra note 72, at
904-11; Shupack, supra note 72, at 1073-93.
75. As recently as 1994, Professor Schwartz declared the puzzle still unsolved. See Alan
Schwartz, Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2073, 2080 n.13 (1994).

Earlier Schwartz concluded that a significant reduction in transaction costs, and a concomi
tant increase in firm value, could be achieved by abandoning the priority scheme in article 9
in favor of a regime in which the debtor's initial long-term financier would rank first, whether
secured or not See Alan Schwartz, A Theory ofLoan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL Sruo. 209, 211,
243-47 (1989). Several commentators also have attacked the law and economics literature on
methodological grounds. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lend
ing, 80 VA. L REv. 2179, 2192-95 (1994) (questioning the assumption that risk cannot be
reduced in absolute terms, only reassigned); Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring
the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929
(1985) (arguing that the social value and utility of security interests should be approached as
an empirical question, rather than as a matter of "cloistered" economic theorizing relying on
assumed facts and bereft of conventional legal analysis); James J. White, Efficiency Justifica
tions for Personal Property Security, 31 V AND. L. REv. 473, 491-502 (1984) (explaining secur
ity interests in traditional terms of making credit available to high-risk borrowers).
76. Early on, Professor Kripke observed that the law and economics analysis of secured
credit proceeds from a perspective unburdened by a practical appreciation for the factual
world of commerce and the role of financing in our systems of manufacturing and distribu
tion. See Kripke, supra note 75, at 931-33. Not to be insulting, along the same lines it might
also be said that, to the average lawyer or banker engaged in the real world of secured
financing, the legal economists' analysis of what they do and why is of little relevance. Per
haps the fatal error was committed at the onset, with the assumption that all secured transac
tions were reducible to a single explanation or "unified theory." See Jackson & Kronman,
supra note 9, at 1146 (stating as their objective the development of a unified theory as to why
the law permits secured financing in the first place). This flaw has been pointed out by a
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The game seems hardly worth the candle when one considers the
transaction costs inevitably associated with secured lending.77 In
short, economics.:based analysis has provided less than satisfying
answers, even to scholars employing that mode of analysis. This is
evidenced by the persistent efforts at theoretical justification among
commentators sympathetic to the genre7s and, more recently, the
admission and proof by two of their number that security indeed is
not efficient.79
In the wake of unfulfilled promises of the law and economics
approach, we were left, until recently, with what might be termed
the "folk theory" justification for secured credit. This is the con
ventional theory that holds that secured credit is worth having
because it makes credit easier to obtain or, in some cases, possible
where it would not be otherwise.so Even if the economics-based
analysis is correct that making credit available to those who would
otherwise be excluded does not invariably yield a system-wide
return of the ilk that the economics model insists upon as an a pri
ori normative proposition, the folk theory's observation about one
of the effects of secured lending is no less valid. Transactional effi
ciency might not alone justify the existence of a social institution,
but when it is clearly an intended consequence,81 its accomplish
ment should not be regarded as superfluous merely because the
institution fails to abide by an after-invented standard.82
number of later commentators. See Picker, supra note 52, at 650 (expressing skepticism that
secured credit plays the same role in all transactions).
77. See F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1403 (1986)
(arguing that the external costs of secured lending exceed any efficiencies gained from
security).
78. See authorities cited supra note 72; see also Carlson, supra note 75, at 2195 ("On this
explanation of secured lending, security interests lower risk and make credit available that
otherwise could not be obtained."); Shupack, supra note 72, at 1083 (noting that practicing
lawyers accept as true what they know from their own experience; that some debtors will
have to offer security or they will not receive loans).
79. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 895-903. Bebchuk and Fried's article is dis
cussed in more detail infra note 90.
80. See, e.g., Kripke, supra note 75, at 941-49 (making the case in traditional terms for
secured credit on personal property); White, supra note 75, at 491-502 (pointing out that
noneconomic considerations may lead lending officials to withhold credit from risky borrow
ers unless the officials are able to take security).
81. See Shupack, supra note 72, at 1072 n.15 (distinguishing between general efficiency
and transactional efficiency, and pointing out that transactional efficiency was clearly one of
the intended purposes in the minds of the drafters of the U.C.C.).

82. The institution of secured debt has been around since the beginning of recorded his
tory. See White, supra note 75, at 479-80. Even if that is a little bit of an exaggeration,
nobody can argue seriously against the prevalence of secured lending practices well before
Professor Schwartz insisted that its global efficiency be demonstrated using the jargon and
tools of modem microeconomic theory. See generally Carlson, supra note 75 (arguing that
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Unlike the economics-based analysis, which itself has failed to
offer a solution to the puzzle of secured transactions,83 the folk
theory at least offers an explanation without contradiction. How
ever, to declare that secured credit is "justified" because it makes
more credit available, or more credit more easily available, is not to
offer a justification in the first place, a fact that appears to have
been missed in the literature thus far, and particularly overlooked
in the legal economists' summary rejection of folk wisdom. That is,
folk theory does not offer a normative justification at all. Rather, it
leaves open the fundamental question of whether we should have
secured credit in any form, or, at the very least, whether we might
be better off without it in some cases.84 At most, then, folk theory
states the ontological effects of having secured credit while blandly
assuming that those effects are normatively desirable without tell
ing us why.

B.

The Contemporary Debate

1.

Functional Analysis

Into the disarray left in the wake of the failure of earlier theo
ries has stepped another group of scholars,85 led initially by
Professor Lynn LoPucki.86 The thrust of the argument launched
from this quarter is that the institution of secured credit allows
debtors and their chosen creditors to enjoy a subsidy at the expense
the efficiency literature on secured lending proceeds from the false premise that risk can
never be created or destroyed but only shifted around).
83. See authorities cited supra note 78.
84. The significance of the conventional explanation for secured lending, postulated as an
effect rather than as a rationale, has yet to be meaningfully analyzed. Indeed, as Professor
Carlson has recently reminded us, the question is, at bottom, an empirical one, although
Carlson goes on to offer a theoretical justification for secured credit in traditional terms.
That justification posits that the reduction in risk to creditors in an imperfect market result
ing from the use of security interests outweighs the external costs, resulting in a net increase
in available credit. See Carlson, supra note 75, at 2192-97.
85. These scholars are uncharitably referred to in certain quarters as "Symps" (shorthand
for the tongue-in-cheek school of thought dubbed "Sympathetic Legal Studies") because of
their concern for the negative effects of secured financing on certain categories of unsecured
creditors. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2045. In fact, the label is unfair since
other commentators, for reasons unrelated to fairness to unsecured creditors per se, have
endorsed their own version of this theory. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 913-21
(explaining that their proposal for a rule of only partial priority for secured creditors in bank
ruptcy is predicated on concerns about the use of inefficient (non-welfare-maximizing) secur
ity interests, not the welfare of "victimized" unsecured creditors); Mann, supra note 73, at 4249 (using the construction context as a working example of the purely economic superiority
of a rule that gives contractors priority over construction lenders without regard to who was
first-in-time.).
86. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994).
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of nonconsensual and unwitting unsecured creditors.87 By transfer
ring a priority position in the debtor's assets to the favored creditor,
the debtor and that creditor are able both to externalize the risk of
subsequent tort liability and to "victimize" certain other unsecured
creditors - particularly those in the middle credit markets88 who simply lack the sophistication to appreciate that their exten
sion of credit to the debtor is little more than a trip to the roulette
wheel.89 LoPucki contends that the combination of these subsidies
causes a misallocation of resources by encouraging more secured
lending to occur than is optimal.9o
To rectify this situation, LoPucki proposes two simple yet con
troversial reforms of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The first is to subordinate secured creditors' priority in the debtor's
assets to the claims of tort victims.91 The second, and somewhat
more ambiguous proposal, is to award secured creditors priority
only over those unsecured creditors who can be shown to have con
sented in fact, rather than hypothetically, to a subordinate posiErl. See id. at 1891 (suggesting that the institution of secured credit "tends to misallocate
resources by imposing on unsecured creditors a bargain to which many, if not most, of them
have given no meaningful consent"). LoPucki divides the vast bulk of unsecured creditors
into two categories - involuntary creditors and uninformed creditors - and describes
unsecured creditors' prospects for recovery as wholly contingent on cash flow; that is to say,
without any expectation of recovery against the assets of the debtor in the event of liquida
tion. See id. at 1931-41. LoPucki distinguishes both of these categories of creditors from the
sophisticated, unsecured creditors who rely on negative covenants to stake out a claim to the
net worth of their borrowers, who are ordinarily large, public companies. See id. at 1924-31.
88. Large companies, LoPucki observes, are the only ones that approach bankruptcy with
significant amounts of unsecured credit. See id. at 1924-25.
89. These are LoPucki's "cash-flow surfers."

See id.

at 1907-16.

90. See id. at 1897-98 (noting that by simply entering into the security agreement the
debtor and a favored creditor are able to appropriate for themselves value that, in the
absence of such an agreement, would go to unsecured creditors); see also Bebchuk & Fried,
supra note 73, at 882-91 (explaining the phenomenon in terms of imposing a negative exter
nality on involuntary and uninformed creditors who are unable to adjust the terms of their
credit to reflect the expected loss arising from the existence of the secured credit). In order
to eliminate the incentive - consisting of this ability to transfer value from nonadjusting
unsecured creditors - on the part of the debtor and certain creditors, to adopt a secured
financing relationship even if value is lost as a result of that arrangement, Bebchuk and Fried
propose a rule of partial priority in bankruptcy for secured creditors based either on the
actual extent of nonadjustment or, patterned on the 1985 proposal by the German
Commission on Bankruptcy Law, a fixed percentage of every secured claim. See id. at 90513. Moreover, contrary to the approach customarily taken by commentators concerned with
theoretical efficiency, Professors Bebchuk and Fried explain that a rule of partial priority
should be imposed by legislative fiat, and not left to private ordering by the parties. See id. at
930-31.
91. Of course, the universe of involuntary creditors is broader than merely tort victims,
but LoPucki limits the scope of his subordination of secured creditors to tort creditors. See
LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1896-97; see also Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agenda for
Basic Reform, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 573, 579-80 (1995).
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tion.92 LoPucki maintains that the cumulative effect of these two
reforms would eliminate the unjustified advantages secured credi
tors presently enjoy under article 9 as a result of its tacit endorse
ment of the wholly :fictitious bargain invented by law and economics
scholars in their futile attempt to prove secured credit efficient.93

2.

A Property-Based Account of Secured Credit

Against the backdrop of this two-front assault on the article 9
security interest, Professors Harris and Mooney have developed a
normative justification for secured :financing grounded in deeply
rooted and hallowed concepts of private property.94 Harris and
Mooney's property-based analysis is straightfonvard and direct, but
no less elegant or compelling for its simplicity than some of the
more intellectually pretentious challenges to which it is in large
measure a response.95 Moreover, it raises a formidable challenge
92. See LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1947-48. To round out his package of reforms,
LoPucki also calls for modernization of the article 9 filing system to provide greater disclo
sure of the terms and conditions of the security arrangement between the debtor and the
secured party. See id. at 1950-51. For a more detailed account of these proposals, see Lynn
M. LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing System: Thoughts on Building the
Electronic Highway, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1992, at 5; see also Lynn M. LoPucki,

Why the Debtor's State ofIncorporation Should Be the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A
Systems Analysis, 79 Mum. L. REv. 577 (1995) (advocating an incorporation-based choice-of
law rule in order to assist searchers in assuring and reducing system costs).

93. See LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1892-96, 1935; see also James J. White, Work and Play
in Revising Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 2089, 2090-91 (1994) (agreeing that the economic effi

ciency debate is irrelevant, "pure intellectual masturbation," to quote his colorful phrase).
At the same time, however, White described LoPucki's proposal to elevate unsecured credi
tor priority as the "real threat" to the goal of maintaining systemic efficiency. See id. at 2093102. Using the results of perhaps the most comprehensive empirical investigation under
taken to date, Professor Ronald Mann also has cast into doubt the conclusions reached by
both the efficiency justifications for secured credit and the scholarship that criticizes the cur
rent regime as intended to exploit the inability of certain unsecured creditors to adjust the
cost of credit to reflect the higher risk that secured lending imposed on them by reducing the
pool of assets available to apply to their claims. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining tlze Pattern
of Secured Credit, 110 HAR.v. L. REv. 625, 683 (1997) (speculating that secured credit may
lower the cost of lending transactions "by enhancing the borrower's ablity to give a credible
commitment to refrain from excessive future borrowing and by limiting the borrower's ability
to engage in conduct that lessens the likelihood of repayment.").
94. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2047-53. Professors Harris and Mooney are
the reporters for the Drafting Committee for the proposed revision of article 9, conducted
under the joint supervision of the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. In large measure, the proposed revisions proceed
from a property-based conception of security. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REVJSBD
ARTICLE 9 (Discussion Draft No. 2, Apr. 1997). The adverse distributional impact of this
approach on unsecured creditors has raised serious questions about its appropriateness. See
LoPucki, supra note 86, at 1891, 1924-41.
95. But see Schwartz, supra note 75, at 2086 (asserting that Harris and Mooney fail in
their effort to explain security because they "do not seriously consider inefficiencies, arising
from market externalities and asymmetric information, that may be associated with
security").
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for anyone who advocates, as we do, that lien stripping ought to be
permitted in chapter 7 bankruptcy cases.
Concisely, Harris and Mooney advance an apologia for secured
credit grounded upon the normative theories that justify the institu
tion of private property.96 Although cognizant that all property
interests are not identical and that to recognize an interest as a
property interest does not end further inquiry,97 they accept as
essentially sound the baseline principles that underlie the policies of
freedom of contract and free alienability of property rights.98 They
then explore the implications of those baseline principles for the
law of secured transactions, concluding that there is nothing suffi
ciently different or unique about conveyances for security purposes
or their distributive effects to warrant a deviation from the ordinary
deference to party autonomy that controls when dealing with other
forms of property transfers.99 While Harris and Mooney construct
their account of security in the context of the debate over the future
of the law of personal property financing, what they have to say in
support of a "hands off" approach to article 9 security interests
applies equally to secured credit as an institution, including real
property liens and encumbrances.
Harris and Mooney's defense of security transfers from the
attacks that have been leveled from the right, on grounds of waste
ful inefficiencies, and from the left, on grounds of unfairness, serves
as a healthy reminder that the burden of persuasion rests with those
who would favor eliminating or limiting the effectiveness of consen
sual security interests.100 Although we can conceive of that case
96. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2048-53. Encapsulated within this conceptu
alization are the related precepts of freedom of contract and the right to alienate property
freely, as well the right of an owner of private property to enjoy his property, within certain
widely circumscribed parameters, to the exclusion of others.
97. The issue is not so much whether property rights are absolute, but the extent to which
the state may limit or interfere with private property ownership. While opinions on this
question differ, nobody in our political-economic system seriously questions the importance
and deference to be accorded to such rights as a threshold proposition. See generally
Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 321 n.347, and authorities cited therein.
98.

See Harris & Mooney, supra note

13, at 2050.

99. See id. at 2052-53. The two important principles the authors derive from analogizing a
security transfer to any other transfer of an interest in property are: (1) Article 9 should be
drafted to facilitate rather than impede the creation of security interests; and (2) the scope of
article 9 should be expanded to include several types of transactions that are now excluded.
See U.C.C. § 9-104 (1994).
100. See also White, supra note 93, at 2092, 2099 (suggesting, in connection with a com
mentary on Harris and Mooney's work, that if article 9 were repealed, the response inevita
bly would be the development of what, in all likelihood, would be even less efficient and less
advantageous security substitutes). Professor White has broadly called for retention and
even expansion of the first-to-file priority principle that now forms one of the central under
pinnings of article 9. See James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Igno-
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being made, perhaps most easily in relation to the priority of non
consensual unsecured claims,101 Harris and Mooney have refocused
and centered the debate by pointing out, quite accurately, that any
one who has a proposal to make in this area writes against the back
drop of a deeply rooted legal tradition, and not tabula rasa.
Harris and Mooney conclude that the extent to which secured
transactions promote efficiency considerations and general social
welfare are empirical questions probably not conducive to reaching
a definitive answer.102 While that assertion certainly is true, it is
equally certain, regardless of whether the precise effects can be
measured or not, that a debtor that fully encumbers its assets has
externalized the cost of its tort and other general business risks to
its unsecured creditors and, in the process, effectively eliminated
any hope for successful reorganization if the debtor later
encounters :financially turbulent waters.103 Harris and Mooney
would respond to this point presumably by pointing out that by
focusing only on the distributional consequences of secured credit,
we potentially overlook the fact that an extension of credit to a
troubled debtor, even if secured, may still be better for unsecured
creditors than if their debtor is unable to borrow at all.104 Although
ranee and New Filing Rules, 79 MINN. L. REv. 529, 535 (1995). For another contemporary

apologia for the current system, as well as the current direction of the refonn process, see
Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC Revision Process: A Reply to Dean Scott, 37
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217 (1995).
101. The authors of this article differ on whether uninfonned creditors, so-called
"Bubbas," should be accorded the same treatment as tort creditors, but then one of us is
biased by his lifelong affiliation with that group, while the other is perhaps insensitive
because of his inability to relate. See Steve Knippenberg, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain:
An Essay in Reply, Reprisal, or Support?, 80 VA. L. REv. 1967, 1969 n.13 {1994).
102. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2047.
103. This is essentially a problem of scope; that is, whether secured creditors should be
permitted, to the detriment of general creditors, to take a lien on virtually everything the
debtor owns, thereby ensuring participation in the debtor's successes if things go well, with
out risking serious loss if the debtor fails. We are sympathetic to the view that the reach of
secured credit should not extend to this extent. In fact, one of us has been active in advanc
ing a proposal that would permit a lien creditor of a business debtor to execute on a fully
encumbered debtor's assets and receive a specified percentage of the proceeds of sale ahead
of the secured creditor. However, the issue insofar as this proposal is concerned is an inter
creditor issue and, as such, it is outside the scope of this article. However, the existence of
the debate does serve to underscore the point that, in both a bankruptcy and a nonban
kruptcy setting, we have some control over the concept of security, and that, in defining a
security interest, we have the freedom to proceed from a sound balancing of nonnative
objectives, not an immutable set of a priori principles.
104. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2035. The authors refer to this phenomenon
as the "second best" result for unsecured creditors. See also Steven L. Schwartz, The Limits
of Theory: A Lesson from the Secured Credit Controversy (May 27, 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors) (arguing that Bebchuk and Fried, as well as other commen
tators critical of article 9's basic priority scheme, tend to ignore the fact that the increased
liquidity afforded by secured credit in times of financial difficulty actually creates value for
unsecured creditors as well as for the debtor).
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this observation fails to address satisfactorily all of the problems
associated with a system that permits a debtor to pledge all of its
assets to a single creditor, Harris and Mooney's conveyance model
remains a highly workable heuristic apparatus for understanding
how security operates under state law. Moreover, it reveals why
the quest to solve the "puzzle" of secured credit may simply have
been a wild goose chase from the beginning.10s
But what of the conveyance model as it relates to secured credi
tors and secured claims in bankruptcy? More specifically, what are
the implications of this conceptualization of a security interest as a
form of private property not just for the general creditors of a
firm,106 but specifically for a consumer debtor? Even more to the
point, what are the implications of the conveyance model for the
Dewsnup issue, and are they tenable? It is at this juncture that we
encounter the limits of the conveyance model precisely because,
ironically enough, of its distributional effects in the case of those
debtors who do become insolvent.
IV.

SECURED CLAIMS
A.

AND

BANKRUPTCY POLICY

The Limits of the Conveyance Model

Insolvency, of course, is the risk against which a secured creditor
has hedged. Harris and Mooney's defense of secured credit is pre
mised, in significant part, on the belief that the distributive effects
of secured credit upon insolvency are neither contrary to the wealth
maximization norm nor any more prejudicial to unsecured creditors
than are other forms of wealth transfers.107 Some, but far fewer
than all, insolvent debtors seek bankruptcy relief. Those who do
and who are individual debtors are presumptively entitled to a fresh
105. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2036 ("Whether the benefits of secured
credit outweigh its costs in a few, many, or most of the circumstances in which security inter
ests are granted is an empirical question that cannot be answered with any certainty using
existing information."). The first serious effort to develop these empirical data reveals that
the reasons why commercial debtors resort to secured and unsecured credit are more com
plex, as well as industry- and context-dependent, than they have been given credit for in the
literature to date. See Mann, supra note 93, at 630 (pointing out that prior attempts at grand
theoretical justifications have ignored important party motivations and incentives that signifi
cantly affect borrowers' decision to use or not to use collateral).
106.

See supra note 99.

107. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2067-71 (arguing that the purposes and
benefits of giving and taking security would be undermined considerably if security interests
were not generally honored in bankruptcy). But see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 891903 (maintaining that according full priority to secured creditors in bankruptcy undermines
the goal of economic efficiency by promoting excessive use of security interests).
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start.1os In addition, it is certainly not unheard of for a balance
sheet-solvent debtor to take refuge from cash flow pressures or
other business problems in a chapter 11 proceeding. Thus, when
Harris and Mooney test their conveyance model of security inter
ests against bankruptcy policy, and find the two not fundamentally
incompatible,109 they overlook a central tenet of their own norma
tive view of security interests. Specifically, they fail to see that the
logical concomitant of a property-based theory would be that a
secured creditor's protectible interest is not limited to the value of
the property at any given point in time. Rather, it should extend to
future as well as to existing equity and to control over the decision
of when to realize that value through foreclosure or otherwise. no
In bankruptcy, however, while there may be general agreement that
bankruptcy proceeds from state-law entitlements and priorities, 111
we also begin with the notion that a claim is "secured" only to the
extent of the value of the underlying collateral as of the date of

108. Section 707(b) of the Code, which essentially pennits dismissal of a chapter 7 case
where the debtor is able to pay off a substantial portion of her debts in a chapter 13 plan,
nevertheless provides: "There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief
requested by the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1994).
109. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2067. The authors conclude both that bank
ruptcy policy does not conflict with the principle of honoring a debtor's prebankruptcy trans
fers of property generally, and that there is nothing "special" about security interests that
give rise to a conflict with bankruptcy policy. Of course, the Code regards at least some
transfers as beyond the pale. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547-548 (1994). Although we have no prob
lem with respecting and enforcing the transfer, or with its conceptualization as a property
interest for state-law purposes, we believe that in a bankruptcy context, fresh-start policy
dictates the interest should not be deemed to continue beyond the filing of the case. See infra
notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
110. This follows naturally from Harris and Mooney's insistence that the transfer of a
security interest must be understood in the same manner as the physical transfer of posses
sion. As we demonstrate below, however, once we abandon the unstated assumption that the
conveyance- or property-based model is the only appropriate metaphoric concept for defin
ing security, the secured creditor's claim to future appreciation through control over the dis
position of the property immediately becomes more attenuated. See infra text accompanying
notes 204-10.
111. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2067 n.135. The basic disagreement that
exists in the literature is not over the recognition of state-law rights and priorities as a start
ing place for analysis, but over whether, and the extent to which, bankruptcy should have a
distributional policy separate and apart from the distributional scheme imposed by state debt
collection law. See Frost, supra note 56, at 82-91, 122-35 (describing the nature of the disa·
greement, but concluding, wrongly in our judgment, that bankruptcy is not suited to
redistributing the social and economic costs of business failure). But see Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 775, 789-90 (1987) (pointing out that the bankruptcy
process is our system for distributing the costs of simultaneous default to multiple creditors
- an issue that is not addressed directly by state law).
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filing or confumation.112 Moreover, with one curious exception,113
a secured creditor's protectible interest in a debtor-rehabilitation
proceeding is limited to the current value of its collateral.114
Harris and Mooney perhaps even overstate the threshold point
that most scholars agree that, at least as a baseline, bankruptcy law
should honor nonbankruptcy entitlements.Us Even the law and
economics scholars who adhere most strictly to that baseline - due
mainly to its compatibility with their view on the scope of bank
ruptcy policyn6 - acknowledge that a bankruptcy system cannot
honor state-law entitlements in every respect. Rather, they contend
that what matters is preserving the "relative value" of state-law
rights and entitlements.117 But this is very different from preserving
every aspect of the interest including, potentially, its future entail112. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 1129(b)(2), 1225(a)(5), 1325(a)(5) (1994); Carlson, Under
secured Claims, supra note 6, at 304-06 (discussing whether bankruptcy values should be
regarded as fixed or subject to change as circumstances during the course of the case dictate).
The time for valuation, particularly in reorganization cases, is a subject of vigorous and con
tinuing disagreement; see also supra note 54. See Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W. Ridings,
Reorganization Value, 51 Bus. LAw. 419 (1996); infra note 223; see also In re Maddox, 194
B.R. 762 (Bankr. D.N.J.) (addressing the issue in the context of a chapter 13 plan), affd., 200
B.R. 546 (D.N.J. 1996).
113. The exception, of course, is for debts secured only by the debtor's principal resi
dence pursuant to § 1322(b)(2), which cannot be modified in a chapter 13 plan. See
Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993). The exception is curious, in our
judgment, precisely because it attaches to what is usually the single most important asset in a
consumer bankruptcy case: the debtor's home. Its inclusion in the Code may be explicable
much more easily with reference to special-interest pressure than in terms of its consonance
with Code policy. Cf. Veryl Victoria Myles, The Bifurcation of Undersecured Residential
Mortgages Under § 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Final Resolution, 67 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 207, 218 (1993) (describing the provisions as a compromise reflecting Congress's
desire to protect the home mortgage industry). Because, however, most home mortgage
loans will have a remaining term considerably longer than the term of the chapter 13 plan,
this restriction is of less practical significance than might be apparent at first blush. See In re
Foster, 61 B.R. 492 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (suggesting that § 1322(d) (formerly (c)) should
be read as prohibiting modification of any debt, the last payment under which is due after the
last payment date under the proposed plan); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994) (added by
the 1994 Amendments to permit modification of a home-mortgage loan, the final payment
for which is due prior to the date on which the final payment under the plan is due). More
over, as a practical matter, if the mortgage bas ten or more years remaining, even if modifica
tion were not prohibited, it would be difficult in most cases to come up with a plan that
satisfied the confirmation standard for the secured portion of the debt as set forth in
§ 1325(a)(5).
114. See supra note 12. In a chapter 11 case, a qualification must be made for a creditor
that makes the § llll(b) election, but even then the creditor is only entitled to payments
with an aggregate value of the amount owed, and not the present value of the face amount of
the claim. For an alternative reading of § llll(b), see Carlson, Unsecured Claims, supra note
6, at 300-04. We adopt the reading that Professor Carlson acknowledges to be the "orthodox
interpretation." Id. at 291.
115.
116.

See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2067 n.135.
See supra note 52.
See supra note 53. But see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 862-63 (challenging

117.
the traditional view that it is desirable to recognize the state-law priority rights of secured
creditors to the greatest extent possible in bankruptcy).
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ments. Moreover, there are numerous instances in which the Code
substantively alters prebankruptcy entitlements and priorities in
order to advance a specific bankruptcy policy, whether it be equal
ity,118 equity,119 maximization of value,120 or fresh start. 121 Finally,
even among scholars whose normative judgment about the efficacy
of legal rules is inversely correlated with their assessment of the
extent to which such rules produce negative distributional conse
quences, there is no longer unanimous assent to the view, derived
from the "creditors' bargain theory,"122 that economic efficiency
demands that the secured creditor's bargain must be emulated in
bankruptcy.123
B.

"Liens Survive Bankruptcy": Eternal Verity or Silly
Semantics?

A 1995 decision from the Seventh Circuit,124 authored by Chief
Judge Posner, illustrates this point, albeit perhaps inadvertently.
John and Alyce Penrod were hog farmers. They executed a promis
sory note for $150,000 to the predecessor in interest of Mutual
Guaranty Corporation. The note was secured by the Penrods' hogs.
A year later, the Penrods filed for relief under chapter 11 and even
tually proposed and confirmed a reorganization plan in which
Mutual Guaranty's claim would be paid in full, with interest, over
seven years. 125 The plan made no mention of Mutual Guaranty's
lien on the hogs. After the plan went into effect, the Penrods sold
what Mutual Guaranty apparently believed were still its hogs.
When the Penrods refused to tum the proceeds from the sale over
to Mutual Guaranty as required under the terms of the original
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) (permitting the trustee to avoid prebankruptcy trans
fer of the debtor's property, including transfers for security purposes, that undermine the
bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors).
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994) (conferring discretion on the bankruptcy court to alter
the legal priority of claims based upon equitable considerations).
120. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(a), (d) (1994) (allowing the debtor to prevent enforcement
of a security interest by providing adequate protection to the secured creditor).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(13) {1994) (permitting the debtor to avoid nonpossessory,
nonpurchase money security interests in certain collateral, including consumer goods and
tools of the trade, to the extent such security interest impairs an exemption).
122. See supra note 52.
123. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 73, at 895-902 {arguing that according full priority
to secured claims in bankruptcy tends to reduce the efficiency of the loan agreement consum
mated between the borrower and the secured creditor); Picker, supra note 52, at 661-62
(maintaining that secured credit can be employed to solve the common-pool problem,
thereby eliminating the need for the mandatory Eden that the creditors' bargain theory
imposes to justify the existence of the bankruptcy system).
124. See In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459 (7th Cir. 1995).
125. See 50 F.3d at 461.
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security agreement, Mutual Guaranty sued in state court to enforce
its lien against the proceeds. The Penrods responded by seeking a
contempt order from the bankruptcy court on the ground that
Mutual Guaranty had violated the confirmation order. The bank
ruptcy court ruled that Mutual Guaranty's lien had been extin
guished and enjoined Mutual Guaranty from attempting to enforce
it, and the district court affirmed.126
On further appeal, the Seventh Circuit observed that the default
rule under the Code for secured creditors who file claims for which
provision is made in the plan is extinction of the lien unless the plan
expressly provides otherwise.127 Because this particular plan did
make provision for the claim, and because that provision did not
include continuance of the lien, the court concluded that of neces
sity the lien was extinguished upon confirmation. In response to
Mutual Guaranty's property-based rejoinder, Judge Posner's opin
ion expressed surprise that it was still necessary to debunk the myth
that "liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected," observing that,
" [t]hey do - unless they are brought into the bankruptcy proceed
ing and dealt with there."128 Finally, the court dismissed as
126. See 50 F.3d at 461.
127. See 50 F.3d at 462-63. The court based its interpretation on the express language of
§114l{c), which provides that "except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order
confinning the plan, after confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free
and clear of all claims and interests of creditors." 11U.S.C.§1141{c) {1994); see also Simon
v. Tip Top CreditUnion (In re Simon), Nos. 94-3304, 94-3312, 1996U.S. App. LEXIS 8733, at
*7 {10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (applying Penrotf); Tor Husjord Shipping v. Isabel/San Benito
Navigation Dist. (In re Burton Secs. S.A.), No. C96-68, 1996U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16951, at *23
(S.D. Tex. July 2, 1996) (citing Penrod in support of the proposition that liens, once brought
into a bankruptcy proceeding, can be altered there). In FDIC v. Union Entities (In re Be
Mac Transp. Co.), 83 F.3d 1020 {8th Cir. 1996), the court observed that a creditor could only
lose its lien under§114l{c) "if the lien holder participated in the reorganization; otherwise,
its lien would not be 'property dealt with by the plan."' 83 F.3d at 1026 (citing Penrod, 50
F.3d at 463). However, even if the creditor elects to ignore the proceeding, the debtor can
always force the issue by filing a claim for the creditor under §50l{c). See supra note 43
(quoting Penrod, 50 F.3d at 459, 462). Moreover, in Winchell v. Town of Wilmington (In re
Winchell), 200 B.R. 734 {Bankr. D. Mass. 1996), the court relied on the broad definition of
property of the estate in§541 as the basis for finding that the creditor's lien was extinguished
upon confirmation of the debtor's plan, even though neither the creditor nor the debtor had
filed a proof of claim. See 200 B.R. at 737-38.
128. Penrod, 50 F.3d at 463. The court rejected as well the argument that the plan dealt
only with the secured creditor's claim, but not with its lien. See Penrod, 50 F.3d at 463. But
see Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89 {4th Cir. 1995) (refusing to interpret § 1327(c),
despite its linguistic similarity to §114l{c), as releasing the debtors' property from a mort
gage that, under the terms of the plan, had been treated as an unsecured claim); Manistee
County v. Reef Petroleum Corp. (In re Reef Petroleum Corp.), 92 B.R. 741 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1988). While Chief Judge Posner in Penrod recognized that the axiom that "liens pass
through bankruptcy unaffected" was little more than a mesmerizing rhetorical aphorism, the
court in Cen-Pen fell prey to that rhetoric even though, in that case, the mortgagee had raised
no objection to its treatment under the plan. See Cen-Pen, 58 F.3d at 92 ("[L]iens pass
through bankruptcy unaffected . . . [u]nless the debtor takes affirmative action to avoid a
security interest in the property of the estate
"); see also In re Beta Intl., Inc., No. 96. . • .
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essentially frivolous Mutual Guaranty's suggestion that this inter
pretation of the Code might be problematic under the Due Process
Clause or Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.129
Unquestionably, the decision in Penrod, authored by one of the
early luminaries of the law and economics movement, establishes
that what comes out of a bankruptcy proceeding may bear little
resemblance to that which entered. The reason for this potential
transmogrification, contemplated in Code provisions like section
506(d) no less than in section 1141(c), is that bankruptcy does have
certain normative policy objectives distinct from those of state col
lection law.130 Not the least of these, in a consumer bankruptcy
case, is the fresh start for a financially beleaguered debtor.131
In spite of the majority's deliberate attempt to limit the prece
dential value of the holding,132 Dewsnup might have triggered a
71561, 1996U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18869 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 1996) (distinguishing Cen-Pen and
Penrod based on the specific provisions of§ 1141(c)); Coffin v. Malvern Fed. Sav. Bank, 189
B.R. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (distinguishing Penrod on the grounds that the mortgagee in this
case had not attempted to collect, and the plan did not provide for, the entire debt owing to
the creditor, but only the past due arrearages). But see Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v.
Smithwick, 202 B.R. 420 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (applying Penrod in the context of a confinned
chapter 13 plan).
129. See Penrod, 50 F.3d at 464 (noting that the creditor's reliance on United States v.
Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), was misplaced since the creditor could have
protected its property interest from an uncompensated taldng by appealing from the order
confirming confinnation). With respect to lien stripping per se, Security Industrial Bank is
equally not a bar since, by virtue of having a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of
the value of the secured claim, and by having an unsecured claim for the unsecured portion
of the claim, nothing has been taken from the creditor. See Howard, supra note 24, at 416
(noting that the lien avoided under § 506(d) is without current value - an "empty legal
right"); see also In re Butcher, 189 B.R. 357, 372-73 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995) (rejecting a similar
challenge to § 522(b) premised on a rational basis standard); infra note 144.
130. As observed supra note 53, this is a pivotal point of disagreement in contemporary
scholarship over bankruptcy purposes and policymaking. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg,
supra note 56, at 948-62; see also infra text accompanying notes 230-34.
131. See supra note 23. The fresh start represents neither a cognizable legal right nor a
fonnal legal status. Rather it is the condition intended to result from the application of spe
cific bankruptcy rules in particular cases. While the centrality of the fresh start as a core
feature of the consumer bankruptcy system is no longer an open question, serious disagree
ment over the nonnative underpinnings of the fresh-start doctrine still exists and has enor
mous implications for questions relating to application of the doctrine in particular contexts.
See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 250-52; see also Beth A. Buchanan
Staudenmaier, Note, Survival of Liens: "Liens Pass Through Bankruptcy Unaffected" - Or
Do They? In re Penrod
Challenging an Adage, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445 (1996) (argu
ing that the approach taken by Judge Posner in Penrod adequately balances the competing
fresh-start and creditor-protection goals of bankruptcy).
-

132. The Court stated: "We
focus upon the case [only] before us and allow other facts
to await their legal resolution on another day." Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 416-17
(1992). The court went on to admonish that "we express no opinion as to whether the words
'allowed secured claim' have different meaning in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."
Dewsnup, 502U.S. at 417 n.3. For discussion of how courts have interpreted that language in
other debtor-relief contexts, see supra note 12.
• . .
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return to an in rem notion of security interests in bankruptcy.133 As
Penrod robustly illustrates, however, it did not.134 Instead, it seems
that the Supreme Court's decision in United Savings Association v.

Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Inc. (In re Timbers of Inwood
Forest Associates)135 rendered four years prior to Dewsnup, was
indeed the watershed event it appeared to be at the time, in terms
of laying to rest the notion that a secured creditor's "interest in
property" could be determined in isolation from other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code.136 In virtually every context in which the
Dewsnup issue has been presented to the courts, the outcome has
been to reject expansion of the doctrine beyond the narrow factual
parameters of the case.137 For a time, the only significant exception
was in the case of lien avoidance under section 522(f) of the
Code.138 However, as discussed earlier, Congress has now
amended that provision in a manner that implicitly abnegates a
property-based conception of security in this context as well in
favor of one that recognizes only the secured creditor's priority in
collateral to the extent of its immediate prebankruptcy value.139
As useful and as normatively appealing as Harris and Mooney's
property metaphor may be for understanding the institution of
secured credit within the broader framework of the commercial
law, the explanatory prowess of the model breaks down when
extended to the bankruptcy milieu. It does so not because this con
ceptualization of security is flawed necessarily, although the
133. See Newborn, supra note 4, at 573-81 (suggesting that prior bankruptcy law, includ
ing the former Bankruptcy Act, was more inclined to accept an in rem notion of security and,
thus, was more reticent about altering the lien enforcement rights of secured creditors).
134. See supra notes 12, 54 and accompanying text.
135. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
136. In Timbers, the Court rejected the argument that an undersecured creditor, as a
condition to the continuation of the stay, was entitled to compensation for the "lost opportu
nity costs" attributable to the delay in repossessing and realizing the value of the collateral.
Instead, the Court concluded that the creditor's "interest in property" entitled to adequate
protection under § 361 was limited to the value of the collateral as of the time of filing. See
Timbers, 484 U.S. at 370-82. How to measure that value, and at what point in time, has been
a continuing source of controversy and uncertainty. See supra note 65; infra note 223. But
see Carlson, supra note 10, at 20-23 (contending that, after Dewsnup, secured creditors are
entitled to claim post-filing appreciation value in reorganization proceedings until confirma
tion, and again upon conversion or dismissal). While his main focus is on reorganization
cases, Professor Carlson points out that a logical reading of Dewsnup is that § 506(a) valua
tion might never constitute a ceiling on undersecured entitlements to collateral, short of
actual sale. See id. at 4.
137. See supra note 12. For example, in Harmon v. United States, 101 F.3d 574, 581-83
(8th Cir. 1996), the court noted that the weight of authority now establishes that lien
stripping is permitted in all reorganization chapters.
138. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 15-17.
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attempt to define a security interest as a property interest has been
vigorously resisted in some quarters.140 Rather, even giving this
conceptualization of security its due, the model fails because bank
ruptcy policy establishes the limits of private property no less than
it does the limits of sanctity of contract.141 Dewsnup's interdiction
against lien stripping has been rejected in chapter 11 and 13 cases
because it would effectively eviscerate the rehabilitative policy that
underlies those chapters.142 Similarly, Dewsnup should be dis
carded in chapter 7 because it interferes fundamentally with fresh
start policy and is not necessary to protect the secured creditor's
interest in the estate's property in a bankruptcy proceeding. To the
extent that the property-based characterization of security interests
is at odds with this formulation, it too should be rejected once a
bankruptcy proceeding has been initiated.143
Once we get beyond the false rhetoric in Dewsnup that lien
stripping implicates constitutional concerns,144 we can appreciate
140. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2051 n.82 (referring to a functional approach
to security devised by Professors LoPucki and Warren); see also John D. Ayer, Rethinking
Absolute Priority After Ahlers, '07 MICH. L. REv. 963, 989-90 (1989) (describing the "demise
of property as possession" in the Supreme Court's (pre-Dewsnup) approach to property
interests in bankruptcy cases).
141. See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 99 (1990) (discussing bankruptcy's liberal policy of discharging individuals from con
tractual obligations in comparison to traditional contract law's "miserly approach" to excus
ing parties who fail to perform as agreed from liability for breach).
142. See supra notes 12, 129.
143. Of course, it is not a foregone conclusion that a property-based conception of secur
ity is inconsistent with this view of bankruptcy policy and purposes. To the extent the under
secured creditor receives a priority claim in its collateral, its property interest arguably has
been fully vindicated. It is the undersecured portion of the claim - which has no value that is stripped down. In this sense there is no taking. This is why, for example, strip down
poses no serious constitutional question. See infra note 144. On the other hand, if one
includes within the definition of the property right conveyed to the secured creditor the right
to foreclose on the collateral and choose the time of foreclosure, then, to that extent, bank
ruptcy conflicts with the property-based understanding of security.

144. See Howard, supra note 39, at 524-25 (explaining that the constitutional issue in
relationship to Dewsnup is a false one; that is, there can be no taking if the lien avoided
under § 506(d) has no value); see also James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured

Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth
Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973, 9'07-88 (1983) (explaining
why Fifth Amendment uncompensated takings arguments with respect to the impairment of
secured claims fail because of the primacy of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution);

supra note 129. It might also be argued that even if one were to conclude in this context that
there was a taking for the benefit of another private person, the taking might still be permit
ted as a justifying public purpose - the national interest in debtor relief, with the creditor's
corresponding unsecured claim as compensation. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984). This assumes that an undersecured creditor whose lien is not
stripped down has no claim for the unsecured portion of its claim. See Howard, supra note
39, at 517-18. However, as discussed infra note 183, it is not clear that an unsecured claim is
barred in the absence of strip down and that, therefore, it can properly be treated as recom
pense for strip down were it permitted to occur.

June 1997]

Secured Credit and Bankruptcy

2271

that Justice Blackm.un's analysis was influenced heavily by the
implicit conception of a security interest as entailing a bargain
between the debtor and creditor,145 a notion that is congruent in
many respects with the theoretical underpinnings of Harris and
Mooney's conveyance model.146 This bargain metaphor, perfectly
valid and fiercely rational under state law and procedures, conjures
up entailments of vested rights and interests that, once internalized,
preordain the protection of those rights and interests under virtu
ally any circumstances. The bankruptcy regime, however, changes
the rules of the game. Many bargains, fairly struck and fully
enforceable in the workaday world, come undone once a bank
ruptcy petition is filed. Hard-core promises are broken and, in the
process, losses reallocated between debtor and creditors and among
creditors inter se.147 In fact, in its most fundamental sense, bank
ruptcy, whether in its liquidation or reorganization mode, repre
sents nothing less than a wholesale and compulsory readjustment of
contractual obligations148 and realignment of property interests.149
In this mix, the time-honored axioms that "liens pass through bank
ruptcy"1so and "bankruptcy respects state law entitlements"1s1 are
145. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) ("[f]he creditor's lien stays with the
real property until the foreclosure. That is what was bargained for by the mortgagor and the
mortgagee.").
146. See supra section III.B.2. Admittedly, this assumes that the property interest con
veyed includes not only the right to foreclosure value but the right to choose the timing on
foreclosure. Since bankruptcy is always a known possibility, and since, under state law, a
mortgagee is not always assured of controlling the timing on foreclosure - for example,
another lienholder may elect to initiate such proceedings - it is not by any means impossible
to reconcile a property-based conception of security with the characterization of secured
claims in bankruptcy advanced here. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 13, at 2068 (observing
that bankruptcy requires "that property claimants recover their property or its value before
the conclusion of the case" (emphasis added)).
147. See Warren, supra note 66, 352-61 (discussing the distributional functions of the busi
ness bankruptcy system).
148. See generally Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 717, 774 (1991) (describing the bankruptcy system as the
forum where the diverse aims and values of the participants in financial distress can be
debated and ultimately synthesized into a coherent view of what it is that the rehabilitated
enterprise shall exist to do in the future).

149. There are numerous Bankruptcy Code provisions that have the effect of either elimi
nating liens entirely or altering the post-bankruptcy rights of lienholders, including the
trustee's avoiding powers, the debtor's power to avoid certain liens under § 522(f)(l), and the
ability to modify the rights of secured claimholders in various reorganization proceedings.
See supra notes 118-21; see also In re Penrod, 50 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1995), discussed supra
text accompanying notes 124-29; Howard, supra note 39, at 526 ("A more accurate statement
is that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected only if none of bankruptcy's powers to affect
liens have been brought to bear.").
150. See Dewsnup v. T1Illlll, 502 U.S. 410, 418 n.4 (1992) (identifying support for the
proposition in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act).
151.

See supra note 54.
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still bandied about with great frequency. Yet they are alone only
empty incantations, and even in context they at best represent
incomplete and imperfect expressions of reality that take on subtle
shadings of different meaning depending on the particular context
in which they are raised.
There is nothing new � all of this. Put in its proper historical
context, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was an evolutionary,
not a revolutionary, piece of legislation. Debtors have been able to
discharge contractual obligations, wholly valid and otherwise
enforceable under state law, since at least the time of the Bank
ruptcy Act of 1841.152 Renegotiation of contractual obligations,
including secured obligations, in reorganization or rehabilitation
proceedings goes back at least as far as the Chandler Act of 1938.153
Furthermore, notwithstanding Justice Blackmun's protestations in

Dewsnup to the contrary, even in straight bankruptcy, the Bank
ruptcy Act of 1898 was not entirely neutral insofar as the treatment
of the state-law rights of undersecured creditors was concemed.154
Unquestionably, however, the Bankruptcy Reform Act did expand
in certain critical respects the ability of the debtor or the trustee to
alter prebankruptcy bargains in order to attain bankruptcy goals.155
An essential component of this undertaking was the Code's adop
tion, in a far more overt manner than anything even hinted at under
the former Act, of the principle that the secured creditor's rights
were limited to the value of its collateral rather than to a possessory
152. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); see Tabb, supra note 43, at
350-53.
153. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978). The
Chandler Act amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544
(repealed 1978), added to the bankruptcy law, among other things, chapter X (addressing
corporate reorganizations), and chapter XII (addressing real property arrangements), both of
which permitted the extension or reduction of secured as well as unsecured debt under
proper circumstances. See Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy Law, 81
CoM. LJ. 226, 231 (1976). The other new form of reorganization, chapter XI arrangements,
was confined to unsecured debt. The general principles of composition and extension have
even more ancient antecedents in Anglo-American bankruptcy law. See generally JAMES
ANGELL MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF TiiE LAW OF B ANKRUPTCY 371-72 (1956); Charles
Jordan Tabb, The History ofthe Bankruptcy Law ofthe United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 5, 27-29 (1995).
154. See generally Frank R. Kennedy, Secured Creditors Under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, 15 IND. L. REV. 477, 482-86 (1982) (noting that the former Bankruptcy Act's approach to
secured claims was largely left to implication); Newborn, supra note 4, at 565-67 (describing
the treatment of undersecured claims in straight bankruptcy cases under § 57(h) of the Act).
155. Explicit claim bifurcation under § 506(a), the liberalization of the standards gov
erning preference recovery pursuant to § 547(b), the ability of consumer debtors to redeem
items of personal property under § 722, and the right to avoid exemption-impairing liens can
be pointed to as just a few examples. See generally Kennedy, supra note 154, at 486-97
(describing the efforts made under the Code in relation to secured creditors as particularizing
and clarifying the ways in which their rights are affected).
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interest in the collateral itself.156 Th.is principle found substance,
for example, in the concept that, under the Code, a debtor might
retain essential collateral even though there was no equity cushion
to protect the secured creditor.157 In short, the Code openly
embraced a sufficiently new and different attitude toward under
secured claims so as to render feeble at best Justice Blackm.un's
contention that application of the plain language of section 506(d)
would amount to an unwarranted break with pre-Code practices
relating to the treatment of liens.15s
C.

The Multiple Lien Redux

Whatever the answer is to the puzzle of secured credit as a mat
ter of state commercial law,159 the bargain metaphor is untenable in
a bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy generally, and chapter 7 in particu
lar, represents a day of financial reckoning. All prefiling claims are
accelerated,160 adjudicated (or estimated, if necessary),161 priori156. See Peter F. Coogan, Article 9
An Agenda for the Next Decade, '67 YALE L.J.
1012, 1028-30 (1978) {indicating that the Code had moved away from an approach that
vie)ved the secured party's interest as "property rights" to one that recognized the interest as
a prior claim against specific assets). That view, analogizing a security interest to a priority
claim rather than a property right per se, is consistent with the approach to security advo
cated in this article. See infra text accompanying notes 216-29.
157. See 11 U.S.C. § 362{d){2) {1994); see also car!son, supra note 10, at 18-19 (noting
that under the Act the absence of an equity cushion was per se grounds for relief from the
automatic stay).
158. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 n.4 {1992); see also Howard, supra note 39,
at 527-29 {describing the changes made in the Code to the rights of lienholders as involving a
"rebalancing" of the rights of debtors and creditors). Professor carlson goes even further,
describing Congress's approach under the Code to undersecured claims as representing "a
sweeping sea of change in the law of the undersecured creditor." Carlson, supra note 10, at
20. Thus, he concurs with Professor Newborn that Dewsnup wrongly abandoned "the prior
ity theory of the Code in favor of an outmoded in rem theory of the old Bankruptcy Act." Id.
159. Under state law, the issue comes down to a battle of sorts between secured and
unsecured creditors. LoPucki, for example, perceives as noted that security extracts a sub
sidy from unsecured creditors that is not reflected in the fonn of lower borrowing costs, but is
arrogated to the secured lender. Thus, LoPucki would subordinate secured creditors' priority
to at least two classes of unprotected unsecured creditors. See supra notes 91-93 and accom
panying text. While not unsympathetic to both the fairness and efficiency concerns motivat
ing LoPucki's proposal, our assertions in this article are not nearly so bold or radical. We
would recognize the secured creditor's priority in bankruptcy in its collateral to the exclusion
of other creditors up to the value of that collateral. We propose only that if the debtor can
find a way to save the property from foreclosure, any subsequent appreciation should be used
to prime the debtor's fresh start. See infra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
160. In certain other instances, typically involving a prebankruptcy default in an install
ment obligation, claims are actually deaccelerated. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers
Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1102 {1985) {discussing Code
§§ 1123{a)(5)(G), 1124(2), 1322(b){3)). These situations occur, however, under the reorgani
zation chapters of the Code.
161. See 11 U.S.C. § 502{c){l) {1994) (authorizing the bankruptcy court to estimate any
unliquidated or contingent claim when necessary to avoid undue delay in the administration
of the estate).
-
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tized inter se, and ultimately settled. The idea of "fresh start,"
whatever else it means, demands that we cleave a wide chasm
between the debtor's pre- and postfiling lives.162 To do so implies
that there is no more intrinsic reason for clinging to the bargain
metaphor in the case of security interests than there is in the case of
garden-variety unsecured contractual obligations.163 To illustrate
the point we return to the example that was the organon for the
original discussion.
In that example we hypothesized a chapter 7 debtor with a
homestead valued at $120,000 and subject to three liens consisting,
in order of priority, of: (1) a $100,000 mortgage; (2) a $15,000 judi
cial lien; and (3) a $20,000 second mortgagee. We also assumed a
$15,000 homestead exemption in the applicable jurisdiction. If the
property were to go to state-law foreclosure at the behest of the
first mortgagee, one would anticipate that the first mortgagee
would bid in the amount of its indebtedness - that is, bid its note
- and either emerge as the successful bidder or be taken out by the
second lienor seeking to protect its interest in the equity over and
above the first mortgage by bidding in all or a portion of its indebt
edness on top of the amount due on the first lien.164 Depending on
the nuances of the law of the jurisdiction, junior lienors that elected
not to bid at sale would then have a statutory right to redeem in
order of priority.165 If the judicial lienor were inclined to redeem, it
162. This is one of the reasons that the continued expansion of the categories of debt that
are excepted from discharge under § 523(a) is troubling. On the other hand, it is instructive
to recognize that the exclusive grounds for objecting to discharge enumerated in § 727(a)
have remained fixed since the adoption of the Code.
163. This point is discussed in greater detail

infra text accompanying notes 204-10.

164. It is well-recognized that, by and large, foreclosure sales do not attract the kind of
lively concourse of bidders that is likely to produce a "fair" price. In fact, in most instances
the only bidder will be the foreclosing party that bids its indebtedness. This is one of the
reasons why, until recently, several courts refused to treat the sale price received at a regu
larly conducted mortgage-foreclosure sale as a conclusive indication of "reasonably
equivalent value" for purposes of the fraudulent transfer provisions of § 548(a)(2). See BFP
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 564 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("And where a
property is obviously worth more than the amount of the indebtedness, the lending mortga
gee's interests are served best if the foreclosure sale is poorly attended; then, the lender is
more likely to take the property by bidding the amount of indebtedness, retaining for itself
any profits from resale.").
165. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. §§ 38-38-302 to -304 (Supp. 1996) (containing a fairly
typical statutory redemption scheme, with the first right to redeem accorded to the owner of
the property or any other person liable for the deficiency, and thereafter to junior lienors and
encumbrancers). Unlike personal property financing, where the Uniform Commercial Code
has imposed some semblance of uniformity, local variations from state to state make it more
difficult to generalize about the procedures governing real property foreclosures. See GRANT
S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL EsTATE FINANCE LAw § 7.1, at 551-52 (3d ed. 1994)
(distinguishing between the common law right of equitable redemption that exists after
default but prior to sale and statutory redemption rights that pertain after the sale). Much of
what is described here in the context of a statutory redemption process would apply equally
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would likely be required to tender, in cash, $115,000 to the court or
trustee, consisting of the $100,000 bid166 and the amount of the
homestead exemption as to which, under state law, the judicial lien
is subordinate.161 The holder of the second mortgage might under
standably elect not to redeem on these facts, even though its inter
est is not subject to the exemption,168 as it would be required to pay
at least $115,000, representing the sum of the two prior liens.169 If it
did redeem in order to appropriate any additional value over and
above the sum of the prior liens, obtain future appreciation in the
property, or both, the $115,000 redemption price (plus other
charges) would be distributed as reimbursement to the judicial lie
nor. The result would be that the debtor's homestead would be
to the dynamics in the bidding process at foreclosure in a jurisdiction that did not confer
statutory redemption rights on the holders of junior liens and encumbrances.
166. This would include accrued post-sale interest and other proper charges. See, e.g.,
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-38 302(1) (Supp. 1996); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 165, at 55455.
167. Ordinarily, a redeeming lienor would tender only the amount paid by the successful
bidder or the next prior redeeming lienor, and the amount of the indebtedness secured by
such lien - on these facts $100,000, plus interest and proper charge, if any. In this case,
however, because the redeeming lien is subject to the debtor's homestead, it is presumed that
the redemption price would have to include the homestead amount. This is not by any means
a foregone conclusion. See Howell v. Farrish, 725 P.2d 9 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that,
under Colorado law, the homestead exemption only applies to execution and attachment,
and not to redemption). Under the alternative rule discussed in Howel� the junior lienor in
this example could redeem by paying only $100,000 in cash and then submitting an affidavit
attesting to the amount of its lien. See Cow. REv. STAT. § 38-38-303(4) (Supp. 1996). The
affidavit is to protect the redeeming party in the event of a subsequent redemption. Assum
ing the homestead exemption did pertain and further assuming no subsequent redemption by
the holder of a junior encumbrance to which the homestead was subordinated, the $15,000
homestead amount would ordinarily be turned over to the debtor. Even under these assump
tions, however, the issue is not beyond cavil. For example, a nonredeeming junior encum
brancer with a consensual lien might successfully make a claim to the homestead proceeds
based either on an express contractual subrogation right or on an equitable basis in light of
the legal priority of its interest in relation to the homestead. Obviously, there are no abso
lutes in this area and the vagaries of individual state law would control.
168. If the homestead exemption did not apply, there would be greater incentive to
redeem, since there would be some value to claim. See infra note 170.
169. On the other hand, because there is some equity ($5,000) over the sum of the two
prior liens, the second mortgagee might well choose to redeem if it had the available cash and
believed there was a potential for appreciation. Because of the circular priority situation that
exists in this scenario, however, this assumes that the second mortgagee could argue success
fully that the junior lien should effectively be deemed satisfied out of the homestead funds in
order to recognize the priority of the second mortgage over the exemption. See supra note
167. Failing that argument, redemption would make no sense, since it would require pay
ment of both the $115,000 paid by the judgment creditor plus an additional $15,000 repre
senting the amount of the judgment lien. If the judicial lienor elected not to redeem in the
first place, the second mortgagee would be well advised to redeem on these numbers, since it
would take title free and clear of both the judgment lien and the debtor's homestead exemp
tion. See, e.g., Cow. REv. STAT. § 38-38-304(1) (Supp. 1996). In this context the debtor's
only hope would be a claim for equitable subrogation to the priority of the judicial lien, but
the argument is attenuated at best, probably not worth litigating, and without substantial case
authority of any sort.
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forfeited and the judicial lien would effectively have been frozen
out of any excess value in the property.17° Alternatively, if the judi
cial lienor did not redeem,171 whether the second mortgagee
redeemed or not, the debtor would still lose her homestead exemp
tion and the judicial lienor would still be frozen out of any excess
value or future appreciation.
If, in contrast to the scenario of a forced sale under state law just
discussed, the debtor were to file bankruptcy prior to foreclosure,
we arrive at a similar but not identical outcome. Under the new
formulaic approach in section 522(f)(2)(A) for determining impair
ment, the entire judicial lien impairs and, therefore, may be avoided
under section 522(f)(l)(A).172 The one clear beneficiary of that
action is the second mortgagee, who enjoys a $15,000 improvement
in its state-law position, provided that the court is either not pre
pared or unwilling to save the avoided lien for the debtor's bene
fit.173 It is a little difficult to understand, however, why improving
one creditor's position at the expense of another comports with
either the core bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors or the
baseline principle of respecting state law entitlements. Further
more, elevating the priority of junior unavoidable liens hardly
advances the fresh-start objectives underlying the lien-avoidance
provisions in section 522(f)(l).
A better approach - "better" defined in terms of its congru
ence with bankruptcy policy - would be to allow the debtor also to
invoke section 506(d) and void the second mortgagee's lien to the
extent of the unsecured portion of its bifurcated claim as of the date
of filing.114 The result would coincide in most respects with the
result under state law,11s subject to the important difference that
170. Assuming the homestead exemption applies at all in this proceeding, see supra note
169, there is at least the argument that the second mortgagee, in order to redeem, must pay
not just the judicial lienor's prior redemption amount but also the amount of the judicial lien
itself. This might operate to preserve the homestead for the debtor. The problem is that, by
the same reasoning, the second mortgagee should be entitled to the benefit of the homestead
exemption, resulting in a $5,000 payment to the judicial lienor, the debtor being cut out of
any homestead payment, and the second mortgagee with the property at a cost of $105,000.
One observation that emerges rather clearly from this otherwise cloudy picture is that emu
lating the state-law result is often easier said than actually done given the uncertainty and the
consequent myriad of possible outcomes that exists under most states' law.
171. Because of the requirement of producing cash, this is always a possibility, particu
larly if the lienor is not a professional lender and foresees considerable carrying, mainte
nance, and resale costs.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
173. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
174. Under § 506(a), this would reduce the lien to $5,000. See supra note 24.
175. But see text accompanying infra note 176. This assertion assumes that mortgage
lenders are in the business of money lending, not real-estate speculating. While the point
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the debtor's homestead exemption would be protected. Of course,
so long as Dewsnup remains the law of the land, that alternative is
mere wishful thinking. In fairness, permitting the debtor to use sec
tion 506(d) as an avoiding power may not always emulate the state
law result with precision, depending on whether relevant state law
resolves the circular priority issue between the judicial lienor and
the junior unavoidable mortgagee by awarding the value of the
judicial lien to the second mortgagee or to the debtor.176 Neverthe
less, the main difference is that the outcome without Dewsnup
that is, an outcome following lien stripping - would preserve the
fresh start instincts in section 522(f)(l)(A) and avoid a rearranging
of state law priorities in a manner that served no compelling bank
ruptcy purpose.
The argument might be made that it is not necessary to overrule
Dewsnup for this reason alone because application by analogy of
the lien-preservation concept of section 551 eliminates the prob
lem.177 Suppose, however, as is likely to be the case, that the prop
erty is not liquidated during the course of the bankruptcy
administration. Under no scenario is there any incentive for the
trustee to sell the property17B and, more than likely, it would simply
be abandoned.179 After the case is closed, two possibilities are
presented: (1) immediate foreclosure by the first mortgagee, or (2)
the debtor staves off foreclosure by reaching an understanding with
the holders of the first and second mortgages.180 In the former
-

seems self-evident, even to the extent that one is inclined to see both activities as legitimate
components of a secured creditor's expectation, rarely will the mere hope of future increases
in value justify the present costs of carrying the property. See Howard, supra note 24, at 40809 (pointing out, as well, that many lenders are restricted by regulatory rule from owning
significant inventories of repossessed properties). Practical constraints, such as complying
with loan-loss reserve requirements or the tax benefits of booking and writing off loan losses
in the current year, also operate in this connection.
176. See supra note 169.
177. See supra notes 19-21; see also In re Gonzalez, 149 B.R. 9, 10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993)
(invoking § 522(f) as the basis for subordinating the unavoided portion of a judicial lien to
the portion of the lien avoided, due to its impairment of an exemption to which the debtors
would otherwise have been entitled), vacated sub nom Gonzalez v. First Natl. Bank, 191 B.R.
2 (D. Mass. 1996).
178. Section 363(f)(3) prohibits the trustee from selling assets of the estate free and clear
of liens unless "the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate
value of all liens on such property."
179. The standard under 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1994) of "burdensome to the estate or that is
of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate" would seem to be easily satisfied.
180. As a practical matter, this would probably have to be in the form of an enforceable
reaffirmation agreement under 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) and (d), although a de facto redemption is
also possible. The problem with the first option is that, while it is no longer necessary to
establish that the reaffirmation is in the best interests of the debtor and his dependents, see
§ 524(c)(6)(B), it is still difficult to rationalize a decision to accept personal liability for what
is, for all intents and purposes, an unsecured claim. The problem with the redemption alter-
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case, how do we ensure that the debtor's subrogated position will
be respected in the state-law foreclosure?ts1 In the latter case, how
can we reasonably expect the holder of the second mortgage to go
along with any proposal the debtor is likely to be able to afford as
long as the second mortgagee's lien secures a $20,000 claim? More
over, because the holder of the second mortgage has the power to
initiate, or threaten to initiate, its own foreclosure proceeding even
though there would be little direct economic reason for it to do so,
it retains enormous hold-up power to secure a concession from the
debtor greater in value than the true value of the lender's interest in
the property.182
But for Dewsnup the debtor would be assured of her homestead
exemption in either case. The only "loss" to the second mortgagee
would be the loss of its prebankruptcy right to future appreciation.
The response to the charge of unfairness in pushing that loss on the
second mortgagee is twofold. First, compensation for the additional
$15,000 already was provided in the form of an unsecured claim in
the prior bankruptcy case.1s3 Second, the assertion that the secured
native is the "hold-up" leverage that the failure to strip the lien in bankruptcy has given the
junior mortgagee. See infra note 182.
181. In the usual situation in which 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) is employed to preserve an
avoided lien for the benefit of the estate, the property will be liquidated in the course of the
bankruptcy administration in order to realize for the estate the value represented by the
avoided lien. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Board of County Commrs. (In re Knights Athletic
Goods), 128 B.R. 679 (D. Kan. 1991). In a situation in which an avoided lien is preserved for
the debtor's benefit, the existence of the junior unavoidable encumbrance typically means
that there is no reason for the trustee to sell the property, and ordinarily the debtor would
not want that to occur. This raises the problem of how to enforce the debtor's subrogated
position under state law, particularly in the face of a contractual subordination of the home
stead in the unavoided junior lien. In effect, there is no obvious enforcement mechanism
short of incurring the expense and delay of reopening the bankruptcy case in the event of
either a subsequent sale or foreclosure of the property, so as to protect the interest of the
debtor established in the earlier proceeding. Cf. In re Kampen, 190 B.R. 99 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1995) (involving an action to reopen a case in order to enjoin the sheriffs sale of certain
previously unadministered real property in order to protect the debtors' homestead rights).
182. The ability of the undersecured second mortgagee to extract from the debtor a price
which is greater than the value of the lien can be attributed to the debtor's nonfinancial
attachment to the property, what Professor Howard terms the "emotional increment." See
Howard, supra note 24, at 421 (demonstrating how, in a foreclosure context, the second
mortgagee can use the "underwater" portion of its lien to increase beyond market value the
amount the debtor must bid to secure the property in the event of foreclosure). In addition,
even in a sale context, the lien creditor can exploit its strategic advantage by requiring pay
ment in excess of the true value of its lien as a condition to its willingness to release its lien in
order to clear title.
183. There may or may not be any actual value available for distribution in respect of
unsecured claims, but the same is true for all other unsecured claimants, consistent with
bankruptcy's basic equality principle. In any event, that risk also was part of the original
"bargain," to the extent one is inclined to imagine the relationship in those terms. It has
never been quite clear to us, frankly, what the position of the undersecured creditor properly
ought to be with respect to any dividend paid to unsecured creditors. On the one hand, there
is at least a suggestion in the majority opinion in Dewsnup that the secured creditor must
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creditor has some form of indefeasible right to postbankruptcy
appreciation is a rhetorical position of advocacy, not an eternal
legal verity as the solemnity with which the argument is sometimes
advanced would lead one to believe. The two points are obviously
related. To conflate the matter, once the debtor files bankruptcy,
the second mortgagee's secured claim in this case is limited to

$5,000. Not only does post:filing appreciation belong to the debtor,
but the prospect of ultimately losing the property to foreclosure, a
result often inimical to fresh-start objectives, also is reduced precip
itously. Reaching this result, however, requires that we dispatch
with the holding and the normative result in Dewsnup. That, in
tum, requires us to accept the possibility of and to construct an
alternative to the conceptualization of security in bankruptcy
implicitly endorsed by Justice Blackmun in his Dewsnup opinion,
an undertaking that occupies our attention in the final two parts of
this article. Part V offers an explanation of what we mean when we
speak of a new conception of security. That part explains the basis
for our analysis of extant concepts of security, and, for that matter,
all legal concepts, as metaphor. Part VI then offers an alternative
metaphor that we submit advances the discourse about security in
bankruptcy beyond the limits imposed by the bargain and convey
ance metaphors that have enjoyed a conceptual monopoly in the
doctrinal analysis thus far.

V.

LEGAL CONCEPTS
.

A.

AND

METAPHORIC REASONING

Legal Concepts

as

Metaphors

Throughout this article, we have regularly referred to the bar
gain metaphor and the conveyance or property metaphor. Our use
of that term is not casual; rather, it is central to the doctrinal analy
sis that follows. When we speak of reconceptualizing security, we
are calling for a fresh consideration of the metaphors by which
sacrifice its unsecured claim as compensation for having its lien left intact and for having
access to future appreciation. See Dewsnup v. Tunm, 502 U.S. 410, 418 (1992); Howard,
supra note 39, at 517. It is far from obvious, however, that this is what actually transpires.
Instead, in most cases it is logical to assume that the creditor enjoys its pro rata share of
distributions to unsecured creditors, crediting such amount against its total claim, and then
sits back and seeks eventual recovery of the balance out of its in rem claim. While this result,
if it occurs, prejudices other unsecured creditors by reducing their dividends pro tanto in
violation of the basic policy interdiction against unequal distributions, it is difficult to see how
the result can be avoided, since there is no statutory basis for disallowance of the unsecured
claim. Indeed, § 506(a) seems to support the argument that the claim is proper and, from the
debtor's perspective, it is advantageous to have as much as possible of the undersecured
creditor's total claim satisfied out of the estate. Also, as earlier noted, the debtor has the
authority to file the claim on the secured creditor's behalf even if the creditor elects to ignore
the bankruptcy entirely and rely on its lien. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1994).
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security has come to be understood. In so doing, we proceed from
recent insights from the cognitive sciences that make a compelling
case for the proposition that virtually all our concepts, including
legal concepts, are metaphoric in nature. A brief excursus may be
helpful here. Experiential Realism ("Experientialism")184 provides
an account of reasoning relatively new to the cognitive sciences
that, among other things, reveals the singular role metaphor plays
in human conceptual systems.185 On the Experientialist account,
only the least sophisticated concepts are garnered directly from
experience. Concepts such as up-down, light-dark, and contain
ment emerge from our interactions with physical reality and thus
are directly grasped.186
These rudimentary concepts have natural dimensions and are
therefore well delineated and sharply defined.187 Most of our con
cepts, however, do not arise directly from physical experience.
Reasoning to concepts without natural dimensions therefore
requires the capacity for metaphor, whereby well-defined concepts
from a source domain are deployed to structure ill-defined or
under-defined concepts from another and different domain, the tar
get domain.188 The target concept is thus modeled on, and is under
stood in terms of, the source concept.189
Consider the following simple example. One of our rudimen
tary concepts is that of physical containment.190 We continuously
184. The term, "Experientialism," or "Experiential Realism," is the cognitive theory
advanced by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
METAPHORS WE LivE BY (1980). The philosophical assumptions on which Experientialism
is premised are outlined in detail in MARK JOHNSON, THE B ooy IN THE MIND: THE BODILY
BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987). Evidence from the cognitive sci
ences, which is in part the basis of their theory of cognition, is elaborated on in GEORGE
LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE,
THE MIND (1987).

AND

DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT

185. See LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 3.
186. In referring to rudimentary concepts, we refer to those that are directly appre

hended from experience and that are not modeled on other concepts - that is, are not
understood metaphorically. See id. at 56-57.
187. The source of rudimentary concepts is the kinesthetic image schemata. Image
schema are preconceptual and have a bodily basis. They emerge from endlessly recurring
patterns we discern in experience, such as the ways in which we experience our physical
orientation in the world around us. Since those patterns are repeating, they become recog
nizable and are embodied as image schematic concepts. See JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 13.
For a summary explanation of image schema, see F. Stephen Knippenberg, Future
Nonadvance Obligations: Preferences Lost in Metaphor, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1537, 1563-65
(1994). For an extended discussion, see JoHNsoN, supra note 184, at 19-28.
188. See LAKoFF & JoHNSON, supra note 184, at 115-17.
189. See id.
190. See JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 21. Johnson has identified and catalogued several

image schema, including up-down, front-back, linear order, and part-whole, to name a few.
See id. at 19-37. The concept of containment, born of the container schema from physical
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experience ourselves and other objects in the physical world as con
tained within buildings, rooms, and so on. With its physical basis,
the concept of containment is crisply defined by its natural dimen
sions.191 The concept of trouble, on the other hand, lacks natural
dimensions and cannot therefore be directly grasped.192 Recogniz
ing analogies between the way we experience troublesome situa
tions and physical containment enables the metaphor, trouble-is-a
container, such that we can speak of "getting into" or "getting out
of trouble." The ill-defined target concept of trouble is understood
in terms of the well-defined source concept of containment from
the physical domain. The concept, that is to say, is understood
metaphorically.193
The Experientialist insight that most concepts are metaphoric is
premised on an important epistemological conviction that our con
cepts are not abstractions of some set of conditions that exists in the
world independent of the reasoner. Experientialism rejects the fun
damental assumptions of what has been called an epistemology of
objectivism.194
Objectivism posits a mind-independent reality wherein objects,
events, and states of affairs are inherently possessed of various
properties and naturally stand in a fixed relation to one another.195
Concepts are abstract likenesses of that reality, true when they cap
ture and faithfully represent it, but false otherwise. Cognition, from
the perspective of objectivism, is algorithmic, such that the measure
experience, is regularly deployed in structuring legal concepts. For an extended discussion of
the containment metaphor at work in article 9 of the U.C.C., see Knippenberg, supra note
187, at 1571-75.

191. Because of its bodily basis, containment is meaningful in the most primary sense.
See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 57-58.
192. Experientialism teaches us that in considerable part we must come to understand
experience through metaphor. Abstractions, like trouble, are directly experienced, but only
indirectly understood. See ld. at 115. For further basic examples and summary explication,
see Knippenberg, supra note 187, at 1561-71.

193. On the Experientialist account, human conceptual systems are mainly metaphoric.
See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 3.
194. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 196.
195. On the Objectivist view, "there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or
framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowl
edge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness." RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND 0BJECTIVISM
AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAx:Is 8 (1983). Objectivism might use
fully be defined as the antithesis of subjectivism. If, for the Objectivist, the world consists of
naturally occurring, mind-independent properties, categories, and structures, for the
Subjectivist they are altogether relative to the prevailing aims of the reasoner. Reality is very
much up to the individual. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 224. For an extended
discussion of Objectivism, its evolution, and principle themes, see RICHARD RoRTY,
PmLOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). Objectivist influences and themes in
semantic theory are described in JOHNSON, supra note 184, at xxix-xxxv.

2282

Michigan Law Review

(Vol.

95:2234

of the correctness (and utility) of our concepts is the degree to
which there is a verifiable correspondence of the symbols they
employ to the reality they are meant to represent.196
In contrast, the Experientialist view holds that conceptual cate
gories do not capture slices of a reality or of categories as they are
out there. Rather, conceptual categories are entirely the product of
human cognitive processes, which are dependent on imaginative
devices such as metaphor.197 Whereas under the objectivist regime
categories transcend cognition, under Experientialist rule catego
ries have no ontological status independent of it.198
That concepts are metaphoric has important ramifications for
legal analysis and law transformation. Traditional legal analysis is
deeply grounded in objectivist assumptions that postulate a tran196. The epistemology of Objectivism, unsurprisingly, supposes the task of human cogni
tion to be one of capturing and describing objective reality. Knowledge transcends cognitive
processes, since it is "out there" whether or not there is a reasoner to "discover" it.
Objectivist epistemological assumptions have been referred to as "metaphysical realism."
See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Tum in Modem Theory: A Tum for the Worse?, 41
STAN. L. REv. 871, 881-90 (1989).
197. On the Experientialist account, there are no categories that are not conceptual cate
gories. The naturally occurring properties of objects, states of affairs, conditions, and so forth
that we experience do not define a category, simply because those things have no inherent
properties a priori. Instead, conceptual categories are defined by perceived prototypes,
which are distinctly human conceptual constructs. See LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184,
at 122-25.
198. 1\vo features of metaphoric reasoning must be noted and explained. First, knowl
edge and meaning arrived at by understanding one concept, the target concept, in terms of
another, the source concept, are by hypothesis partial and incomplete. See LAKOFF &
JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 12-13. If a source and target concept were identical in every
particular, they would be the same concept. The latter feature gives rise to a corollary propo
sition, that in highlighting similarities between source and target concepts, asymmetries (a
term we use to refer to dimensional differences between source and target concepts) are lost
to view. Second, when one concept is structured and defined by another, in the process of
metaphoric mapping, the inferential consequences, or "entailments," belonging to the source
concept are carried to, or mapped on, the target concept. For an extended discussion of
entailments, see JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 130-38.
As to the first of these features, consider the following example from contract law. A
contract is partially defined by the metaphor, a-contract-is-a-container-for-contracting-parties.
The metaphor is manifested in expressions like, "they entered into a contract," and "she could
not get out of her contract." The metaphoric concept is useful because it highlights certain
dimensions of our experience of contracts shared with our experience of the concept of physi
cal containment But the concept of containment from the physical domain only partially
structures the concept, contract. To provide more complete meaning, other metaphors must
be pressed into service, which in conjunction afford a fuller understanding of the target con
cept. To continue the above example, "contracts" or "agreements" are also partially defined
by the metaphor, an-agreement-is-a-place, or, more particularly, an-agreement-is-a
destination. The metaphor finds expression in statements like, "they arrived at an agree
ment." The containment and destination metaphors together tell us more about how we
experience contracts than either alone. The more metaphors by which a target concept is
understood, the richer the definition, and the fuller our understanding of that concept.
Important, sophisticated concepts are the most likely to be highly defined by multiple meta
phors. Lakoff and Johnson have, for instance, catalogued some ten ontological metaphors
that define the concept idea. See LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 46-48.
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scendental, objective reality that exists independent of human con
cepts.199 The method of traditional legal analysis is to abstract
principles from cases, statutes, and other authority to arrive at tran
scendent propositions.200 Inasmuch as the propositions transcend
their instantiations in the concrete cases from which they derive,
they are assumed to be capable of objective application when
brought to bear in subsequent cases. There is a "right answer," and
the analyst has only to find it - the decisionmaker need only avoid
contaminating the proposition to be applied with subjective
impulses.
For example, as discussed in considerable detail above,201 much
of the discourse about the treatment of secured claims in bank
ruptcy turns on the nature of security,202 whether the rights of
secured claimants with security interests or mortgages are property
or contract rights. Under an analytic program guided by objectivist
assumptions, there is an immutable, correct conception of security
- the rights of secured claimants are property or they are contract
rights. The business of legal analysis, rightly understood, is to iden
tify the correct conception.
On acknowledging that our concepts, legal and otherwise, are
no more and no less than metaphoric constructs that enable mean
ing in accordance with our goals and purposes, rather than abstrac
tions of things the way they really are, analysis of legal doctrine
takes a different tum.203 For example, it is one thing to say that a
contract is a container, but something very different to say that the
concept of contract shares recognizable dimensions with the con
cept of physical containment and so can be usefully, if only par
tially, understood in that way. As we make clear in the next part,
exploring alternative metaphors by which the concept of security is
structured forces attention upon aspects of security and the fresh
199. Objectivism finds its expression in the law as Externalist principles, or legal formal
ism. This is not to say, of course, that legal formalism has gone unchallenged. See Moore,
supra note 196, at 890 (discussing "interpretivism," which discounts metaphysical debate as
impossible of resolution, and so not worth scholarly attention). Moore characterizes as illus
trative the work of Stanley F!Sh, Robert Cover, and Ronald Dworkin. See id. at 891-92.
200. See id. at 888; cf. Steven L. Wmter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. R:Ev. 1371, 1387 (1988) (positing that the law of standing has
proceeded from the metaphor of standing regarded as a literal truth).
201. See supra Part III.
202. See generally Knippenberg, supra note 187 (offering an extended discussion of the
Coogan-Gilmore debate over the "true nature" of the security interest in the context of
future advance priority under article 9).
203. See, e.g., Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 312-24 (demonstrating how con
version of nonexempt assets to exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy can be understood
either as an act of bad faith or as a legitimate exercise of a property right).
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start that are otherwise lost to consideration. Moreover, recogniz
ing that our concepts are imaginative devices of cognition, and not
symbolic representations of some transcendental state of affairs in
experience, frees us to augment, modify, or, where it serves our
ends to do so, suspend one concept in favor of others.
B.

Beyond the Bargain, Conveyance, and Property Metaphors

We have so far described the bargain and conveyance/property
metaphors and identified the failure of both to offer either a viable
explanation, in the case of the bargain metaphor, or justification, in
the case of the conveyance and property metaphors, for secured
credit in bankruptcy. Here, we seek to explain the reasons those
models are driven to inextricable impasse. As it is central to our
analysis and explication, we would at this juncture reiterate the fun
damental principle upon which Experientialism rests: All concepts
are the product of imaginative instruments of cognition, most nota
bly the capacity to understand a target concept by reference to a
source concept, the capacity to reason metaphorically.
The conveyance/property metaphor advocated by Harris and
Mooney serves both to illustrate Experientialist principles and to
advance our remaining discussion of the troublesome holding in
Dewsnup. By insisting that a security transfer must be understood
as a conveyance of property from debtor to creditor, Harris and
Mooney corroborate the conceptualization of security at the basis
of article 9. On entering into the security agreement with its credi
tor, the debtor transfers something to the creditor, some interest
that thereafter belongs to the creditor and that is as a matter of
course understood to be property. The security agreement, then, is
as much an instrument of conveyance as it is a contract between the
parties that gives rise to contractual rights and duties. In short, the
undisputed traditional metaphor regards the creation of a security
interest as representing the movement of property from the debtor
to the creditor. Security is thus understood in terms of property
concepts ordinarily associated with absolute transfers, the proto
type for which is the transfer of physical possession of real or per
sonal property from one party to another.204
204. As we noted earlier, important concepts tend to be well defined by multiple meta
phors. See supra note 198. Article 9, a case in point, is a complex cognitive model consisting
of a variety of coherent ontological metaphors and an overarching structural metaphor (the

secured transaction is a journey).

For an in-depth discussion of the metaphors that structure the concepts in article 9, see
Knippenberg, supra note 187. It is worth noting here that the property and bargain meta
phors are consistent with the cognitive model by which article 9 is structured.
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That a security interest can usefully be thought of in terms of a
conveyance of possession is irrefutable.205 That security must neces
sarily be thought of in those terms is not. The creation of a security
interest is, in many respects, like a physical transfer of property.
Accepted rules of conveyancing are modeled on the source-path

goal image schema,206 whereby physical possession passes from one
party to another. The security transfer can be, and routinely is, con
ceived of in the same way. The debtor, in conferring upon the
secured creditor the right to seize an asset identified in the security
agreement, can be taken to have passed something to the secured
creditor, thereby forfeiting an aspect of ownership of that asset;207
the right to hold it as against all others under all circumstances.
The debtor thereby alters the relationship to property that she
would otherwise enjoy under settled notions about property
ownership.208
The conveyance/property metaphors are useful in defining
security, an abstraction without natural dimensions of its own. The
concept of a physical conveyance of property has natural dimen
sions in that it can be directly observed, directly experienced, and
so directly understood without recourse to other defining concepts.
Security, in contrast, represents a conceptual ex;tension beyond the
rudimentary notion of a physical transfer.

Nothing observable

passes from debtor to creditor as the result of the security "trans
fer." Nevertheless, to think of security in terms of a conveyance,
and so to think of the security interest in terms of property, is to
make the concept of security meaningful. The source concept of
the conveyance is well understood, and the clearly defined attrib
utes associated with it serve to define the target concept of security
when conveyance is mapped onto that concept.
Understanding security in terms of a conveyance of property
enables us to reason about security by highlighting those features
that we perceive the two concepts to share. As indicated earlier,
however, metaphoric reasoning is by hypothesis partial. While sim
ilarities between concepts are highlighted, asymmetries are lost to
view. It is one thing to say that the creation of a security interest
can usefully be understood in terms of a conveyance of property,

205. See supra notes 100·01 and accompanying text.
206. This is one of the several image schema identified by Lakoff and Johnson. See supra
note 184.
207. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 23, at 313-14 (describing the metaphor of
encumbered property as a physical resource depleted by the security transfer).
208. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 2-5 (1984).
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but quite another to say it is a conveyance of property. The former
assertion acknowledges that security is in many respects like a con
veyance of property, but admits of differences between them. The
latter assertion denies those distinctions. The loss of asymmetries
is, of course, the natural product of metaphoric reasoning: In high
lighting similarities between concepts, differences are eclipsed or
hidden.
The hiding power of metaphor is hardly remarkable. Meta
phoric reasoning is so pervasive in cognitive processing, so ubiqui
tous in our concepts, that we are mainly unaware of it.209 It is a
natural inclination to presume that our concepts are not imagina
tive constructs, but slices of reality, or symbolic representations of
external conditions or phenomena.
For example, in constructing an entire statute, article 9, around
security understood as property, the implicit assumption is that the
security transfer is a conveyance of property, and that to assert as
much is to proclaim the discovery of the true nature of the security
interest about which there can be no doubt. The property model
has therefore become the starting point, and frequently the ending
point, for analysis of doctrine and the rules governing security, both
in and out of bankruptcy.
To insist that the creation of security is a conveyance of property
rather than a target concept modeled on the source concept of the
conveyance leads to doctrinal impasse and dysfunctionality, some
instances of which have been and will be identified in this article.
Worse, if discourse about security in bankruptcy is limited by the
conviction that there is a single, correct conception of security,
meaningful analysis of bankruptcy policy, insofar as it is related to
secured claims in consumer cases at least, is foreclosed. To illus
trate, we return to one of the features of metaphoric mapping dis
cussed above: the imposition of entailments associated with source
concepts onto target concepts.
Entailments, it will be recalled, are the ontological conse
quences that attend a concept. Consider again the conveyance met
aphor on which security is modeled. Where one transfers
possession of tangible property, the rela�onship of the transferor to
the property conveyed terminates. The transferor may neither
physically occupy the thing transferred nor subsequently transfer it
to others. Such are the consequences, the entailments, of the trans
fer of possession and of ownership.
209. See LAKoFF & JOHNSON, supra note 184, at 28.

June

1997]

Secured Credit and Bankruptcy

2287

When the concept of security comes to be understood in accord
ance with the metaphor, the-creation-of-a-security-interest-is-a
physical-conveyance-of-property, the entailments associated with
the source concept are mapped onto the target concept; that is, the
ontological consequences associated with the concept, conveyance,
are imposed upon the concept of security. Once it is decided that a
lien is the product of a conveyance of property, the secured credi
tor's claim suddenly enjoys special status because security interest
or mortgage is property. The entailments-of-the-source concept,
the property/conveyance metaphor, are axiomatic in the law.
Whatever rights in the collateral that remain with the debtor are
limited by that which she has "transferred" away - all value of the
asset - unless there is value in excess of the claim. If the debtor
"transported away" the value in the property, none remains to be
given to, or taken by, others in the absence of equity.
For present purposes, the most important entailment mapped
from the source concept of property to the target concept of secur
ity arises from the metaphor that defines the nature of the lien from
the perspective of secured creditors. The security interest or mort
gage is understood initially according to the simple ontological met
aphor, a-lien-is-a-physical-object. That metaphor is, of course,
entirely consistent with the conveyance metaphor, which envisions
a physical transfer of lien rights from the debtor to the creditor.
While this simple ontological metaphor does not go far in defin
ing security, it does enable various extensions. For example, a
security interest as a physical object can attach to the collateral, or,
in the case of real estate, can be understood as a mortgage on
encumbered property. That view of security coheres with the meta
phor, the-collateral-is-a-container-for-property-interests, enabling
various metaphoric extensions expressed in remarks like, "she has a
security interest in the debtor's inventory."
An entailment of singular importance follows from these onto
logical metaphors. Where objects or substances are attached to or
are contained within another - for example, where a security
interest becomes attached to the collateral, where the secured
claimant has an interest in the collateral - they remain with it
unless they are somehow extricated. That is a fundamental conse
quence of physical attachment and containment. The entailment is
mapped onto the concept of security, meaning that it remains with
the collateral should it pass out of the debtor's possession and con
trol or, importantly, into the bankruptcy estate.
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The above-described entailments emanate from the property
and conveyance models. Those metaphors enable meaning in that,
in conjunction, they define security such that we may manipulate
the latter concept in useful ways. When we come to understand
security in terms of the property and bargain metaphors, well
defined concepts with natural dimensions like physical attachment
and containment, it becomes possible to reason about security.
But when we grant a conceptual monopoly to the conveyance
and property models, the entailments of the conveyance model of security as property - tyrannize analysis and suppress penetrat
ing considerations of policy. As stated earlier, entailments offer
ready solutions to issues under consideration with no apparent need
for meaningful justification beyond that suggested by the entail
ments themselves. If we presume security to be property, then of
course liens must "pass through" bankruptcy, since they are some
thing within or attached to the collateral.
But the entailments of the ontological metaphors that define
property and security understood as property have consequences
beyond the obvious. Both in and out of bankruptcy, property
receives protection under the law that contract rights do not; for
example, constitutional protection. For that and other reasons, it is
axiomatic that property rights of creditors are left undisturbed in
bankruptcy. Where it might not be deemed offensive to alter con
tract rights, tampering with property invokes claims of taking and
unfairness. As we explain in the next part, that is the very sort of
limiting analysis we believe is responsible for Dewsnup.
The Dewsnup opinion is completely dominated by the property
and conveyance models of security that pervade state law. It evalu
ates lien stripping exclusively by reference to the metaphor,
security-is-property. In the majority opinion, the property meta
phor is the beginning and ending point for analysis, and the dissent
offers no contradiction on that point.210 Given the entailments
mapped from that concept to the concept of security, the outcome
in the case was inescapable: the secured claimant's "property" can
not be divested through lien stripping. Justice Blackmun's hope
lessly convoluted interpretation of the Code is powerful evidence of
the influence of the entailments-of-the-property metaphor.

Dewsnup is therefore dysfunctional. To say that security can
only be understood as property leads inexorably to the conclusion
reached in that case, but it is not a justification for it. Entailments
210. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
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compel results, but they do not implicitly justify them. Where anal
ysis is limited by entailments, there is no room to consider counter
vailing policy objectives at work in the bankruptcy case, including
most importantly the fresh start in consumer cases.
It is upon recognizing that legal concepts are metaphorically
defined that analysis is enabled. In ending the search for the right
way to conceive of security in favor of the quest for multiple meta
phoric concepts to yield a more robust definition, we are freed to
consider and reconsider concepts like security.
More important, letting go of the commitment to a single meta
phoric system advances discourse by diverting attention from
results enjoined by metaphoric entailments to a wide-ranging explo
ration of bankruptcy policy. Letting go of the property metaphor in
bankruptcy focuses attention on the fresh start in a way that, we
believe, leads to a very different view of lien stripping. Appraisal of
rules and doctrine, unfettered by entailments that are necessarily
mapped from source to target concepts, becomes an exercise in
meaningful normative evaluation. In the next part, we offer an
alternative model for security to enable precisely that sort of
analysis.
VJ.

A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF UNDERSECURED
CLAIMS IN BANKRUPTCY
A.

In Concept

As described earlier,211 one alternative to a property-based con
ception of security interests in bankruptcy is a value-based account
that recognizes the existence and priority of the secured creditor's
interest in the debtor's property up to the value of the collateral as
of the moment of filing.212 Several commentators have put forth
cogent arguments based on the history of the Code in support of a
priority approach to security and, in particular, undersecured
claims.213 Rehashing those arguments at this time would serve no
point. Instead, we would press the logic of those arguments one
step further by proposing that, in a bankruptcy context, it is appro211. See supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
212. Actually, the precise timing of the valuation, whether at the time of filing or some
other point in the case, is a subject of some controversy. See infra note 223.
213. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 952 (suggesting that under the Code the argu
ment can be made that secured status consists of no more than a priority claim equal to the
value of the creditor's collateral); Newborn, supra note 4, at 577-81 (arguing that the
Bankruptcy Code evinces a congressional intent to bring undersecured creditors within the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, contrary to the Bankruptcy Act jurisprudence on which
the majority in Dewsnup relied).
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priate to reassess the character of secured claims with reference to
the fundamental underlying nature of a bankruptcy case. We
appreciate that this process has ramifications that resonate through
out the fabric of the commercial law.214 For present purposes, how
ever, we urge such a reconceptualization of secured claims simply
as a means for more fairly balancing the rights of secured creditors
with the Code's fresh-start policy, a policy that is without analogue
in state debt/collection law.21s
In substance, as earlier noted,216 a bankruptcy case involves
nothing less than the complete acceleration and adjudication of all
claims217 against the debtor - liquidated and unliquidated, contin
gent and noncontingent, disputed and undisputed, matured and
unmatured, secured and unsecured - in a single, expedited pro
ceeding.21s A pivotal, although frequently unarticulated, premise
214. See, e.g., Nickles, supra note 8 {discussing the inherent tension between bankruptcy
and the commercial law). This is also part of the broader debate over whether a security
interest represents a property interest or just another species of contract right. See infra text
accompanying notes 224-34; see also Kenneth N. Klee, A Brief Rejoinder to Professor
LoPucki, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 583, 587 {1995) (indicating support for a proposal to reform
article 9 to carve a fixed percentage out of collateral for the benefit of a levying judicial lien
creditor).
215. See generally Warren, supra note 111, at 782-89 (explaining the policy difference
between state collection and federal bankruptcy law).
216.

See supra notes 147, 151 and accompanying text.

217. Tue term "claim" is broadly defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) {1994). However, the
determination of when a claim arises, for purposes both of discharge and entitlement of
administrative expense status, has proved an exceedingly nettlesome one, particularly in the
area of environmental and product liability claims. See, e.g., In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 786 {7th Cir. 1992) {decided under § 77 of the 1898 Act);
United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1004-06 {2d Cir. 1991)
(involving environmental clean-up claims); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th
Cir. 1988) (involving products liability claims); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns
Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988) (involving products liability claims). Recently,
the Eleventh Circuit adopted a new test for determining whether persons asserting claims
based on postconfirmation events, but arising out of products manufactured and sold before
confirmation, would be treated as holding "claims" within the meaning of § 101(5). See
Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp. (In re
Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995). This test focuses on the existence of a
preconfirmation relationship between the debtor's product and the claimant. See 58 F.3d at
1577. Tue Fifth Circuit, relying heavily on the lower courts' opinions in Piper, has adopted a
similar version of the "relationship" test. See Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268
{5th Cir. 1994). Whatever standard ultimately predominates, the expansive definition of
"claim" and the near-universal criticism evoked in response to the Third Circuit's decision in
Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 {3d Cir. 1984),
which used a state-law claim accrual theory for measuring when a claim arises, serve as com
pelling testimony to the emphasis in bankruptcy cases placed on separating what happened in
the debtor's prefiling life from the debtor's postfiling existence, regardless of whether the
proceeding is in the nature of liquidation or rehabilitation.
218. Tue procedures allowing for estimation of claims that cannot be determined without
unduly delaying the administration of the case, moreover, reinforce the primacy of "closing
the books" on all outstanding prebankruptcy transactions. See supra text accompanying note
148.
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of bankruptcy policy is that, with a few notable exceptions, pre
filing claims lose their individual identity once a case is commenced.
That is to say, except in circumstances in which strong competing
public policy considerations predominate,219 the origin of any par
ticular claim - whether incurred in good faith or bad, in contract
or tort - is no longer relevant. Rather, inquiry is focused solely on
questions of allowability and relative priority, essentially inter
creditor issues.
By and large, courts seem to recognize this principle in reorgani
zation and debt-adjustment cases,220 but Dewsnup stands in the way
of a comparable recognition in individual chapter 7 cases. The
irony could not be more striking. In the one type of proceeding in
which the bankruptcy fresh start is most sharply in focus, the
debtor's ability to accomplish a clean break with her past is fore
closed by a determination that the postfiling accrual of value will be
burdened by a claim originating in the debtor's prefiling life.221
How does this observation inform the question of the proper
conceptualization of secured claims in bankruptcy? The in rem
notion simply superimposes the state-law template onto the bank
ruptcy landscape while remaining oblivious to the differences in the
legal terrain. Under state law, a secured creditor can be said to
possess two different sets of rights: rights against the debtor upon
default of repossession and foreclosure triggered by default - so
called "default rights" - and rights of exclusivity or priority against
other claimants with an interest in the collateral - so-called "prior
ity rights."222 What is often overlooked in the Dewsnup type of
analysis is that only one set of rights survives a bankruptcy filing,
219. These policies generally are reflected in the statutorily enumerated discharge excep
tions. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994).
220. Initially, commentators expressed serious concern over the pernicious effects of
Dewsnup in chapter 11, 12, and 13 proceedings. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 4, at 319-36.
Despite some early indications of reason for concern, particularly in chapter 11, courts have
seemed to recognize the importance of confining the holding in Dewsnup to the facts
presented in the case and, in particular, of not extending the holding beyond chapter 7 pro
ceedings. See supra note 12.
221. The disruptive effect of extending Dewsnup's interdiction against lien stripping into
rehabilitation proceedings has been widely recognized. As one court accurately described it,
importation of Dewsnup into chapter 11 could not be accomplished without eviscerating the
core principles of reorganization law. See Wade v. Bradford, 39 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir.
1994). By the same token, Dewsnup's interference with the core policy in consumer cases,
namely fresh start, is arguably no less ominous.
222. For example, in the case of personal-property financing under article 9, attachment
of the security interest vests in the secured party what might be termed its "vertical" rights
against the debtor, which are triggered on default. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-203, 9-501 to -507
(1994). Beyond this, consummation of the additional steps necessary to perfect the interest
establish the creditors' "horizontal" rights in the collateral vis-a-vis other claimants, including
creditors, buyers, statutory lienors, etc. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301, 9-303(1), 9-307, 9-312
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namely the creditor's priority rights in the collateral. Like other in
personam claims, the secured creditor's default rights against the
debtor are eliminated, save for a successful challenge to discharge
or dischargeability. Furthermore, even the creditor's priority rights
do not represent a continuing interest in property, irrespective of
the appropriate characterization of those rights prior to bankruptcy.
Instead, they represent a claim against the property that may con
tinue after bankruptcy if the property is exempt or has been aban
doned, but only to the extent of the value extant at the moment of
filing.223 It is this closure of the debtor's prepetition life, expressly
built into the confirmation standards in nonliquidation cases and
implicit in the structure of chapter 7, that resides at the core of the
fresh start.224
(1994). The same basic dynamic occurs when a creditor secures a claim with an interest in
realty.
223. The particular time for valuation is itself a more complicated question, particularly
in chapter 11. See generally David Gray Carlson, Time, Value, and the Rights of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, or, When Does Adequate Protection Begin?, 1 BANKR. L. & PRAc.
113, 121-22 (1992) (noting that a moment-of-filing approach enhances the debtor's fresh start
ifstrip down under § 506(d) is permitted). For an exhaustive review of the case law address
ing the question of the applicable date of valuation of property of the estate, see Wood v. LA
Bank (In re Wood), 190 B.R. 788 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996). See also supra notes 54, 112.
However, a priority-only construction of secured claims in bankruptcy can be reconciled with
either a "later than petition filing date" valuation or even, as Professor Carlson has argued,
with the date of "disposal" of the collateral, either by sale or confirmation of a plan. See
Carlson, supra note 10, at 20-52 (exploring the finality of bankruptcy valuations in light of

Dewsnup).

224. Section 727(b) provides for the discharge of all debts arising prior to entry of the
order for relief, and § 524(b) operates as an injunction against any attempt to collect a dis
charged debt Obviously, along with the exemptions in § 522 and the right to be free from
discrimination based on the fact of bankruptcy, the discharge and discharge injunction are
key ingredients of the fresh start. Attempting to define the fresh start or to justify it in
normative terms is a more difficult exercise. See generally Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra
note 23, at 248-52; Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope of the Fresh Start in Bankruptcy:
Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 56, 89-103
(1990) (reviewing the various policy justifications that have been proffered for the discharge).
Moreover, determining the proper scope of the fresh start in relatively precise functional
terms, and not simply invoking the shopworn incantation that the discharge is intended for
the "honest but unfortunate" debtor, is essential to the resolution of a variety of questions
that arise during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. See Margaret Howard, A Theory of
Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 1047, 1047-48 (1987) (proposing a
"functional economic theory" as a means for resolving specific issues relating to, and propos
als for, modification of the discharge); Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious Thrills: The Case for
Application ofAgency Rules in Bankruptcy Dischargeability Litigation, 70 Tur.. L. REv. 2515
(1996) (describing the fresh start as a condition intended to result from application of specific
bankruptcy rules in particular cases, rather than as a formal legal status or cognizable legal
right). While it is not (thankfully) our goal to put forth a full-blown normative theory of
fresh start in this work, it is clear nevertheless that to the extent a debtor otherwise deserving
of discharge carries any of the financial burdens of the past into the postbankruptcy future,
the fresh start has been encumbered. Thus, however one individually resolves the fundamen
tal issues of essential nature and appropriate scope, the damage has been done, and done in
deference to an ideal - protection of private property - that the very existence of a system
for discharging debts belies in the first instance.
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If the central issue in Dewsnup relating to the right to future
appreciation in property is framed in these terms instead of using
the rhetoric of property law, the picture develops quite differently
than the outcome reached by the Dewsnup majority. Specifically,
in the bankruptcy context, a secured claim must be regarded first
and foremost as a "claim," indistinguishable from other claims inso
far as the debtor/creditor analysis is concemed.225 The significance
of the secured nature of the claim relates only to the question of
priority in particular assets in the ultimate distribution of the estate
among the body of creditors as whole - the creditor/creditor anal
ysis. Contrary to Justice Blackmun's suggestion in Dewsnup, it is
not property entitled to protection any more than an unsecured
claimant can assert a protectible property interest in its state-law
based contractual rights against the debtor. What was conveyed at
the onset was the right to foreclose under state law upon default,
not some form of joint- or common-ownership rights. Therefore,
when a collective procedure is initiated, barring the creditor from
unilaterally taking action to foreclose, this right translates into a
prior claim to the asset - nothing more and nothing less. This was
after all the real bargain, just as the unsecured claimant has the
right to sue and levy upon specific assets under state law or to
receive a pro rata distribution from unencumbered assets upon
insolvency. While the bargain in many cases may not be explicit, or
even voluntary in the sense of there being meaningful alternatives,
there is no defensible basis for recasting the secured claim in a man
ner that confers an unintended and unwarranted advantage on the
secured creditor. This is particularly true when doing so potentially
erects an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the debtor's fresh
start.
The preceding discussion points to a conceptualization of
secured credit in bankruptcy that abandons the inherent subjectiv
ity and ambiguity imbedded in the bargain metaphor and the state
law property entailments that attend that metaphor. In their place,
we urge a view that coheres with the bankruptcy notion of a
"claim." In effect, a security interest can more accurately be seen
as representing a kind of priority claim; it is a priority claim of a
different ilk than the statutory priority unsecured claims,226 but only
in that the priority is measured against certain assets of the estate
rather than against the unencumbered residue. Thus, just as in the
225. See supra note 156.
226. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (1994).
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case of any other priority claimant, the secured creditor's future
rights against the debtor are severed by the filing of the petition,
including its rights against the debtor's future property interests no
less than against the debtor in personam. Properly understood, the
secured claim is a claim against specific assets that, like any other
claim, must be fixed as of the time of filing. This is, of course, a
very different conception of security than one that envisions the
secured claim as representing a continuing property right that "sur
vives" bankruptcy. It will be recalled, however, that the claim sur
vives, as Judge Posner put it so well, only to the extent we say it

survives. 221

Although imagining secured claims in this fashion may be con
ceptually at odds with the orthodox state-law ideation of security, it
is perfectly consistent with the jurisprudential principles that ani
mate the consumer bankruptcy system. It squares with the fresh
start principle embedded in chapter 7 in the same manner as, for
example, the 1994 Amendments' statutory formulation of "impair
ment" for section 522(f) purposes.228 Furthermore, once we accept
this reconceptualization of the meaning of secured claims in bank
ruptcy, it becomes very easy to let go of the antiquated notions of
security in bankruptcy, and the "fairness" kinds of impulses that
derive from those notions, that bolstered and may have even
accounted for the result in Dewsnup. 229
While basically explicated from a positivist stance - how the
Bankruptcy Code operates in fact - the justification we have
advanced for conceptualizing secured claims in bankruptcy also
derives from a particular normative view of bankruptcy policy and
purposes, a view that transcends the traditional consumer/commer
cial bankruptcy dichotomy. By and large, in recent years the con
troversy over the proper scope of chapter 11 has formed the
backdrop against which the larger battle over bankruptcy policy has
been waged.230 Yet that discussion has significant implications for
all types of bankruptcy proceedings. Ignoring for simplicity's sake
the subtle, albeit important, shadings of difference in the various
227. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. In effect, this result strikes a fair and
sensible balance between the fresh-start doctrine and the policy considerations, properly
understood, that seem to have animated the Supreme Court's decision in Long v. Bullard,
117 U.S. 617 (1886). See supra note 51.
230. For citation to the voluminous literature devoted to this topic, see Linda J. Rusch,
Bankruptcy as a Revolutionary Concept: Good Faith Filing and a Theory of Obligation, 57
MONT. L. REv. 49, 96-97 n.236 (1996).
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positions that have been staked out in the literature, the primary
bone of contention among the commentators has been over the
question of whether the bankruptcy process exists solely to maxi
mize returns for creditors with cognizable state-law claims, or
whether the process properly takes into account a broader range of
social and economic concerns that includes protection of non
creditor constituencies with an interest in the debtor firm.231 We
subscribe to the latter view. That is to say, we recognize creditor
wealth maximization as a legitimate, but not the only legitimate,
purpose of the bankruptcy process. As we have argued elsewhere,
bankruptcy purposes are several and varied, and these purposes
"form the ever-shifting basis upon which bankruptcy courts must
act to sort out and order a broad spectrum of interests clamoring
for protection in the bankruptcy proceeding. "232

This eclectic understanding of bankruptcy purposes coheres
with the conceptualization of secured claims that we have advanced
in this article in relation to the question of lien-stripping in chapter

7. Specifically, it provides the normative fulcrum that we use in
striking the appropriate balance between the legitimate expecta
tions of secured creditors and the fresh-start policy in consumer
bankruptcy cases. Contrary to the view held by most commentators
who subscribe to the economic account's first principle that bank
ruptcy provides nothing more than a collective mechanism for col
lecting debt, we believe that distributional issues are preeminent in
bankruptcy proceedings.233 Successful reorganization cannot be
accomplished without taking into account and accommodating the
conflicting, often antithetical, interests of all groups affected by firm
failure. Likewise, fresh start, whether conceived in purely humani
tarian terms or as a mechanism for returning the debtor to active
participation in an open-credit economy,234 cannot be attained
unless prebankruptcy rights are subject to adjustment and the
norms of prebankruptcy collection law are subject to deviation.
Therefore, reconceptualizing the rights of an undersecured creditor
in bankruptcy as a "claim," no different in its essential character
231. See generally Frost, supra note 56, at 81-91; Ponoroff, supra note 56, at 468-71 (dis
cussing just whom the bankruptcy law serves). For an attempt to justify circumscribing the
concern of the bankruptcy law to traditional creditor groups in constitutional terms, see
Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REv. 487, 559-84
(1996).
232. Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 56, at 966.
233. See generally Warren, supra note 66, at 356 (offering a nonnative justification for
distributive goals in bankruptcy).
234. Alternative nonnative justifications for the discharge are discussed supra note 224.
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than any other claim, secured or unsecured, is defensible on both
positive and normative grounds.
B.

In Application

Having a defining model or working theory for justifying a
value-based approach to security, with all of the consequential pol
icy implications that this approach holds for lien stripping, is an
essential point of departure in any reform effort. Ultimately, how
ever, the wisdom of the rule and the prospects for its adoption, will
be judged in terms of its practical effects on the lending community
and the market for consumer credit. Oddly, perhaps, given the
furor the issue has generated, we surmise that reversal of Dewsnup
would cause, at most, a proverbial blip on the screen, although that
prediction is subject to one qualification that would have to be
addressed as part of the overall fix.
Most home- or other real-property-owning chapter 7 debtors
will see their property sold either during the case235 or very soon
after the stay is lifted. In either event, restricting the secured lender
to the market value of the property at filing is not prejudicial to the
lender because, as a practical matter, there is no, and never will be
any, appreciation to be forfeited. A debtor with sufficient postpeti
tion cash flow or resources to carry the property will have chosen,
or have been forced into, a chapter 13 debt-adjustment proceed
ing,236 or, in rare circumstances, a chapter 11 case.237 Thus, the fear
of cram down in a chapter 7 case - where the debtor can retain the
235. If that occurs, the valuation quandary is eliminated. It is the predictive character of
valuation that accounts for its inherently speculative and subjective nature. See Carlson, Eely
Character, supra note 6, at 70-75 (pointing out that all valuations, as distinct from actual sales,
are exercises in "subjunctive" reasoning and, as such, are never reducible to a verifiable cer
tainty). See also Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 160, at 1062 {observing that value is a func
tion of time, but that bankruptcy ignores time in valuing claims).
236. While there is no involuntary chapter 13, this is often the practical effect of a finding
under 11 U.S.C. § 707{b) (1994) that the granting of relief to the debtor under chapter 7
would be a "substantial abuse." Both the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits have adopted the
view that the ability to fund a chapter 13 plan is per se a substantial abuse. See Fonder v.
United States, 974 F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1989);
Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913 {9th Cir. 1988). The Fourth and the Sixth
Circuits take the approach that the ability to fund a chapter 13 plan is simply one factor in
what amounts to a case-by-case facts and circumstances analysis. See Green v. Staples (In re
Green), 934 F.2d 568 (4th Cir. 1991); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989); see also
In re Higuera, 199 B.R. 196 (Bankr. W.D. Okla 1996) (holding that ability to pay, standing
alone, is insufficient to warrant dismissal under § 707(b)); In re Ontiveros, 198 B.R. 284 (C.D.
Ill. 1996) (adopting a limited form of the "totality of the circumstances" test); Heller v. Foul
ston (In re Heller), 160 B.R. 655, 658 (D. Kan. 1993) (observing that whatever approach is
taken, it is clear that the debtor's capacity for repayment is the primary factor in the
analysis).
237. Although statistically quite rare, a chapter 11 proceeding may be brought involunta
rily. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1994).
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property and modify the underlying obligation - is grossly exag
gerated and cannot, as has been argued,238 alone form a sufficient
policy justification for the outcome in Dewsnup. 239
Even were Dewsnup to be repealed tomorrow, there are realisti
cally perhaps only three scenarios in which the debtor would be
able both to proceed under chapter 7 and to retain the property,
thereby exposing the mortgagee to the risk of being deprived of the
benefit of its state-law bargain or, more properly, its claim in and to
the property forming the collateral for the loan.240 Each of these
situations is taken up in turn. They reveal that (with one exception)
even in these circumstances the "risk" to secured lenders is
minimal.
The first scenario occurs when the debtor is able to "redeem"
the property immediately after the case is closed by coming up with
the cash necessary to pay off the reduced value of the lien. This is
obviously the clearest example of the lender being deprived of post
fi.ling appreciation since the lender is divested completely of any
interest in the property.241 But, as a practical matter, how much of
a threat does this scenario really pose for professional lenders on a
day-to-day basis? We submit that the risk is de minimis. First, short
of an extraordinarily lucky day at the racetrack, relatively few debt
ors who have just gone through a chapter 7 bankruptcy case will
personally have the resources to fund the payoff. Second, it is
unrealistic to presume that such a debtor will have the cash flow to
re-qualify for new financing, particularly at or near the 100% of
value level that would probably be required.242 Third, while family
resources or similar private sources of credit are always a possibil
ity, chances are that those options, if available, would have been
exploited earlier in an effort to head off bankruptcy in the first
238. See Adler, supra note 57, at 5, discussed supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
239. See Joann Henderson, The Galia-Lowry Brief: A Quantum Leap from Strip Down
to Chapter 7 Cram Down, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 131, 167 (1991).
240. This was, of course, a key ingredient underlying the majority's decision in Dewsnup.
See supra text accompanying note 4. Because, however, the mortgage instrument is the con
summate contract of adhesion, particularly in consumer transactions, the accuracy of the
analogy is open to serious debate.

241. Presumably, however, the affected creditor still has an unsecured claim for the
undersecured portion of the debt under § 506(a), for whatever value it is worth, which there
would be no reason not to file regardless of the creditor's desire under other circumstances to
remain aloof from the proceeding entirely. See supra note 144.
242. Alternatively, in a jurisdiction with generous exemptions, made applicable in bank
ruptcy under § 522(b), the debtor might look to such assets as a source of cash or credit.
Ordinarily, however, the high-exemption property is likely to be the very property that the
debtor is seeking to save from foreclosure and that, therefore, by definition, is already
encumbered.
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place. Certainly there may be some calculating (or well-advised)
debtors who are willing to suffer the stigma of bankruptcy and
pocket their hole card to be played at a more strategically advanta
geous moment, but we strongly suspect that those instances would
be so numerically insignificant as to have virtually no effect on the
cost or the availability of consumer credit at large.243

In addition to the foregoing circumstances making it highly
unlikely that most debtors would ever be in a position to redeem, it
is also the case that the mere fact that a debtor has the capacity to
redeem does not mean that she has the legal right to do so. That
determination is governed by applicable state law and, more partic
ularly, by private contract. The terms and conditions of loan agree
ments and security instruments typically are negotiated, if at all, off
of the lender's standard documents. Therefore the lender should
have ample opportunity, within the perimeters established by appli
cable regulatory legislation, to protect itself against an undesired
redemption - for example, when the note carries a favorable rate
of return - with a modicum of advance planning.244 Finally, even
in those relatively few cases in which the debtor has both the ability
and the right to redeem, the lender has not only received the full
value of its collateral, but has been spared the costs and risks associ
ated with foreclosure. Thus, subject only to the unsubstantiated
charge that judicial valuations are consistently low, an assumption
particularly suspect when the relevant comparison is with foreclo-

243. The opportunity for exploiting a strategic advantage is far more likely in the case in
which the lien, although without any actual economic value, remains as an encumbrance
against the property. See supra note 182.
244. See Howard, supra note 24, at 391 (explaining this point in the context of a broader
explanation of why an interpretation of § 506{d) that permits strip down of liens against
realty does not violate either the spirit or purpose of § 722). Professor Howard cites O'Leary
v. Oregon (In re O'Leary), 15 B.R. 881 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987), in support of this proposition.
See Howard, supra note 24, at 391. In fact, the court in O'Leary observed that redemption,
as distinct from strip down, depended on the terms of the note and mortgage, which might
include "pre.payment penalties and other contractual obligations that would remain unal
tered by fixing defendant's allowed secured claim under § 506." 75 B.R. at 884. In fairness,
however, it should be noted that in many circumstances, such as primary home mortgage
loans, requirements and restrictions imposed by the secondary market may effectively tie the
hands of both parties when it comes to items such as prepayment penalties. Also, since its
loan is now nonrecourse, in many cases the secured creditor would have no interest in
obstructing early repayment even at the reduced amount of the lien remaining after strip
down. Thus, in many instances where the debtor had the financial capacity to do so, the
effect of the strip down would be to facilitate a de facto redemption of real property collat
eral. Since the creditor would still be receiving the full value of its state-law security interest,
however, we do not see any particular inequity in this result. Further, because the redemp·
tion would occur pursuant to the debtor's rights under state law, we do not regard it as
inconsistent with the Code's provision for redemption of personal property collateral.
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sure rather than market values,245 the potential prejudice to the
secured lender under this scenario is nominal at most.
The second scenario in which the debtor may be able to strip
down and retain the property is one that actually does not involve
or require the repeal of Dewsnup. It �volves- accomplishing in two
steps what Dewsnup now forbids doing in one by resorting to the
device that has come to be known as "chapter 20."246 In its simplest
form, a chapter 20 entails an initial filing of a chapter 7 case to
discharge personal liability on dischargeable debts, followed by the
rapid-fire filing of a chapter 13 designed to reimpose the automatic
stay and, inter alia, permit retention of desired property or modify a
nondischargeable debt.247 In Johnson v. Home State Bank,248 the
Supreme Court rejected a mortgage lender's argument that once
the debtor's personal liability had been discharged in the earlier
chapter 7 case, the mortgage lien was no longer a "claim" subject to
rescheduling in chapter 13.249 By implicitly placing its imprimatur
on chapter 20s,250 the Court created the opportunity for debtors in
Dewsnup situations to obtain all of the benefits of a prohibited strip
down by simply using the chapter 20 technique to accomplish an
installment redemption of the property at a price equal to the value
of the property rather than the amount secured by the lien.251
245. See supra note 66.
246. "Chapter 20" is the informal name that has been attached to a particular pattern of
serial filings used by individual debtors. See generally Lex A. Coleman, Individual Consumer
"Chapter 20" Cases After Johnson: An Introduction to Nonbusiness Serial Filings Under
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 357, 363-65 (1992).
247. See, e.g., Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Saylors (In re Saylors), 869 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir.
1989); Downey Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Metz (In re Metz), 820 F.2d 1495 (9th Cir. 1987);
Johnson v. Vanguard Holding Corp. (In re Johnson), 708 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).
248. 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
249. See 501 U.S. at 84-86 (holding that a surviving nonrecourse mortgagee lien is a
"claim" within the meaning of § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code).
250. Prior to Johnson some bankruptcy courts had taken the position that chapter 20s
were inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of chapter 13 and, accordingly, should be
barred as a matter of law. See, e.g., In re McKissie, 103 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
In Johnson, the Supreme Court failed to outlaw chapter 20 cases either as an abusive manipu
lation of the system or as presumptively involving bad faith for purposes of the confirmation
standard in § 1325(a)(3). Technically, however, the issue of good faith was not before the
Court. See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 88 (declining to address the good faith issue (or the issue of
"feasibility" under § 1325(a)(6)) because both the district court and the court of appeals had
decided the case on the ground that the creditor's mortgage lien did not constitute a
"claim").
251. The process would work as follows: Assume a debtor who owns real property with a
current value of $100,000 subject to a lien securing an indebtedness of $150,000 that is cur
rently in default Before foreclosure can be initiated, the debtor files chapter 7, discharging
all personal responsibility for the debt Assuming no dividend to unsecured creditors (or that
the creditor elects not to file in that capacity), the creditor emerges with an in rem claim for
$150,000 (plus accrued interest). Because of Dewsnup, the debtor would have been pre-
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Again, the risk here to lenders is minimal. To begin with, the
fact that a sophisticated or well-advised debtor can accomplish strip
down today in spite of Dewsnup means that, at best, what we have
now is unprincipled, selective regulation of mortgage strip down. It
might be argued that this makes the case for reversal of Johnson,
not Dewsnup.252 However, chapter 20 debtors are still subject to
case-by-case scrutiny of their motives under the good faith standard
in section 1325(a)(3),253 and, in point of fact, the highly individual
ized nature of the fact mosaic in these cases suggests that potential
abuses are best regulated in just this fashion rather than by attempt
ing to draw sharp, inflexible lines.254 In addition, at least by dint of
the number of reported decisions, there is no indication that this
crack in the dam has created or threatens to create a flood of filings
aimed at end-running Dewsnup. This may be due, in large measure,
to the fact that Nobleman, as a matter of chapter 13 policy and
interpretation, precludes use of chapter 20 to strip down a mortgage
against the debtor's personal residence.255 In any event, this empir
ical reality reinforces the notion that the repeal of Dewsnup poses
no practical threat of consequence to the mortgage-lending commu
nity. As nifty as it sounds, most debtors flirting \vith bankruptcy
lack the :financial capacity to pull off an effective strip down,
whether in one step or two. For those few who do have the ability
to pay off the amount of the secured claim under a confirmed chap
ter 13 plan and are not legally precluded from doing so, there are
sound reasons for permitting them to do so and no apparent justifi
cation for discriminating among them based solely on guile. Alter
natively, if those reasons are not regarded as sufficiently
eluded from avoiding the underwater portion of the lien in the chapter 7 case. At this junc
ture, the creditor would be expected to commence foreclosure proceedings. However, before
that can occur, the debtor now files a chapter 13 petition and in his plan proposes, in con
formity with § 1325(a){5), to pay to the mortgagee over the life of the plan the present value
of $100,000. Obviously, because of § 1322{b)(2) and the Nobe/man decision, the strategy will
not work where the lien is on the debtor's principal residence. See supra note 12. Barring
that circumstance, the debtor has managed to pull off in two steps what Dewsnup prohibits
accomplishing in one. In fact, because of the payout feature of the plan, the debtor is in even
a better position than would result from strip down alone, and this factor is doubtless the
most troubling aspect of the practice. For further discussion of whether installment redemp
tions, distinct from the question of lien avoidance, should be permitted, see infra notes 275-78
and accompanying text.
252. This is certainly, for example, the tack that Professor Adler would advocate.

supra text accompanying notes 59-61.

See

253. Unlike some bankruptcy courts, all of the appellate courts to speak to the good faith
issue in the context of a chapter 20 case have refused to find bad faith per se, instead leaving
the determination to a fact-specific analysis in each case. See authorities cited supra note 247.
254. See Ponoroff & Knippenberg, supra note 56, at 966-70 (advocating the advantages of
developing the contours of good faith, as it relates to filing, using the case method}.
255.

See supra note 12.
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compelling, then logically we cannot continue to indulge without
closer scrutiny the rationale that has driven Congress's preference
in recent years for chapter 13 over chapter 7.256
The third scenario in which the repeal of Dewsnup might pose a
serious practical threat to lenders is in those jurisdictions that inter
pret section 521(2) of the Code257 in permissive rather than
mandatory terms. It is this circumstance, as opposed to the chapter
20 phenomenon where good faith still operates as a control,258 that
poses the greatest risk of the debtor accomplishing an installment
redemption of the stripped-down value of the lien. Accordingly, it
is also the circumstance in which lender complaints are most legiti
mate and would have to be addressed as part and parcel of any
reform effort aimed at repealing Dewsnup.
Section

521(2) requires

an individual debtor in chapter 7 to file

a statement with the clerk indicating the debtor's intention (to
retain or surrender) with respect to property of the estate securing
a consumer obligation and then to perform in accordance with that
stated intention within forty-five days.259 This provision has created
a split in the circuits over the question of whether a debtor who is
current on the debtor's obligations to the creditor may propose sim
ply to retain the property without either redeeming it260 or
reaffirming the debt secured by the property.261 Relying on author
ity from the Sixth Circuit to the effect that the Code neither pro256. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 340
{1989) (contending, based on empirical data, that the drive to push debtors into chapter 13
has distorted the law in certain critical respects).
257. Congress added § 521(2) to the Bankruptcy Code as part of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. It pro
vides, in substance, that if an individual debtor's debts include consumer debts secured by
estate property, then the debtor, before the earlier of the first meeting of creditors or 30 days
following filing of the petition, within a specific time frame, must state his intention with
respect to retention or surrender of such property and, if the property is claimed as exempt,
whether the debtor intends to redeem the property to reaffirm the debt secured by the
property.
258. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
259. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(2){A), (B) {1994). However, subparagraph (C) states that
"nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B)
shall alter the debtor's or the trustee's rights with
regard to such property under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 521{2)(C) {1994).
• • .

260. See 11 U.S.C § 722 (1994) (providing individual debtors with the right to redeem
personal property intended primarily for the debtor's personal, family, or household use
from a lien encumbering such property by paying to the secured creditor the value of its
secured claim (under § 506(a)), provided that there is no value in the property for the estate).
In effect, the debtor is given a right, not available under state law, to cash out the lien by
paying the value of the collateral rather than the amount of the debt. Section 722, of course,
does not apply to real property.
261. Reaffirmation entails a voluntary agreement between the debtor and a creditor
under which the debtor's personal liability on an otherwise dischargeable debt is renegoti
ated and reaffirmed or simply reaffirmed. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 {1994).
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vides for nor permits installment redemptions,262 the Seventh
Circuit,263 later joined by the Eleventh,264 held that section 521(2) is
mandatory in the sense that a debtor who neither redeems nor
reaffirms must surrender the property to the secured creditor.26s
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit has joined in the view that a debtor
may not retain collateral securing a consumer obligation without
either redeeming the property or reaffirming the debt.266 The
Fourth Circuit,261 by contrast, relying on authority from the Tenth
Circuit,268 has ruled that a debtor who is not in default, and who
gives proper notice of the debtor's intention to retain the property
and continue paying the debt, without formally reaffirming or
redeeming, has fully complied with section 521(2).269
262. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1056-58
(6th Cir. 1983). Note that Bell was decided before the enactment of § 521(2).

See In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990).
See Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993).
265. See Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1514-16 (noting that the plain language of the section pennits
only three options: retain and reaffirm, retain and redeem, or surrender); see also First Natl.
263.

264.

Bank v. Parlato, Civil No. 3:95cv2056 (AVC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16066 (D. Conn. Sept.
24, 1996) (refusing to permit a chapter 7 debtor, even though current on his automobile
installment loan payments and in compliance with other loan terms, from retaining the auto
mobile after discharge without either redeeming or reaffirming); In re Gregg, 199 B.R. 404,
407-09 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) (providing that the secured creditor has standing to enforce
the debtor's obligation to perform in accordance with their stated intention under § 521(2)
when the debtors fail to perform).
266. See Johnson v. Sun Fm. Co. (In re Johnson), 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam). But see In re Castillo, 209 B.R. 59, 75 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (questioning the
scope of the holding in Sun Fin.).
267. See Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Belanger (In re Belanger), 962 F.2d 345
(4th Cir. 1992).
268.

See Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989).

269. See Belanger, 962 F.2d at 346. Belanger suggests that courts that have adopted the
mandatory view have failed to give proper weight to § 521(2)(C), which provides that subsec
tions (A) and (B) are not meant to alter the rights of debtors in regard to the property, and
to the legislative history, which reveals that Congress rejected a proposal that would have
provided for lifting of the automatic stay if the debtor retained the property and failed to
timely redeem or reaffirm. See also Mayton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Mayton), 208
B.R. 61 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1997); Capital Communications Fed. Credit Union v. Boodrow, 197
B.R. 409, 411-12 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (affirming the bankruptcy court's detennination that the
plain language of the statute supports the position taken in Belanger); Sears Roebuck & Co.
v. Lamirande, 199 B.R. 221, 224 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding that the options stated under
§ 521(2) are not exclusive); cf. In re Irvine, 192 B.R. 920, 922 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding
that the creditor is entitled to have stay lifted if the debtor fails to comply with § 521(2)). If
the debtor is not in default on the underlying obligation with respect to which he has failed to
state his intention, vacation of the stay would not create any immediate remedies for the
creditor. See In re Weir, 173 B.R. 682, 692 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1994). The court in Weir
declined to comment on the enforceability of an ipso facto in the underlying note and secur
ity instrument under these circumstances since the issue was not presented on the facts of the
case. See 173 B.R. at 692 n.24. However, the court did affirmatively reject the creditor's
suggestion that other remedies might include denial of discharge or contempt. See 173 B.R.
at 690-91; see also Beneficial N.Y., Inc. v. Bushey (In re Bushey), 204 B.R. 661 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding only that a debtor not current on a secured obligation has a
mandatory obligation to do something in respect of the debt). For a good discussion of the
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The rule in the Fourth and the Tenth Circuits, in addition to its
consistency with the language of the statute and generally accepted
principles of statutory construction,210 seems truer to the general
goal of the Code and the spirit of fresh start that animates the
Code's consumer bankruptcy provisions.211 For example, a
mandatory interpretation of section 521(2) leads inevitably to the
conclusion that a debtor cannot reaffirm. just one of several debts
secured by the same property even though the junior liens are
wholly or partially under water.272 On the other hand, were
Dewsnup to be overruled, a permissive interpretation of section
521(2) arguably threatens to affect the terms of the secured loan in
a manner that is not only inconsistent with the theory of the rights
of secured creditors in bankruptcy that we have advanced in this
work, but that may pose constitutional infirmities as we11.213
split in the interpretation of § 521(2) and the implications that follow from the various posi
tions that have been staked out, see David Gray Carlson, Redemption and Reinstatement in
Chapter 7 Cases, 4 ABI INST. L. REv. 289, 319-22 (1996).
270. See Mayton, 208 B.R. at 66 ("Amazingly, courts restricting the debtor to redemption
or reaffirmation refer not at all to subparagraph (C) [of § 521(2)]." (internal quotation marks
omitted} (quoting In re Ogando, 203 B.R. 14, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996))); Belanger, 962 F.2d
at 347-48 (pointing out that to give full effect to the words of the statute, "if applicable" as
used in § 521(2)(A) must apply to redemption or reaffirmation).
271. See, e.g., Capital Communications, 197 B.R. at 412 (contending that allowing debtors
this "fourth option" fairly balances the "rights of secured creditors vis-a-vis debtors"); First
N. Am. Natl. Bank v. Doss (In re Doss}, 203 B.R. 57 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1996) (finding that
§ 521(2) essentially serves a notice requirement, and that the election to redeem or reaffirm
is therefore not mandatory); cf. Ogando, 203 B.R. at 15-16 (finding that § 521(2} imposes a
mandatory requirement that the debtor file a statement of his intention either to retain or
surrender the collateral, but does not otherwise infringe on the debtor's rights with respect to
the debt or the collateral). For a particularly well-reasoned analysis of the issue based on the
applicable legislative history, see Castillo, 209 B.R. 59.
272. See In re Greer, 189 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995}. In this case, the creditor was
owed three debts, all secured, pursuant to a cross-collateralization clause, by the debtor's car.
The value of the car was less than the amount of the senior claim (the original automobile
loan). Thus, the debtor proposed to reaffirm that debt only, and the creditor objected. Cit
ing Taylor, the court held that all three debts had to be reaffirmed if the debtor wanted to
keep the car. See 189 B.R. at 221. Because, as even the court noted, the creditor's objection
made no economic sense given that the creditor was better off with a partial reaffirmation
than either a redemption or surrender of the car (which had a value less than the first lien), it
is obvious that the objection was intended to extract an even greater repayment from the
debtor by exploiting the advantage resulting from the debtor's simultaneous desire to keep
her car and inability to fund a cash-out redemption. This is precisely the reason why the
permissive approach to § 521(2) facilitates fresh start, and not "head start," the latter repre
senting a catchphrase frequently employed by th� courts inclined toward constraining the
debtor's options in an effort to justify their position. See, e.g., Taylor v. AGE Fed. Credit
Union (In re Taylor), 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1993).
273. It will be recalled that the real problem the Supreme Court had with the legislation
before it in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), was that the
original provisions of the Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934 permitted not only reduction of the
indebtedness to the value of the property, but payment of such value in the form of deferred
payments. See 295 U.S. at 591-93. The Act also had retroactivity problems, much like the
problem with § 522(t)(2) when applied to pre-Code security interests. See United States v.
Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982). Because of the fact that the payout in these cir-
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In some instances, it is fair to assume that a debtor who pro
poses to continue payments as originally scheduled in order to
retain the property subject to the lien does so to protect an exempt
equity position that the debtor has built up in the property. That is
to say, purely from a financial standpoint, the creditor will be over
secured, and the excess value is exempt from administration. There
is little reason for a debtor to employ this strategy when the amount
of the debt is greater than the· value of the collateral, particularly
when redemption under section 722 is an option. If, however, the
debtor is first able to use section 506(d) to reduce the undersecured
loan to the value of the collateral, there is much more incentive to
retain the property because of either its sentimental value or the
cost and inconvenience of replacing it.274 In essence, the stripped
down creditor is forced into the position of having made a nonre
course loan without an equity cushion, so that the debtor enjoys the
benefit of any appreciation in the property while the creditor bears
the entire risk of a decline in value.
While defining a secured creditor's interest with reference to the
value of the collateral at filing does no violence to the preban
kruptcy bargain of the parties,275 it is another kettle of fish entirely
to defer payment of that value and to put at risk the creditor's abil
ity to recover its claim from the property.276 Therefore, in the intercumstances would presumably include compensation for the deferral based on the contract
rate of interest, it is not clear that the issues entailed in the combination of strip down, dis
charge, and extension would rise to the level of constitutional infirmity. See Lindsey v. Fed
eral Land Bank (In re Lindsey), 823 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1987) (a pre-Dewsnup case involving a
debtor's effort to amortize payments on a stripped-down lien over time). There are, how
ever, other reasons short of constitutional requirements not to put the stripped-down mortga
gee in this position with respect to its secured claim, including the fact that it is inconsistent
with the conceptualization of a security interest in bankruptcy advanced in this work. See
also infra note 276.
274. Given the rationale that a debtor who is not in default might simply continue making
regular payments, the total amount of each payment would presumably have to stay at the
same amount designated in the original note - that is, the amount necessary to amortize the
original principal balance and accrued interest over the life of the note. Obviously, however,
because of the reduction in principal, the allocation of each payment to principal and interest
would change and the obligation would pay out sooner than the maturity date contemplated
in the note. Conceivably, if no value were assigned to the increased risk imposed on the
mortgagee, the lender might be better off with a fair valuation and imposition of this arrange
ment than it would be with its ordinary state-law remedy of seizure and immediate
foreclosure.
275.

See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.

276. Because the indebtedness would be equal to exactly the value of the property and

essentially be nonrecourse on account of the discharge, in the event of a subsequent decrease
in value an economically rationale debtor simply would cease paying the note and leave the
creditor with its rights against the property. Moreover, the same circumstances might create
a disincentive for the debtor adequately to maintain or insure the property until market
appreciation operated to give the debtor something to protect. Some of these concerns easily
could be ameliorated with proper covenants in the loan documentation and broad definition
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ests of consistency and evenhandedness,277 it seems that any
proposal calling for the repeal of Dewsnup must also address this
issue. Logically, the issue can be resolved by explicitly malting reaf
firmation of the stripped portion of the debt mandatory where the
debtor proposes to retain and to continue to make regular pay
ments.278 This approach would protect the secured creditor from
effectively having its lien stripped down twice, in contravention of
the spirit of section 72'1(a)(8), in circumstances in which the debtor
late-decides to cease making payments following a decline in the
value of the property. In addition, it would have the further inci
dental advantage of clarifying that, in any other situations, the
debtor is not required by section 521(2) to choose redemption, reaf
firmation, or surrender of the property to the exclusion of other
non-Code alternatives.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Dewsnup transgresses most of
the traditional principles of statutory construction. Indeed, given
the approach the Court has taken to other bankruptcy issues,279 its
existence may be explicable only as a kind of involuntary judicial
reaction to the perceived opportunity that section 506(a) creates to
"arbitrage between the bankruptcy court's low valuation and the
higher price a buyer pays at a later sale."28° In any event, justifica
tions for Justice Blackmun's tortured reading of section 506(d)
of the events of default to include the breach of such covenants. Further, in many instances,
the debtor might have a noneconomic-based attachment to and interest in the property. See
supra note 182. This fact, coupled with the unlikelihood that the debtor could obtain the
financing to secure replacement property, provides some assurance to the lender of the
debtor's incentive to stay current on payments and maintain the property so that the lender
eventually will receive the full value of its secured claim. Nevertheless, in a liquidation pro
ceeding in which the creditors are to be denied any participation in the debtor's future, they
should not be required to endure both the avoidance of their undersecured claim and defer
ral in the payment of their secured claim.
277. Ironically, the bargain metaphor could lead to just the opposite conclusion. If, how
ever, as we have advanced, it is appropriate to imagine the security interest as simply a prior
ity "claim," rather than as a continuing property interest, it is appropriate to pay that claim at
the same time it is adjusted to value and not to subject the creditor to an even less favorable
result in the future.
278. We have far less sympathy for the proposal in circumstances in which the creditor
effectively requires the continuance of regular payments by exercising its state-law contract
rights to block any attempt to cash out the property. See supra note 82 and accompanying
text.
279. See supra note 11.
280. Carlson, Undersecured Claims, supra note 6, at 254 (referring to the practice
whereby the trustee is able to obtain a low judicial valuation and then sell the property at a
high price, effectively extracting a subsidy for general creditors at the expense of the secured
creditor). Exactly how serious a threat to secured creditors this practice represents is an
open question. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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couched in terms of bargain metaphors and nondefeasible property
rights are noble sounding, but ultimately empty, rhetorical ruses. In
fact, as we have seen, the most articulate defense of Dewsnup has
forthrightly acknowledged that the real issue is distrust over judicial
valuations that are too conservative.281 There are no sovereign or
inalienable principles at stake. Instead, the issue boils down to a
political exercise of balancing fresh-start policy against the compet
ing commercial policies served by maintaining a stable environment
for asset-based financing.
Collateral valuations are mere predictions and, as such, are
inherently uncertain.282 Moreover, while it is unclear to us that this
uncertainty necessarily produces low valuations - particularly
since judicial valuations typically do not factor selling and delay
costs into the analysis283 - even conceding the point does not
diminish the case for overruling Dewsnup. We make this assertion
based on our observation that the fresh-start objectives of the con
sumer bankruptcy system are attained by recognizing that the filing
of the petition changes fundamentally the nature of the debtor's
relationships with his creditors, both secured and unsecured. An
essential aspect of this closure of the debtor's prepetition life is
achieved by liquidating secured creditors' claims in relation to the
then-extant value of their collateral. The filing of the petition
serves to construct a nearly impenetrable barrier separating the
debtor's pre- and postpetition lives. A property-based heuristic for
understanding security provides a convenient method for structur
ing the discussion about the rights and entitlements of secured par
ties in a nonbankruptcy context. It loses its viability, however, as
soon as the bankruptcy curtain is drawn. The very act of filing
extinguishes the secured creditor's default rights against the debtor
and repossessory rights in and to the property. This is no less true
for secured claims than it is for any other kinds of claims against the
debtor or assets of the estate. This judgment is not only intuitive; it
also finds support in a number of other Code provisions, ranging
from the new statutory definition of "impairment"284 to the nega
tive implications drawn from �e explicit provision in chapter 11 of
a mechanism for secured creditors to hedge against low valuations

281. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
282. See supra note 66.
283. See supra note 65.
284.

See supra note 15.
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or a temporarily depressed market.285 It also coheres with the reha
bilitative goals of the consumer bankruptcy system no less than it
does with the rehabilitative objectives of the various chapter
proceedings.
Despite its interference with the Code's fresh-start policy,

Dewsnup has proved tenacious. In large measure, we believe that it
has been difficult to eradicate because it hangs on a false concep
tion of bankruptcy and, in particular, an appealing but ultimately
inaccurate conception of the nature of security in bankruptcy.
However, once the misconception is understood, we can :finally snip
the slender vine from which the rule in Dewsnup hangs. At bottom,
unlike the leaf that sustained Johnsy in her time of need, we really
could have done quite nicely without it all along.

285. Section llll(b) permits a secured creditor to elect to have its entire debt treated as
secured rather than bifurcated under § 506(a). This provision was, in large measure, a con
gressional reaction to a case under chapter XII of the Act in which the court held that a
secured creditor that had disapproved of the debtor's plan of arrangement could be cashed
out on a nonrecourse debt for the appraised value of its collateral in lieu of return of the
property. See In re Pine Gate Assocs., 2 Banlcr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1976); see also Carlson, Unsecured Claims, supra note 6, at 255 (discussing the origins of
§ llll(b)). However, as earlier noted, in terms of the economic value of the payment
received by the electing creditor under chapter 11, the debtor-in-possession usually can
achieve the same result as if the creditor had not elected by extending the payout period.
This is a function of the fact that § llll(b) only requires that the sum of the payments aggre
gate to the amount of the secured claim, not that they have a present value of such amount as
of the date of confirmation. Despite this, § llll(b) still affords some protection in the event
the debtor fails to make the payments called for by the plan or if the value of the property is
temporarily depressed. See supra note 24. Nevertheless, the absence of any sort of similar
provision in chapter 7 is some indication that the drafters did not intend to preclude strip
down under § 506(d) in individual liquidation cases.

